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SUMMARY OF THESIS 
In this thesis an inquiry is made into the contributions that cultural ecofeminism, 
critical-transformative ecofeminism and cyber-(eco)feminism make towards the 
articulation of an ecological feminist notion of the self that can generate or promote 
an ethical relation with nature from a position beyond dualism and essentialism. 
In the first chapter, titled Cultural ecofeminism, different aspects of patriarchal 
Western culture are identified that are responsible for the twin dominations of 
women and nature. In the light of their critique of patriarchal culture and the 
alienated masculinist self that lies central to it, cultural ecofeminists endorse two 
alternative notions of the self, namely a female self and a feminine self. In both 
cases the notion of relationality between self and nature is stressed, and alternative 
"feminine" values such as care and nurturing are put forward as providing us with 
alternative ecological values. The contribution that this position makes towards the 
articulation of an ecological feminist self lies in its emphasis on a notion of 
relationality between self and nature, so as to establish an ethical relation between 
self and nature. From both a feminist and an ecological perspective however, this 
position is flawed given its inability to (adequately) overcome the problems of 
dualism and essentialism. 
In the second chapter, titled Critical-transformative ecofeminism, the dualist 
conceptual framework of the rationalist philosophical tradition is identified as 
grounding the domination of women, nature and others. By employing the notions 
of continuity and difference, a strategy is proposed to move beyond dualism and by 
implication, essentialism. In this chapter, the notion of a pluralist feminine self is 
proposed and in the context of a critical-transformative ethics, the notion of the 
mutual self is endorsed that allows for continuity and difference between different 
selves and self and nature. The ecological values that are endorsed by this position 
include respect, care, and trust, therefore coinciding, but also diverging from 
cultural ecofeminism. Critical-transformative ecofeminism's contribution towards the 
articulation of an ecofeminist self beyond dualism and essentialism, lies in its 
successful movement beyond dualism, especially with regard to the notion of the 
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mutual self as a feminist notion of an ecological self. The shortcoming of this 
position is however that the pluralist feminine self which is proposed as an 
ecological notion of a feminist self, is unsuccessful in its attempt to address the 
problem of universalising female gender identity. 
In the third chapter, titled Cyber-(eco)feminism, the notions of the cyborg, the 
situated self and the lnappropriate/d Other are discussed as alternative feminist 
subjectivities. In the discussion of a politics of articulation, an environmental politics 
that emphasises the social and artifactual dimensions of nature, is articulated. 
Through the figuration of nature as Coyote Trickster, an ecological dimension to 
these selves comes to the fore and together these notions are positively received 
from an ecological and feminist perspective as adequately overcoming the problems 
of dualism and essentialism. From an ecological perspective, it is however argued 
that the technophilic character of the cyborg is problematic and doubt is cast on its 
ability to forge significant ethical relations. The politics of articulation proposed by 
cyber-(eco)feminism is commended for its inclusivity, but in the final analysis, it is 
argued that to establish an ethical relation with nature, care must be taken not to 
overlook nature's difference, that is, that nature is an independent entity with needs 
and ends of its own. 
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OPSOMMING VAN TESIS 
Hierdie tesis behels 'n ondersoek na die bydraes van kulturele ekofeminisme, krities-
transformatiewe ekofeminisme en cyber-(eko)feminisme tot die artikulering van 'n 
ekologies-feministiese self wat 'n etiese verhouding met die natuur kan voortbring 
vanuit 'n posisie wat die probleme van dualisme en essensialisme oorskry. 
In die eerste hoofstuk getiteld Cultural ecofeminism, word verskillende aspekte van 
patriargale Westerse kultuur ge"identifiseer as onderliggend aan die dominasie van 
be ide vroue en die natuur. In die lig van hul kritiek op patriargale kultuur en die 
vervreemding van die "masculinist self" wat sentraal staan daarin, onderskryf 
kulturele feministe twee alternatiewe konsepsies van die self, naamlik 'n "female 
self' en 'n "feminine self'. In beide gevalle word die konsep van relasionaliteit 
tussen self an natuur beklemtoon, en alternatiewe "vroulike" waardes soos sorg en 
koestering word voorgestel as ekologiese waardes. Die bydrae wat hierdie posisie 
lewer tot die konsepsualisering van 'n ekologies-feministiese self, le in die 
beklemtoning van 'n konsep van relasionaliteit ten einde 'n etiese verhouding tussen 
self en natuur tot stand te bring. Hierdie posisie skiet egter te kort vanuit beide 'n 
ekologiese en feministiese perspektief aangesien dit nie in staat is om die probleme 
van dualisme en essensialisme (toereikend) te oorkom nie. 
In die tweede hoofstuk getiteld Critical-transformative ecofeminism, word die 
dualistiese konseptuele raamwerk van die rasionalistiese filosofiese tradisie 
ge"identifiseer as onderliggend aan die dominasie van vroue, die natuur en andere. 
Met behulp van die konsepte "continuity" en "difference" word 'n strategie 
voorgestel waarvolgens dualisme, en by implikasie essensialisme, oorskry kan word. 
In hierdie hoofstuk word 'n konsep van 'n "pluralist feminine self' voorgestel en 'n 
konsep van die "mutual self' word in die konteks van krities-transformatiewe 
ekofeministiese etiek voorgestel, wat ruimte laat vir beide kontunu"iteit en verskille 
tussen selwe en tussen self en natuur. Die ekologiese waardes wat deur hierdie 
posisie onderskryf word, sluit respek, sorg en vertroue in. Dit sluit dus aan, maar 
verskil ook van kulturele ekofeminisme. Die bydrae van krities-transformatiewe 
ekofeminisme tot die artikulering van 'n ekologies-feministiese self wat dualisme en 
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essensialisme oorskry, le in die suksesvolle oorskryding van dualisme. Dit is 
spesifiek die geval met die konsep van die "mutual self' as feministiese konsep van 
'n ekologiese self. Die tekortkoming van hierdie posisie is egter dat die "pluralist 
feminine self' wat as 'n ekologiese konsep van 'n feministiese self voorgestel word, 
onsuksesvol is as 'n paging om die probleem van universalisme ten opsigte van 
vroulike identiteit aan te spreek. 
In die derde hoofstuk getiteld Cyber-(eco)feminism, word die konsepte van die 
cyborg, die "situated self', en die "lnappropriate/d Other" bespreek as alternatiewe 
feministiese subjektiwiteite. In die bespreking van 'n "politics of articulation", word 
'n omgewingspolitiek geartikuleer wat die sosiale en artefaktiese dimensies van die 
natuur beklemtoon. Deur middel van die figurering van die natuur as "Coyote 
Trickster", kom 'n ekologiese dimensie tot die verskillende konsepte van die self na 
vore. Gepaardgaande met die konsep van die natuur as "Coyote Trickster", word 
hierdie konsepte positief evalueer weens hul oorskryding van die probleme van 
dualisme en essensialisme. Vanuit 'n ekologiese perspektief word daar egter 
geargumenteer dat die tegnofiliese karakter van die cyborg problematies is, en dit 
word betwyfel of die cyborg in staat is om betekenisvolle etiese verhoudings aan te 
gaan. Die "politics of articulation" wat voorgestel word deur cyber-(eko)feminisme, 
word as prysenswaardig geag weens die inklusiewe karakter daarvan. In die finale 
analise word daar egter geargumenteer dat ten einde 'n etiese verhouding met die 
natuur tot stand te bring spesiale voorsorg getref moet word om die anders-heid van 
die natuur in ag te neem. Dit is dat die natuur 'n onafhanklike entiteit is met 
doelwitte en behoeftes van haar eie. 
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Introduction 
Background and research question 
It has become increasingly evident that industrial progress, whilst having 
liberated humans from many constraints, also has its downside, culminating in 
what is today commonly referred to as the environmental crisis. The 
environmental crisis is created by the cumulative negative effects of 
industrialisation. These include global warming, the unsustainable utilisation of 
renewable resources, the rapid depletion of non-renewable resources, the loss of 
biodiversity and the possibility of a nuclear winter. To the extent that modern 
industrial societies seem incapable of controlling the negative effects of 
industrialisation, they have become structural features of industrial development 
that pose serious threats to the integrity and stability of ecosystems. 
Environmental degradation also threatens the health, wellbeing and autonomy of 
current and future generations 1 • The health risks associated with ecologically 
unsound practices and modern forms of agriculture have been put firmly on the 
Western public agenda by (mostly women) consumer activists. In the context of 
developing countries writers such as Vandana Shiva (1989) have shown that 
poor communities and countries usually bear a disproportionate level of the costs 
of environmental destruction without having an equal share in the benefits. It is 
often women who are responsible for sustaining their families by performing 
duties such as gathering firewood, fetching water, and growing edible and non-
' 
edible plants. It is therefore they who are most severely affected by the 
' destruction of local environments in developing countries and who are most 
heavily involved in grassroots activism as exemplified by the Chipko movement. 2 
Furthermore, the unsustainable use of resources compromises the ability of 
future generations to meet their basic needs. These considerations render the 
environmental crisis also a social crisis. 
1 See Norton's (1991: 62, 213) distinction between three generations of environmental 
problems, and also Eckersley's (1992: 7-31) taxonomy of environmental problems. 
2 The Chipko (tree-hugging) protest movement was started by Indian women to protect fragile 
forests against commercial exploitation. This movement exemplifies Third World resistance 
to misdirected international development aid and resistance to foreign commercial 
exploitation of local resources. The movement is well documented in Braidotti et a/ (1994), 
Shiva (1989), Seager (1993), Sturgeon (1997). 
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Given the interconnectedness of the environmental crisis with socio-economic 
issues, pressing questions are thrust upon us regarding how to go about 
addressing or resolving this crisis. One approach that is followed is to reform 
political, economic and social institutions and structures. Without 
underestimating the significance of this reformist approach, it must be pointed 
out that it is insufficient, as it tends to treat the symptoms rather than the 
causes of the environmental crisis. The strategies that are followed to address or 
resolve environmental problems remain trapped in the framework that is 
responsible for environmental destruction and degradation in the first place. 3 This 
is where philosophical reflection may be of particular significance, as the task of 
philosophers is to analyse and reveal the deeper structures that ground the 
environmental problems we are confronted with. That is, philosophers can help 
us to fully come to terms with our particularly Western ways of thinking and 
being that inform and sanction the instrumentalisation of the natural environment 
purely as a resource for humans. 
One of the insights of a philosophical reflection upon the instrumental treatment 
of nature by humans, is that the way in which we understand our selves 
significantly influences our treatment of those entities that are perceived as lying 
beyond the boundaries of the human self (Naess, 1985a, 1985b, 1989; Fox, 
1990; Eckersley, 1992: 69; Plumwood, 1993; Cuomo, 1998; Matthews, 1991 ). 
For some radical ecologists, one of the primary reasons for the destruction and 
degradation of the natural environment is anthropocentrism (Plum wood, 1 991, 
1993, 1997; Naess, 1989; Fox 1990, 1993; Warren, 1990; Cuomo, 1998).4 
Broadly speaking, anthropocentrism entails for them the view that humans are 
superior beings and that their needs take precedence over and above all others. 
The value that humans are said to embody exceeds the value of nature by far, 
which warrants the treatment of nature as an instrument in the fulfillment to the 
needs and desires of man. This points towards another dimen'sion of 
3 See Naess (1985a, 1985b) for a discussion of deep ecology as opposed to "shallow" 
reformist ecology. 
4 Radical ecology consists of three streams, namely deep ecology, ecofeminism and social 
ecology. Ecofeminism and deep ecology shares an ecocentric (non-anthropocentric) 
approach in terms of which nature is accorded inherent value as opposed to having value 
only for humans. Such an ecocentric approach is, however, not shared by social ecology 
(Murray Bookchin: 1989, 1991), which is why social ecology is not included in this discussion. 
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anthropocentrism and that is that humans consistently form the point of 
reference in terms of which value is accorded to nature. 5 
Ecological thinkers argue that anthropocentrism is grounded in an understanding 
human self that is radically isolated from its physical environment. Radically 
separate from nature, the human self is regarded as superior due to exhibiting 
certain valued features such as rationality, which creates a hierarchical relation 
between humans and nature. Coupled with an overvaluation of rationality as 
distinctive quality of the human, radical separation and hierarchy work together 
to sanction the instrumental treatment of nature. A direct link is therefore 
discerned between anthropocentrism and the dominant notion of the self in 
Western culture that is conceived of in atomistic, rationalist and hierarchical 
terms. As such, at least within the context of ecological thinking, reconceiving 
the self as an ecological self takes on pressing urgency. 
In an attempt to address the problems of anthropocentrism, deep ecology takes 
up the challenge of reconceptualising the dominant notion of the self in Western 
culture. 6 Deep ecology presents us with a notion of the Self that emphasises a 
relation of identification with nature (Naess, 1985a, 1985b, 1989). That is, the 
Self is expanded to include nature so that the interests of nature are also the 
interests of my Self. By emphasising human connectedness with nature, this 
deep ecological self (as an ecological Self) shows an unambiguous departure 
from anthropocentrism. The interests of humans are decentered so as to include 
also the interests of nature. As such, this notion of the ecological Self is put 
forward as generating and providing a basis for ethical conduct towards the 
natural environment. 
Ecological feminism 7 has a different approach to addressing anthropocentrism. 
The point of departure of ecofeminism is that, given the various connections that 
exist or are said to exist between women and nature, the domination and 
5 See Eckersley (1992: 35-45) for a discussion of the strong and weak forms of 
anthropocentrism. 
6 The founder of deep ecology is the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess. See also the work 
of Fox (1990) and Matthews (1991) who are prominent proponents of deep ecology. 
7The terms "ecological feminism" and "ecofeminism" are used interchangeably as denoting 
roughly the same meaning, although the term "ecological feminism" imparts a particularly 
philosophical character, a quality expressly absent in some strands in ecofeminist thinking. 
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subordination of women and nature are inextricably linked. 8 As such, 
ecofeminism plays a unifying role in that it brings together ecological thinking 
with feminist thinking (Warren, 1987).9 In an appeal to ecological thinkers, 
ecofeminists assert that the domination and subordination of nature and the 
domination and subordination of women are interconnected and that the one 
cannot be addressed in isolation from the other. For this reason feminists in 
particular have a special interest in ending the domination not only of women, 
but also that of nature (King, 1989). The significance of ecological feminism 
therefore lies in its articulation of the intersection of the interests of women and 
nature and finding ways to address these against a broader background of 
ecological and feminist concerns (Cuomo, 1998). 
Highlighting the connections between the domination of women and nature, and 
in response to the notion of the ecological Self proposed by deep ecology, 10 
ecofeminists advance the argument that the articulation of a notion of an 
ecological self cannot be conducted in a vacuum. That is, to adequately address 
the pervasiveness of anthropocentrism, a thorough analysis of the dominant 
notion of the self is called for. Ecofeminists argue that the conceptualisation of a 
notion of the ecological self is incomplete if the manner in which the self has 
been articulated in opposition and as superior not only to nature, but also to 
women and the feminine, is not taken into account as well. Taking heed of these 
additional exclusions (i.e. women and the feminine) not only throws light on the 
problem of anthropocentrism, but also on what is required to formulate a notion 
of the ecological self that does not display the same characteristics that have 
historically functioned to the detriment not only of women, but also of nature 
8 For an in-depth discussion of the various connections that are identified between women 
and nature, see Warren (1993). 
9This statement needs to be qualified however. Despite the "unificatory" role that 
ecofeminism plays, ecofeminism is neither a unifying nor unified body of thought aiming to 
replace either feminist or ecological thinking as separate disciplines. Whilst being a separate 
body of thought overlapping both with feminist and ecological thinking, by pointing out that 
and how ecology and feminism meet, it also has the goal of challenging feminist and 
ecological thinkers to scrutinise their own theories in order to strengthen and improve them 
(Warren, 1987; Plumwood, 1994). A commitment to diversity can also be detected within 
ecofeminist thinking itself. Carlassare (1994) has convincingly argued in favour of retaining 
the diverse character of ecofeminism in the face of pressure to conform to "academic 
standards" of writing. 
1° For an implicit or explicit critique of the deep ecological Self, see Salleh (1984), Plumwood 
(1991, 1993), Kheel (1990), and Cuomo (1998). 
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{Piumwood, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1993; Warren, 1987, 1990; Kheel, 1985, 
1990; Cuomo, 1998). 
As I have explained above, and as will be made evident during the course of this 
thesis, the environmental crisis that we are currently faced with calls for a 
thorough reconceptualisation of the self, of self-realisation, and the self's 
relation with others. In the section below and the chapters that follow, I will 
demonstrate how a direct link can be established between our environmental 
crisis and a notion of the self conceived of in dualist and essentialist terms. 11 
Dualism and its correlate, essentialism, have structured the relation between 
humans and nature so as to sanction the domination and subjugation of both 
women and nature. 
Dualism and essentialism form the backbone of Western philosophical thought, 
and represent two central themes that are grappled with in contemporary 
ecological and feminist thinking. The philosophical writings of the great "masters 
of suspicion", Marx, Nietzsche and Freud called into question the central tenets 
of Western tradition of philosophical thinking. This initiated the start of an 
irrevocable change in philosophy as a discipline, which has culminated in what 
some have come to refer to as the "crisis of philosophy" {Braidotti, 1991, 
1994b: 149). Broadly speaking, this crisis points towards the deconstruction of 
the cornerstone of philosophical thinking, namely rationality and its close ally, 
truth. Pivotal to this project lies a scathing critique of essentialism and dualism, 
the repressive and exclusionary characteristics of which are revealed as not only 
undesirable, but indubitably untenable. 
Dualism refers to a way of thinking that is characterised by the division of reality 
into hierarchical dualist pairs. The categories male and female in a dualist pair 
11 Here it may be asked how, if we can trace the environmental crisis to dualism and 
essentialism, do we explain environmental destruction and degradation of the natural 
environment in non-Western cultures known for a philosophical orientation that is specifically 
non-dualist. In this regard it is useful to keep in mind that despite the apparent endorsement 
of a non-dualist philosophy, in practice, behaviour and actions are very much in line with a 
dualist conceptual framework. In the case of the Asian Tigers, in particular Indonesia, the 
reasons for this shift in orientation can be ascribed to globalisation and rapid industrialisation 
according to Western models of economic development. Subsequently it may be asked if 
any culture exists today that is untouched by Western modes of thinking and production and 
consumption. 
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are perceived as fixed and ahistorical, which explains why dualism necessarily 
implies essentialism. The relation of sharp differentiation that characterises a 
dualist pair reinforces the assumed superiority of the one as opposed to the 
other. The poststructuralist deconstruction of dualist thinking has revealed that 
the Self is in fact directly implicated by the Other in order to sustain its integrity 
(Foucault: 1970: 326-340). In this way the artificiality of the relation of radical 
separation between Self and Other is exposed. This is not to imply that 
differences between Self and Other are abolished however, rather, departing-
from the culture of sameness that dualism commands, it is asserted that there 
are always only differences (Derrida, 1981: 26). 12 
From an ecological perspective dualism is denounced for sanctioning the 
destruction and degradation of the natural environment. It is argued that 
anthropocentrism is grounded in dualism in terms of which humans are sharply 
differentiated from the natural environment (Warren, 1987, 1994; Plumwood, 
1986, 1988, 1991, 1992, 1993). Coupled with the perception that humans are 
superior beings, the disconnection between the human and natural spheres serve 
to condone the instrumentalisation (read: exploitation) of nature. Unlike the 
poststructuralist emphasis on differences, environmental thinkers hold the view 
that some sort of significant connection between humans and nature should be 
established as part of addressing the environmental crisis and other forms of 
domination (Fox, 1990; Naess, 1985a, 1985b, 1989; Matthews, 1991; 
Plumwood, 1989, 1991, 1993; Cuomo, 1998). 
From a feminist perspective, essentialism often denotes biologism, in terms of 
which women's identity and difference are perceived as biologically based and 
therefore ahistorical and fixed. In this scheme of things, naturalistic arguments 
are presented that identify women with nature, an identification that has 
historically served and been employed to oppress and subordinate women. This 
initiated a shift within feminism to a constructivist position according to which, 
to cite Simone De Beauvoir (1964), "women are not born, but made", which 
12 See (Oger, 1995; Norris, 1987; Culler, 1983) for in-depth discussions of Jacques Derrida's 
deconstructive philosophical thinking. 
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renders women's identities socially and symbolically constructed and thus 
subject to change. 13 
In keeping with these two accounts of female identity, two dominant streams in 
feminist theory can be identified namely the Anglo-American gender, and French 
Continental sexual difference theorists. Sexual difference feminist theory, also 
known as the ecriture feminine movement, draws its conceptual foundations 
from linguistics, literary studies, semiotics, philosophy and psychoanalytic 
theories of the subject. 14 Gender theory is a materialist feminist approach that 
has roots in De Beauvoir's existentialism and Marxist historical materialism and 
focuses on a political theory based on the will to change (Braidotti et a!, 1994: 
40). In opposition to a more conceptually orientated approach, materialist 
feminism focuses on the structure of social power relations rather than the 
symbolically structured psychological make up of individuals (Delphy, 1984). 
Accordingly, for gender theorists social power relations (socialisation) determine 
women's identity, whereas for sexual difference theorists, women's identity is 
an effect of their particular positioning within a symbolic system. 
Given their divergent approaches it is perhaps not surprising that the relations 
between these two streams within feminist theory have been fraught with 
tension. Sexual difference feminism has been subjected to criticism not only 
with regard to the confusion created by the term sexual difference that has 
resulted in it being charged with biological essentialism, but also because of its 
narrow focus on language and the textual. 15 This focus on symbolic systems of 
meaning has been criticised for losing sight of the material reality of women, and 
they have also been criticised for espousing a psychic essentialism. On the other 
hand the materialist approach of gender theorists has been subjected to criticism 
with regard to what is perceived as a limiting critique of ideology and an 
endorsement of a gender free position. As a result both these positions lapsed 
13 Firmly situated in the humanist existentialist tradition, De Beauvoir herself did not take 
symbolic systems into consideration. Predictably then, it was under inspiration of De 
Beauvoir's existentialism, along with (an adapted) Marxism, that Anglo-American gender 
theory emerged. 
14 An example of Lacanian and Freudian feminist psychoanalytic theory is lrigaray 
(1974/1985a, 1977/1985b), Cixous (1981) and Clement (Cixous and Clement, 1975/1986). 
15 This focus on language and the textual shows sexual difference theorists' allegiance to 
poststructuralist philosophical thinking. 
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into reductionisms, the one material and the other textual, that has resulted in an 
intellectual stalemate between the two positions. 
The tension between the Anglo-American and French streams of thought can be 
further illuminated by the equality-difference debate 16 that coincides with a focus 
on gender on the one hand and sexual difference on the other. 17 A central issue 
in feminism is highlighted by the equality-difference debate. That is, although 
there may be agreement that equality is what feminists fight for, it is questioned 
at what price we are willing to attain equality. Central to this debate is the 
erasure of differences between men and women which has historically 
amounted to a reinforcement of the masculine self; something which is most 
explicitly demonstrated in the case of liberal feminism. The Anglo-American 
appeal to a gender-free position, often expressed in the endorsement of some 
form of androgyny, so as to bring about equality between men and women, fails 
to take into account the asymmetry between the sexes on a symbolic level. In a 
manner similar to liberal feminism, a disregard for the different cultural meanings 
and values that are associated with the masculine as opposed to the feminine 
culminates in a continued entrapment in phallocentrism. For this reason, sexual 
difference feminists have criticised the focus on gender as opposed to sexual 
difference as effecting a deflection of the attention away from women to 
assume a new symmetry between the sexes (Braidotti, 1994b: 150-151 ). 18 
16 See Scott (1988) for an interesting discussion and engagement with the difference-equality 
debate. 
17 According to Grosz (1990}, equality feminism includes liberal (Mary Wolstonecraft) and 
socialist feminism, their emphasis being on equality as opposed to difference. Although an 
equality feminist position, socialist feminism differs markedly from liberal feminism. It is most 
critical of liberalism and the liberal self that we will see is a masculine self, but because it 
ultimately wants to erase differences between men and women, it is included in the equality 
feminist camp. With Braidotti (1991), Grosz (1990) includes De Beauvoir (1964), Firestone 
(1970) and Millet (1969) in the equality feminist camp. Grosz (1990) along with Gatens 
(1986) cites liberal feminists like Wolstonecraft (1978), De Beauvoir (1964) and Mitchell 
(1974) as equality feminists. 
18 An appeal to gender has also manifested in feminist academia and illustrates the erasure 
of difference succinctly. In American universities, the focus on gender studies (to make 
feminism more palatable to the faint-hearted) instead of feminism or sexual politics 
generated a proliferation of men's studies courses. This is a trend that is particular not only to 
American universities. If we can go by the appearance of men's studies at prominent South 
African universities, along with the popular appeal that is made to "gender equality" in 
political speeches and the media, this trend has found fruitful soil also in the South African 
context. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
9 
Opposed to focusing only on sexism and patriarchy, feminist thinkers like 
Gross19 (1986) and Grosz (1988, 1990) and Braidotti (1991, 1994b) argue for a 
movement beyond phallocentrism. In a discussion of these terms in the context 
of theory and the production of knowledge, Grosz (1988: 93) asserts that 
sexism refers to obvious acts of discrimination privileging men and depriving 
women. As Grosz (1988: 93) puts it "[s]exism is a manifest phenomenon, easily 
illustrated for it ranges from the open expression of hostility or suspicion about 
women, to ignoring and excluding women altogether from being considered 
worthy or relevant objects of investigation". Patriarchy on the other hand is " ... 
an underlying structure of evaluation, it can be analysed most directly in the 
examination of the unspoken assumptions lying behind the apparently sexually 
neutral terms, Reason, Truth, Knowledge". The point that she (Grosz, 1988: 94) 
makes is that "even if the sexes behaved in identical ways, their behaviour 
would still not have the same social meaning and value" if the underlying 
patriarchal assumptions are not addressed as well. As such, patriarchal theory is 
characterised by its unspoken repressed, unrepresented "feminine" foundations. 
Phallocentrism refers to the discursive or representational form of women's 
oppression in terms of which women are construed on the model of the 
masculine, whether in terms of sameness/identity, opposition/distinction or as 
complementary (Grosz, 1988: 94-95). 20 A central challenge of feminism is how 
to break out of the structure of phallocentrism, which has relied on the various 
dichotomous characterisations of man and woman. A simple reversal of the 
binary opposition is not a viable alternative, as this strategy remains trapped 
within a binary logic. Phallocentrism can, however, not be challenged from 
outside, as this leaves the system intact: but on the other hand, to remain only 
within its terms is to risk absorption, to be unable to move beyond it (Grosz: 
1990: 1 00). 
The strategy that is proposed by the French Continental strand of feminism 
(sexual difference theorists) as offering a way to move beyond phallocentrism is 
to shift the focus from equality to autonomy. Equality has historically been 
unable to guarantee autonomy and autonomy can only be expressed in a 
19 Gross and Grosz is the same author. 
20 The strategies of equality feminists such as liberal feminists and those who ultimately aim 
at erasing differences between men and women, along with academical reformist-minded 
feminists, remain inadequate for failing to address the pervasiveness of phallocentrism. 
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reconstructive affirmation of difference (Grosz, 1990: 339-339; 1988: 92-1 03; 
Braidotti, 1994b). The goal of female autonomy signals women's claim to 
political, social, economic and intellectual self-determination. This involves the 
deconstruction of phallocentric discourses and a reconstructive project of 
constructing and developing alternative models, methods, procedures and 
discourses (Gross, 1986: 192). Part of this constructive project is to create 
alternative representations of women that move beyond an entrapment in 
phallocentrism. Engaging with the question of language and representation in 
their political and material effects is pivotal to this endeavour. Acknowledging 
language as a material, active, productive system is therefore part of the project 
of creating new modes of expression, new discursive styles, and new 
enunciative positions to articulate women's specificity. To acknowledge the 
materiality of language is to engage with power ''not just as a force visible in the 
acts, events and processes within political and public life, but also as a series of 
tactical alignments between institutions, knowledges, practices involved with 
the control and supervision of individuals and groups" (Gross: 1986: 203). 
An affirmation of difference in this context signals a refusal to submit to the 
ruling order and is performed as a political act of subversion, not only of the self, 
but also of the other. Insisting on difference is to demand acknowledgement and 
respect not only insofar one conforms to the norms and criteria of those in 
power, but it is also to claim the freedom to challenge and subvert existing 
structures of meaning and power. This is however not where it ends, exactly 
how such an affirmation of difference is performed, is of the utmost importance. 
As we have seen, both the Anglo-American and French Continental branches of 
feminist theory fall short on crucial issues. Challenging dominant cultural values 
and meanings and striving towards the creation of different meanings and 
representations of women's difference by sexual difference feminism, is of 
course most commendable. This however, can only thrive against a background 
that simultaneously addresses women's social and material positions, that is, if 
the emphasis on equality is also taken seriously. Despite the emphasis and focus 
on women's social and material positions by gender theorists, a continued 
disregard of the significance of symbolic structures as metaphysical nonsense 
has proved untenable. 
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These points of critique were made all the more pertinent by post-colonial and 
US black feminists who criticised the universalist character of white feminist 
theory (and of course practice) (Spivak, 1990; Mohanty, 1988; Trihn Minh-Ha, 
1989; hooks, 1990). What is highlighted here is that despite their claim to non-
essentialism (read: constructivism), the materialist feminist appeal to "women's 
experience" serves to erase differences between women which exposed 
feminism's continued universalisation of white, middle-class women's 
experiences. In the case of sexual difference feminism, this point of criticism 
pertains to the whiteness of psychoanalytic theory, and stresses the seriousness 
which the differing social and material realities of women have to be regarded 
with. 
This charge of essentialism leveled at both the Anglo-American and French 
feminist currents pose interesting challenges to both. The predicament can be 
described as follows. The poststructuralist deconstruction of woman, and an 
emphasis on differences, particularly differences between women, has evoked 
concern with regard to the potentially paralysing effect that this can have on 
feminist politics. In a feminist context, an emphasis on differences between 
women undermines the ability to speak of women as a social group to the extent 
that it becomes problematic to claim that women are oppressed. 21 
Feminists such as Diana Fuss (1990) have an interesting approach to this 
dilemma. Fuss points out that talking about women, even in constructivist 
terms, necessarily presupposes some form of essentialism, which suggests that 
speaking of women is always already essentialist. For Fuss then, this is the 
dilemma of feminism and one that cannot be avoided. She does however 
conclude that despair need not follow, as "a strategic essentialism" takes into 
consideration the context within which essentialism is "committed" (Fuss, 1990: 
20). That is, the focus should be not on the fact that an "essentialist" position is 
taken, but why. A strategic essentialist position that emphasises the radically 
specific, and therefore complex situatedness of different women, offers a way 
out of the Anglo-American - French feminist deadlock. In such a context, the 
21 See also Grosz (1990), Alcoff (1988), Frazer and Nicholson (1990: 15-31) and Flax (1987, 
1992) for an in-depth discussion of this problem. 
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sensitivity to differences that is generated by poststructuralist insights and black 
feminist critique can be fruitfully employed. Moreover, given her historical 
position as other (read: object), legitimacy is not only bestowed upon the 
endeavour to articulate a female feminist subject; indeed, it becomes pertinent 
also in the broader political project of feminism. 
This brings us to a recent development in feminist thinking that, resolving the 
stalemate between gender and sexual difference theorists, can be described as a 
new feminist materialism. 22 What emerges here is the situated, specific, 
embodied nature of the feminist subject that avoids a biological or psychic 
essentialism. This feminist materialism is influenced by the poststructuralist 
redefinition of the body and incorporates Foucault's (1974, 1980) insights with 
regard to the materiality of discourse and the relation of knowledge to power. 
The materiality of discourse refers to the discursive construction of the subject 
in and through language. Embodiedness in this context refers to the subject as 
empirical bio-cultural entity (Braidotti et a/, 1994: 50). Articulating a female 
embodied subject employs gender as a "regulatory fiction" that must be read in 
the framework of the critique of the ethnocentric and univocal meaning of the 
term gender. As suggested above, gender is also redefined as "marking the 
intersection of language with the social, of the semiotic with the material" 
(Braidotti, 1994: 1 54). 23 Here identity emerges as a site of differences where 
the subject occupies a variety of possible positions at different times that are 
organised along a multiplicity of variables such as sex, race, class, age and 
lifestyle. In the course of this discussion it will become clear that the position I 
support coincides with the above, but in the light of environmental concerns, it 
is qualified to suit the concerns and interests that are relevant from an ecological 
feminist perspective. 
From the discussion thus far, it is clear that my focus on essentialism and 
dualism captures the related concerns of feminist and ecological thinking. 
22 Amongst the feminist thinkers that can be grouped with this "new feminist materialism" are 
feminist critical theorists such as Benjamin (1988), Flax (1990a), and Benhabib (1987), post-
colonial and black writers such as Spivak (1990a), Trinh-Minh-Ha (1989), bell hooks (1981, 
1984), and other feminist theorists such as De Lauretis (1990), Haraway (1991), and Harding 
(1991). 
23 See also Scott (1986, 1989, 1992) for a discussion of the insufficiency of not integrating the 
social and discursive in contemporary feminist theory. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
13 
Whereas the tendency in ecological thinking is to concentrate on dualism, the 
problem that is most prominently grappled with in feminist thinking tends to be 
essentialism, although as we have seen, essentialism is part and parcel of 
dualism. In this study then, I would like to discuss the contributions that 
different ecofeminists make towards a conceptualisation of an ecological 
feminist notion of the self with the aim of (a) illustrating how the problems of 
dualism and essentialism are engaged with and (b) determining whether some 
avenue can be carved out that resists reinforcing dualism and essentialism 
without altogether abolishing the conceptual space needed to defend the related 
political agendas of both environmentalism and feminism. 
For the purposes of accomplishing this task, I distinguish between three different 
feminist positions that are relevant, albeit in different ways, in this regard. As I 
will discuss in the section dealing with Methodology, I refer to these positions 
respectively as cultural ecofeminism, critical-transformative ecofeminism and 
cyber-(eco)feminism. Having illuminated the problems of dualism and 
essentialism in ecological and feminist thinking, I would now like to turn to the 
research question that informs this inquiry which reads as follows: 
What are the contributions that cultural, critical-transformative and 
cyber-(eco)feminism make towards the articulation of an ecological 
feminist notion of the self that can generate/promote an ethical 
relation with nature from a position beyond dualism and essentialism? 
The contributions made by the respective positions towards the articulation of 
an ecological feminist notion of the self that goes beyond dualism and 
essentialism can be interpreted and therefore evaluated on two levels insofar as 
they incorporate proposals towards the articulation of a feminist notion of an 
ecological self on the one hand, and an ecological notion of a feminist self on the 
other. 24 In the respective chapters of this study, the contributions to both an 
24 The formulation of an ecological self and a feminist self are two separate undertakings that 
can be shown to overlap significantly in their challenge and transformation of the dominant 
notion of the self in rationalist philosophical thinking. As such, these are complementary and 
may be shown to comprise different facets of an ecofeminist notion of the self. Alternatively, 
such an ecofeminist notion of the self can also be described as a feminist subjectivity that is 
formulated in explicitly ecological terms and which at the same time also allows space for 
female specificity. 
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ecological self and a feminist self that are endorsed by different ecofeminists 
with different conceptions of ecology, nature, subjectivity, and the self, are 
evaluated from an ecological as well as a feminist perspective in the light of the 
shared concerns raised by the problems of both dualism and essentialism. 
The separation of an ecological feminist notion of the self into an ecological self 
and feminist self is performed in the light of some central questions in both 
ecological and feminist thinking. In ecological thinking this pertains to the 
insufficiency of exploring the articulation of an ecological self without paying 
attention to ecofeminist perspectives nature, the female/feminine and the self in 
the articulation of an ecological self. At the same time, ecological perspectives 
cannot be ignored when it comes to the articulation of a (female) feminist self. 
Indeed, the articulation of both a (female) feminist self and an ecological self 
requires a reconceptualisation of nature, which in turn evokes woman's 
association with nature, which has historically coincided with the exclusion of 
women from the realm of subjecthood. In my view, this points towards the 
responsibility to rethink the relation between women and nature that resists an 
overidentification of women with nature, without placing women in an 
oppositional relation with nature. 25 In this study this task is executed by 
exploring different notions of nature, female identity and female feminist 
subjectivity. Carrying out this undertaking is particularly important if we take into 
account the perception that exists of ecofeminism as reclaiming and uncritically 
affirming the woman-nature connection. 26 Although this view is not entirely 
unfounded, I do hope to show that this is an incomplete representation of 
ecological feminist thinking. 
For this reason then, it is fitting to explore the contributions that are made 
towards the articulation of an (ecological) notion of a female feminist self as an 
instance of an ecological feminist self. This may reveal an unambiguous 
movement away from a regressive over-identification of woman with nature, and 
an engagement with the female self or subjectivity that compares favourably 
with recent developments in contemporary feminist theory. As such, the 
suspicion which ecofeminism has been regarded with in feminist circles may also 
25 See Soper (1995) for making similar observations. 
26 See footnote nr.28 below. 
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be corrected. This in turn may reveal a resistance in some feminist circles to 
engage thoroughly with ecological concerns and the need to conceive of a 
feminist self in ecological terms. 27 This brings us to my engagement with the 
concept of the self and the distinctions that are drawn to structure this inquiry. 
Methodology 
As the research question formulated above indicates, this study is divided into 
three chapters, titled Cultural ecofeminism, Critical-transformative ecofeminism, 
and Cyber-(eco)feminism. The respective chapters are continuous with each 
other but, on the whole, each position can be shown to represent a distinct 
viewpoint with regard to the main themes that are analysed and discussed. The 
consecutive chapters also portray the historical development of ecological 
feminist thinking, which, alternately, is also continuous with the unfolding of 
feminist and ecological thinking. 
These preliminary comments on the structure of the thesis opens the way for 
further elaboration upon the content of each chapter. The title of chapter one, 
Cultural ecofeminism, could be deceptive. In an attempt to systematise 
ecofeminism as a body of thought resisting neat classification, Plumwood (1988) 
. 
nevertheless identifies two main streams in ecofeminist thinking namely cultural/ 
ecofeminism and social ecofeminism. She describes the former as being al 
predominantly spiritual tradition, whilst the latter is more politically orientated. lnl 
terms of feminist theory, the two positions coincide roughly with radicaf 
i 
feminism on the one hand, and socialist feminism on the other. Plumwood points 
out however that the two streams are not mutually exclusive, given that some 
ecofeminists incorporate aspects of both strands of thinking, thereby defying 
rigid categorisation. 
Other ecological or ecological feminist thinkers draw different distinctions or 
work with a different classification system that problematises, but also 
coincides, with the distinction above (Zimmerman, 1994; Mellor, 1997). What 
this illustrates and reflects is the eclectic and therefore complex character of 
27 See Braidotti eta/ (1994: 161-167) for a rather unflattering portrayal of ecofeminist 
thinking. 
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ecological feminist thinking as a body of thought (Zimmerman, 1 994; Carlassare, 
1994). The strands that different authors identify and focus on, depend largely 
on their line of inquiry, and often also mirror the depth of their analyses. I, in 
turn, work with a classification system that is suited to my line of inquiry. I 
distinguish different nuances in what I refer to as cultural ecofeminist thinking, 
and identify two additional streams in ecofeminist thinking, namely critical-
transformative ecofeminism and cyber-(eco)feminism. Before I proceed to name 
and discuss the different subdivisions within cultural ecofeminism, I would like 
to explicate the considerations that informed my particular engagement with and 
therefore classification of ecofeminist thinking. 
My research question centers on the contributions of different ecofeminist 
positions towards the articulation of an ecological feminist notion of the self that 
will promote the establishment of ethical relations with the natural environment 
from a position beyond dualism and essentialism. It follows that this 
preoccupation is reflected in the structure of the thesis. First and foremost I 
focus on those positions that have a particular contribution to make towards the 
articulation of an ecological feminist notion of the self beyond dualism and 
essentialism. Secondly, despite what might at first glance look like an integration 
of very divergent positions/8 in each chapter, the notions of the self along with 
the ethic that is articulated can be grouped together. Another factor that played 
an important structuring role, is what I, also in keeping with my research . 
question, have identified as the ethical as opposed to the more overtly political~" 
current that runs through ecofeminist thinking. 29 This approach crisscrosses ~ 
through the distinction that Plumwood (1988) draws between cultural and social 
ecofeminism above, therefore upsetting the fixed order that she imposes. Given 
the focus of my research, the structure of my first chapter exhibits such a 
crisscrossing. Weaving my way around and between the two pillars that are 
cultural ecofeminism and social ecofeminism, the complexities of ecofeminist 
thinking are encountered head on. 
In my discussion of cultural ecofeminism as a distinct ecofeminist position, a 
number of strands of ecofeminist thinking are integrated. That is, it 
28 Here I am referring to Chapter 1 in particular. 
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encompasses spiritual, nature, and affinity strands, along with aspects of 
social/ist ecofeminism. In this discussion, the spiritual and nature strands can be 
positioned together, in that first and foremost, they share an affirmation and 
revalorisation of the body as female. Nature and spiritual ecofeminism celebrate 
women's bodies and affirm their connectedness to nature. As I observed above, 
it is then also these two positions that would generally be viewed as 
representative of cultural ecofeminism. Affinity ecofeminism is also included in 
this discussion because by focusing on women's reproductive labour, 30 it shares 
with nature and spiritual ecofeminism an identification of women with nature. To 
the extent that women's difference is affirmed and the notions of the self and 
ethics that are endorsed by cultural and social/ist ecofeminism coincide, these 
two positions are integrated in this chapter. 
As will become evident during the course of this inquiry, most ecofeminists who 
do not fall into the nature or spiritual camps hold some allegiance to social/ist 
ecofeminism. The different strands in social/ist ecofeminism differ markedly in 
approach and focus. To discuss social/ist ecofeminism in a single chapter (as 
opposed to cultural ecofeminism), would therefore not do justice to the richness 
of this stream of thinking. The main reason for my particular arrangement of the 
different ecofeminist perspectives is the focus of my inquiry, which is on the 
contributions that different ecofeminist positions make towards the articulation 
of an alternative ecological feminist notion of the self. On account of the 
historical materialist tradition it is grounded in, the engagement with the self by 
social/ist ecofeminists is severely limited. The social/ist feminist focus on the 
sexual division of labour that includes reproduction in their historical materialist 
analysis does open up the way for a psychological dimension to their analysis. 
This is the aspect of social/ist ecofeminism that, because of its explicit focus on 
the self and ecological values, is regarded as relevant to the analysis and 
discussion conducted in Chapter 1. This aspect of social/ist ecofeminism is 
included because it enhances and builds upon the main arguments and 
viewpoints formulated by cultural ecofeminists (in this context as spiritual, 
29 As I will argue in the body of this text, the ethical and political are strictly speaking not 
separable. The difference therefore lies not wholly in content, but rather in accent. 
30 Whereas in later socialisUmaterialist feminism the emphasis shifted from childbearing to 
childrearing, here it is the former rather than the latter that is stressed, accounting in turn for 
the link with those streams that emphasise women's bodily difference. 
I 
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nature and affinity ecofeminism). What it shares with these strands of thinking is 
an emphasis on women's difference, and it overlaps and reinforces both the 
notions of the self and ethic that are endorsed by cultural ecofeminism. 
The second chapter, titled Critical-transformative ecofeminism, focuses mostly 
on the work of ecological feminist thinker Valerie Plumwood. The reason why I 
devote most of an entire chapter to her work is because she is the only 
ecofeminist thinker who is explicit in her articulation of a notion of an ecological 
self and a concomitant ethic.31 Although Plumwood's thought and writing forms 
the backbone of what I have termed critical-transformative ecological feminism, 
other ecofeminists such as Warren (1987, 1990, 1993), Cuomo (1998), King 
(1989, 1990), Merchant (1990, 1994) and Mellor (1998) enhance and reinforce 
her analysis. What is particularly noteworthy about Plumwood's approach is that 
unlike the work of the ecofeminists discussed in Chapter 1, there is a distinct 
reconstructive moment in her work. The absence of such a reconstructive 
moment in the chapter titled Cultural ecofeminism can be ascribed to their 
alliance to a materialist feminist tradition that is characterised by an empirical 
approach where the focus is on women's experience. Plumwood is less 
specifically situated. Having roots in German Critical Theory,32 her work depicts 
also a shift towards integrating the conceptual and the material. 
The third and last chapter in this inquiry into the contributions that the different 
ecofeminist positions make towards the articulation of an ecological feminist 
notion of the self and ethics, is titled what I have tentatively come to refer to as 
cyber-(eco)feminism, the main representative of which is Donna Haraway. Whilst 
Haraway is not an explicit ecofeminist writer and does not set herself the task of 
articulating a notion of an ecological self or ethic, her work on the self, nature 
and politics is highly relevant to ecological feminist thinking for a number of 
reasons. This is because she articulates her views in the context of post-
industrial, late capitalist, high-tech culture, a position of particular relevance 
31 Cuomo (1998) has followed in her footsteps, but as I acquired access to her book only 
recently, her work is integrated to the extent that it coincides with Plumwood's. 
32 The Frankfurt School developed the German tradition of Critical Theory. It breaks with 
orthodox Marxism's historical materialism and conducts a critique not of political economy, 
but enters Marxist debates through a critique of culture, scientism and instrumental reason 
(Eckersley, 1992: 97). 
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from an environmental perspective posing interesting challenges to ecological 
and feminist thinking alike. As such, it can be shown that her engagement with 
the self, nature and politics has significant contributions to make towards the 
articulation of an ecological feminist notion of the self. One thing that sets this 
chapter off against the others is that instead of discussing an ethic as in the 
previous chapters, I discuss what Haraway refers to as a politics of articulation. 
This absence of an ethic reveals not only Haraway's situatedness as 
poststructuralist theorist, but also her rootedness in socialist feminist theory. 
In Chapters 1 and 2, I go to great lengths to explain and illustrate my focus on 
ethics and its effects. Here, in Chapter 3, in acknowledgement of the blurring of 
the boundaries between politics and ethics in poststructuralist thinking, I deviate 
a little and discuss Haraway's politics of articulation, (which is in keeping with 
the socialist feminist trend to focus epistemology and politics) mainly with the 
purpose to establish whether, in the face of rapid globalisation and increasing 
ecological degradation, we can indeed afford to do away with ethics. Regarding 
her socialist feminist background, what distinguishes Haraway's thinking from 
earlier materialist feminism, is that, (like Plumwood), and in keeping with her 
consistent integration of the social/material with the semiotic/symbolic, there is 
a definitive reconstructive moment in her work. These two attributes are what 
set her apart from all other social/ist ecofeminist thinkers, which in turn 
accounts for why I find it fitting to analyse and discuss her work in a separate 
chapter. The main reason why I find it appropriate to devote a whole chapter to 
Haraway's thinking, can however be ascribed to the fact that to my knowledge 
she is the only poststructuralist feminist thinker who seriously engages with 
ecological thinking and issues. Coincidentally, this is a void in contemporary 
feminist thinking that inspired the writing of this thesis in the first place. 
In what follows I would like to give a broad outline of the structure and content 
of this thesis so as to guide the reader in reading this text. 
Structure 
Consistent with the three streams that I identify in ecofeminism, the three 
chapters that comprise this thesis are respectively titled Cultural ecofeminism, 
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Critical-transformative ecofeminism and Cyber-(eco)feminism, the structure of 
which is roughly the same. Each chapter starts off with a contextualisation to 
situate each position within feminist and ecological thinking. In Chapter 1, the 
contextualisation is followed by an account of the different aspects of 
patriarchal Western culture responsible for the twin dominations of women and 
nature. They are, respectively, philosophical dualism, a psychology of fear of the 
other, and Western science and Cartesian-Newtonianism. Dualism is revealed as 
a hierarchical structure that puts "women down and men up". What is revealed 
is that in dualist philosophical thinking, nature and women are identified with the 
flesh and with the body, and subsequently held to be inherently evil, as opposed 
to men who are identified with the mental and spiritual. From this perspective, 
the identification of women and nature with the body has sanctioned the 
domination of both. This is followed by the argument that it is the male fear of 
mortality that is the cause of the twin dominations of women and nature. From 
this perspective it is argued that the male fear of mortality manifests itself in the 
suppression of women and nature as reminders of change, vulnerability, 
finiteness and ultimately death. In the section on Western science and Cartesian-
Newtonianism, knowledge and the methodology of scientific knowledge are 
exposed as being defined in opposition to women, and subsequently inimical to 
both women and nature. 
In the section that follows, one response of cultural ecofeminism to the 
environmental crisis is discussed in the light of the different factors that are 
respectively put forward as the root cause of the oppression of women and 
nature. The focus of this discussion is on an understanding of female identity 
that I translate and discuss as a notion of a female self. The female self that is 
endorsed by cultural ecofeminists is placed in direct opposition to the alienated 
male self that is criticised in the preceding section. Representing a particular 
engagement with the question of difference, here the female self is perceived as 
significantly connected with nature. The view of nature that is embraced departs 
radically form its status as lifeless brute matter, and we are also introduced to 
the (feminine) values of intuition and care as offering alternative ecological 
values. 
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In the next section, the cultural ecofeminist employment of a vocabulary of care 
is discussed with reference to an exposition of an ethic of care. Rather than 
giving a detailed account of an ethic of care the focus here is on the notion of 
the self that informs this ethic. The conception of female gender identity that is 
socio-psychologically grounded offers what I translate and discuss as a notion of 
a feminine self. Whilst offering an account of women's difference, I show how 
this conception of the feminine self coincides with the ecofeminist appeal to the 
different social roles that women occupy as providing us with alternative 
(ecological) values. These values are consistent with an ethic of care and a 
feminine self that offer important insights with regard to the articulation of an 
alternative ecological feminist notion of the self. As I will show, however, 
cultural ecofeminism does not succeed in overcoming the problems of dualism 
and essentialism. This comes to the fore in the final part of this chapter that 
consists of an assessment of cultural ecofeminism in the light of the problems of 
dualism and essentialism from an ecological and feminist perspective. 
The second chapter, titled Critical-transformative ecofeminism, starts with a 
brief contextualisation that is followed by an analysis of dualism as the root 
cause of the twin dominations of women and nature. I start by showing how 
dualism has structured the rationalist philosophical tradition and how the 
concept of nature employed sanctions the domination and instrumentalisation of 
nature. This is followed by an in-depth analysis of dualism, and the structure and 
functioning and main features of dualism are discussed. In the light of this 
exposition, I show how the critical-transformative ecofeminist approach to the 
domination of women and nature as a result of dualism distinguishes this 
position from cultural ecofeminism. This is followed by an explication of 
Plumwood's strategy to move beyond dualism. 
In the sections that follow, an exposition is given of the contributions of critical-
transformative ecofeminism towards the articulation of an ecological feminist 
notion of the self beyond dualism and essentialism. This section is divided into 
three parts. Performing a critical affirmation of female gender identity, 
Plumwood endorses what I translate as a pluralist feminine self. This pluralist 
feminine self is offered in an attempt to overcome the universalist character of 
the feminine self that is discussed in Chapter 1 on the one hand, and on the 
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other to liberate the feminine self from its dualist construal. The second notion 
that is discussed is a degendered human self that is proposed with the intention 
to create a setting against which an ecological self beyond gender can be 
articulated that leaves space for the flourishing of differences. This notion of the 
human self signifies an attempt to transcend what Plumwood views as the false 
choice between either endorsing a masculine or feminine self as an alternative 
ecological self. The third section moves into the realm of ethics, and shows how 
a non-anthropocentric notion of continuity between humans and nature can be 
established whilst leaving space for differences between humans and nature. 
In the section on critical-transformative ecofeminist ethics, I give an exposition 
of the ethic that is endorsed by critical-transformative ecofeminism, in particular 
the notion of the self that is central to such an ethic. The notion of the self that 
emerges is the mutual self that, drawing on a broadened notion of intentionality, 
establishes a relation of continuity and difference between the self and nature. 
This notion of the self is articulated in response to what Plumwood views as 
deep ecology's over-emphasis on continuity at the expense of acknowledging 
differences. In the final section of this chapter, I critically assess the 
contributions that critical-transformative ecofeminism makes towards the 
articulation of an ecological feminist notion of the self beyond dualism and 
essentialism. 
In the third and final chapter of this thesis, titled Cyber-(eco)feminism, the 
contextualisation is directly followed by a discussion of the different but related 
notions of the self that are endorsed by cyber-(eco)feminism. The absence of an 
explicit account of the cause of the twin dominations of women and nature 
cannot be ascribed to a lack of insight in this regard. This is made evident by the 
systematic deconstruction by Haraway of all the dualisms that have grounded 
sexism, racism, colonialism and naturism. 
In the first part of this chapter the figure of the cyborg and the lnappropriate/d 
Other is discussed as instances of "monstrous selves". The second part consists 
of an exposition of the situated self that offers a notion of the female knowing 
subject that is radically specific. Emerging as half-human, half-machine, the 
cyborg is a poststructuralist entity par excellence. A subversive playful figure, 
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the cyborg stands out for its highly differentiated character and disregard for 
boundaries previously regarded as sacred. As possible cyborg subjectivity, the 
lnappropriate/d Other marks a moment of pause, curbing the radical 
differentiation of the figure of the cyborg. Socially and discursively constructed 
along variable axes of difference, the lnappropriate/d Other is presented as a 
notion of (female) feminist subjectivity that is neither self nor other. 
The situated self comes to the fore in the context of Haraway's discussion of 
feminist epistemology. This notion of the self is articulated in an attempt to 
conceive of an alternative feminist knowing subject that is radically specific and 
which overcomes the stark boundary between the knowing subject and the 
object of knowledge. In the process, nature as passive object is reconceived in 
non-anthropocentric terms as the figure of the Coyote Trickster. In the section 
that follows, Haraway's concept of nature is further elaborated upon. In keeping 
with nature as Coyote Trickster, nature is conceived of as llartifactual" and as 
"social". 
Emphasising the artifactuality and social dimension of nature, a way is opened 
up for the articulation of a politics of articulation as an ethically sound alternative 
political strategy to navigate negotiations around environmental issues. Moving 
away from a politics of representation, which often results in the obliteration of 
the voices of others, a politics of articulation is an inclusive politics. In the final 
section of this chapter, I perform a critical evaluation of the notions of the self, 
nature and politics that are proposed by cyber-(eco)feminism from an ecological 
and feminist perspective. The third chapter is followed by a Conclusion, which 
consists of a summary of my findings and a few concluding remarks. 
In what follows then, I would like to explore the contributions that cultural, 
critical-transformative and cyber-(eco)feminism respectively make towards the 
articulation of an ecological feminist notion of the self that will generate ethical 
relations with the natural environment from a position beyond dualism and 
essentialism. In a field as young as ecological thinking, such an inquiry requires 
that we suspend our quest for fixed and final solutions for a moment and 
graciously allow for open-ended answers to the enormous environmental 
challenges and pressing concerns that we are faced with at the advent of a new 
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millennium. This might enable us to consider how far we have come, how we 
can creatively apply the knowledge and insights that has thus far been 
generated, and getting an idea of the direction we should be steering the 
process of establishing sound ecological feminist practices. 
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Chapter One 
Cultural Ecofeminism 
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In the following chapter I give an exposition of the contributions made by 
cultural ecofeminism towards the conceptualisation of the ecological feminist 
notion of the self and concomitant ethic beyond dualism and essentialism. 1 
Although cultural ecofeminists do not set themselves the explicit task of 
formulating an ecological feminist notion of the self, I hope to show that cultural 
ecofeminist thinking does offer significant insights regarding the articulation of 
an ecological feminist notion of the self and an ethic that can be associated with 
it. As I have explained in the Introduction, this will entail an examination of the 
contributions that are made towards the articulation of a feminist notion of an 
ecological self and an ecological notion of a (female) feminist self. In the light of 
the problems of dualism and essentialism then, the aim of this discussion is to 
determine the viability of the notions of the self and the ethic articulated by 
cultural ecofeminism from an ecological and feminist perspective. 
Articulating their views from an ecofeminist theoretical position, cultural 
ecofeminists locate the link between the domination of women and nature in 
patriarchy. In their critique of patriarchal culture, they expose what in their 
perspective are the foundations that ground the devaluation and subjugation of 
women and nature. The domination of nature is perceived as inextricably linked 
to that of women, which is ascribed to the age-old association of nature with 
women and the feminine. From this perspective, the twin dominations of nature 
and women can be shown to be the effect of philosophical, psychological and 
epistemological factors that shape Western patriarchal culture. Before I discuss 
the different factors that are respectively put forward to account for the 
simultaneous domination of women and nature, I briefly contextualise cultural 
ecofeminist thinking. The section that follows, titled "Patriarchal culture: self, 
woman and nature", consists of a discussion of what different representatives of 
1 As I have explained in the Introduction, aspects of social/ist ecofeminist thinking are 
integrated in this discussion of cultural ecofeminism. As such, cultural ecofeminism here 
consists of nature, spiritual, affinity and social ecofeminist strands. 
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early ecofeminist thinking identify as t~e link between the domination of women 
and nature. In the first part titled "Philosophical dualism", the connection 
between the twin dominations of women and nature as an effect of dualism, is 
discussed. In ec~feminist thought, dualism is probably one of the most referred 
to (as opposed to analysed) problems implicated in the domination and 
subjugation of women and nature. 2 In cultural ecofeminist thinking it is most 
elaborately engaged with by Dodson Gray ( 1981) whose account of "hierarchical 
dualism" shall be focused upon. According to Gray, the masculine/feminine, 
mind/body, spirit/flesh dualisms in Western religious and philosophical thinking, 
in terms of which men are associated with the uppersides and women and 
nature with the undersides, provide an explanation for the simultaneous 
domination of women and nature in western patriarchal culture. 
In the following section, an exposition is given of the, psychological account of 
the domination of women and nature offered by Dodson Gray, (1981 ), Griffin 
(1989), Spretnak (1993) and King (1989). What is revealed in this section titled 
"A psychology of fear of the other", is that the dominant masculine conception 
of the self in patriarchal culture that invariably finds its expression in the male 
self, is one that is constituted through the denial and suppression of women and 
by implication also, nature. But, argue cultural ecofeminists, underlying these 
oppressive practices, lurks fear, and it this fear of the other that lies at the core 
of the male psyche. This results in an impoverished self, marked by alienation 
and disconnectedness. Such is this sense of disembodiedness that it 
paradoxically manifests itself in self-destructive death-denying cultural practices. 
In the final section, the focus shifts to the epistemological factors that are 
perceived to ground the domination of women and nature. In this section titled 
"Western science and Cartesian-Newtonianism", I discuss Merchant's (1980) 
arguments that Cartesian-Newtonian thinking employs images of women and 
nature that sanction the domination and subjugation of both. What is also 
illuminated is how, consistent with the images and views expressed of nature 
and women, the conditions for the acquisition of scientific knowledge too, are 
formulated in explicitly genderised terms (Fox-Keller, 1985). This exposes the 
2 Other cultural ecofeminists, who refer to dualism without conducting a thorough analysis 
thereof, are Griffin (1978, 1989, 1990), Salleh (1984, 1992). 
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knowing subject and scientific knowledge as defined in opposition to all that is 
associated with women. Brought in relation with this critique of Western science 
and Cartesian-Newtonianism, is the cultural ecofeminist critique of the rise and 
role of technology in the domination and exploitation of nature. 
Having discussed the critique of patriarchal culture in terms of the distinct 
factors that inform and legitimate the treatment of both women and nature, the 
section that follows, titled "Reconceiving the self", documents one cultural 
ecofeminist response to the environmental crisis. The spiritual poverty of 
Western consumerist culture in response to which this position took shape, is 
touched upon. The focus of this discussion is however on the celebration of the 
female self and her connectedness to nature as superior and in contrast to the 
male self identified in the previous section. This female connectedness to the 
body and nature is further elaborated upon beyond the initial spiritualist 
sentiments of cultural ecofeminism. Representing a particular engagement with 
the question of difference, the female self is valorised and affirmed in opposition 
to the male or masculinist self that is criticised and rejected in the preceding 
section3 . Celebrating and revaluing what is devalued and oppressed in patriarchal 
culture, a conception of the self as female comes to the fore that is perceived to 
be significantly connected with nature and which embraces a view of nature that 
departs radically from its inferiorised status as lifeless matter. In keeping with 
this, (feminine) values such as connectedness, intuition and care are 
\ reappropriated as alternative ecological values. 
In the third section titled "An ethic of care", I discuss the alternative ethic that is 
endorsed by cultural ecofeminists, focusing in particular on the notion of the self 
that is to inform such an ethic. Here, a second notion of the self comes to the 
fore, one that strongly resembles, but which also diverges significantly from the 
self that is acclaimed in the section titled "Reconceiving the self". In the first 
3 As we shall see in the forthcoming sections, a distinction is drawn between a "male self', a 
"masculinist self' and "masculine self'. The "male self' refers to biological males, whilst the 
"masculine self', being the dominant notion of the self in Western culture, is not restricted to 
men only. To show how the masculine self, has traditionally coincided with being male, when 
applicable, I use the phrase "masculinist self'. Similar comments can be made with regard to 
the use of the "female self' and "feminine self'. The "female self' refers to biological women, 
whilst the "feminine self' is articulated in opposition to a "masculine self', but, as we shall see, 
whilst this notion which is derived from an account of female gender identity, is also offered as 
alternative to the dominant masculine notion of the self, it is also referred to as a "feminine 
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part of the section on cultural ecofeminist ethics, "Rights, care and nature" I 
show how the feminist critique of rights based ethics is consistent with an 
ecofeminist rejection of rights based environmental ethics. As such, Carol 
Gilligan's articulation of an ethic of care is invoked by the cultural ecofeminist 
use of a vocabulary of care. As indicated above, rather than giving specific 
content to an ecofeminist ethic of care, cultural ecofeminists focus on the notion 
of the self and the values that are to inform such an ethic. In the section that 
follows titled, "Ethics, relationality and female gender identity" a feminine self, 
derived from a conception of female gender identity that is socio-psychologically 
grounded, is discussed. Whilst offering an account of women's difference, I 
show how this conception of the self coincides with the ecofeminist appeal to 
the different social roles that women occupy as providing us with alternative 
values. These values are consistent with an ethic of care and along with a 
feminine notion of the self, offer important insights towards the articulation of an 
alternative ecological feminist notion of the self. Conducted in the light of 
feminist and ecological concerns, I close this chapter with an evaluation of the 
cultural ecofeminist notion/s of the self and forthflowing ethic. 
Before proceeding to discuss the cultural ecofeminist critique of patriarchal 
culture, I would like to take the opportunity to sketch some primary features that 
characterise cultural ecofeminism, also with the aim of placing it in the context 
of feminism.4 
2. Contextualisation and background 
Following the overview given by Jaggar (1983) of the evolution of different 
streams in feminist thinking, I would like to briefly sketch the context that 
cultural ecofeminism emerged from. Cultural ecofeminism has come into being in 
opposition to two streams within feminism, namely liberal feminism and the first 
wave of radical feminism. Liberal feminism, which has its roots in the 18th 
century, reached its peak in the mid 1960's and had its focus on bringing about 
equality between men and women. Following Mary Wolstonecraft's A 
notion of the self'. 
4 Although the discussion of cultural ecofeminism conducted in this chapter moves beyond the 
confines of its relation to radical feminism, contextualising cultural ecofeminism in this manner 
remains relevant to the chapter as a whole. 
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Vindication of Rights for Women (1978), a main argument of the liberal feminist 
strand is that women are not essentially different from men, and that the claim 
that women are biologically weaker than men is a ruse that men use to prevent 
women from equal admittance to the public sphere. Moreover, they argued that 
the differences between men and women are a function of socialisation, which 
determines gender, rather than biology, which determines sex. Over a period of 
time however, many feminists started expressing their discontent with the male-
defined identities they were expected to adopt in order to gain access to a 
masculine-defined sphere and masculine institutions that the liberal feminist 
demand for equality, is uncritical of. 
! 
Out of this dissatisfaction, radical feminism emerged which holds the view that 
patriarchy is the root of all forms of oppression. An early phase of radical 
feminism however, shared with liberal feminism the view that women's liberation 
is possible only through the liberation from and control of biology, or 
alternatively expressed, nature. A prominent and well-cited representative of this 
first wave of radical feminism (relevant particularly from an ecofeminist 
perspective), is Shulamith Firestone ( 1970), who argues that the oppression of 
women is grounded in women's biological reproductive role. She argues that 
since patriarchy is grounded in women's biological constitution, women need to 
liberate themselves from the constraints imposed on them by their reproductive 
capacities. What Firestone proposes, is to transform the biological basis of 
women's oppression by replacing biological reproduction with artificial 
technological processes. According to Firestone, reproductive technology holds 
the key to women's liberation, and commends it for its 'victory over the 
Kingdom of Nature"' (Jaggar, 1983: 92; quoting Firestone, 1970: 9). 5 
5 Together with liberal feminism, ear1y radical feminist thought is also identified as equality 
feminism, given the respective arguments forwarded either explicitly or implicitly for the 
erasure of differences between men and women (Gatens, 1991; Braidotti, 1991; Grosz, 
1990). The view of the self that is endorsed is one that is consistent with the liberal view of the 
self. The neutrality that this notion of the self is suggestive of has its roots in the liberal view of 
the human, which is by definition male or masculine. Leading figures of equality feminism 
then are Wolstonecraft (1792/1978), Millet (1969), De Beauvoir (1964}, and Firestone (1970). 
Equality feminism however, has an additional branch, which is associated with those gender 
theorists whose aim is the establishment of equality between men and women outside of the 
liberal framework, and who, when it comes to gender identity, endorse some form of 
androgyny. It is particularly early socialist or materialist feminism that falls into this category. 
As I have stressed, in this chapter, the confines of radical feminist thinking are transgressed 
to include the insights of some social/ist ecofeminists. The reason why it is not inappropriate 
to do so, is because in ecological literature, this ecofeminist position is generally received as 
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In the course of radical feminism's development, however, a significant 
divergence from liberal feminism and the first phase of radical feminism 
occurred. The former's emphasis on the similarities between men and women is 
rejected in favour of an affirmation of women's difference. In stark contrast with 
Firestone's dim view of women's biology, a celebration and revaluation of 
women's (biological) difference and its connectedness to the natural world 
followed. 
Cultural ecofeminism shares with radical feminism the view that patriarchy is the 
root of all forms of oppression. 6 Like later radical feminism, it also valuates 
women's difference positively, which distinguishes it sharply from liberal 
feminism. Deriving the attribute "cultural" from its call upon all women to found 
an alternative female culture to replace the "misogynist, hierarchical, 
domineering, violent and death-denying culture of patriarchy" (Zimmerman, 
1994: 236), cultural ecofeminism sees patriarchy and all its manifestations also 
as responsible for the wanton destruction of the natural environment and thus 
principally responsible for the ecological crisis. This concern with the natural 
environment signifies a disjunction with the technophilia of Firestone's version of 
radical feminism, as the environmental degradation and exploitation along with 
nuclear and toxic waste and air and water pollution as a result of the 
implementation of technology, has come under sharp criticism by cultural 
ecofeminists (amongst others). The ideal of science - total control over nature -
embodied in advanced technology is rejected outright by cultural ecofeminists as 
being one of the primary causes of environmental destruction and degradation. 7 
In the following section, I will illustrate the aspects of patriarchal culture that 
cultural ecofeminists single out as sanctioning the domination and subjugation of 
both women and nature. 
affirming women's difference (thus coinciding with radical feminism) along with the different 
values that inform women's traditional roles (Zimmerman, 1994; Dobson, 1995). Because this 
notion of the self that coincides with these roles and values are however ultimately presented 
as desirable for both men and women which has a neutralising effect, the link is made with 
equality feminism. The analyses of these thinkers' work seldom move beyond this focus on 
women's difference, and the suggestion by some gender theorists that the differences in 
between the genders in terms of identity should be erased, (once these differences are 
acknowledged and the positive aspects incorporated), hardly receives any attention. In the 
last section of this chapter, the evaluation, this will receive the deserved attention. 
6This is not always explicitly stated, but it is implied in the argument that the domination of 
nature is the effect of nature's association with women. 
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3. Patriarchal culture: woman, nature and the self 
3.1. Philosophical dualism 
The belief that unites the diverse group of thinkers whose views I hope to show 
strengthen and overlap with each other, is that the twin domination and 
subordination of women and nature is an effect of patriarchy (Gray, 1981; 
Spretnak, 1993; Griffin, 1978, 1989; Daly, 1978, 1984; Collard, 1988; Salleh, 
1984; Birkeland, 1992; Shiva, 1989, 1990; Plant, 1989). For the reader who 
would like to be reminded, patriarchy here, to put it in simple terms, refers to the 
rule of the fathers - and in more senses than one. Stating that patriarchy lies at 
the root of the domination of women and nature is in effect to argue that all 
forms of oppression can be traced back to patriarchy, that is the domination of 
women by men. In support of this view, Mary Daly extends the viciousness of 
patriarchy to include a number of other atrocities, asserting that "the polluting, 
poisoning, contaminating evil of men's rule of phallocracy" is ultimately 
responsible for the pervasiveness of "rapism, racism, gynocide, genocide and 
ultimately biocide" (Daly, 1984: 379). 
To come back to the twin dominations of women and nature, different 
arguments are put forward to link the simultaneous domination and 
subordination of women and the natural environment in patriarchal culture. Often 
alluded to, but seldom accompanied by an in depth analysis,8 it is maintained 
that the domination of both women and nature can be accounted for by 
philosophical dualism. In agreement with others (Griffin, 1978; Gray, 1981; 
Birkeland, 1992), who either explicitly or implicitly argue that dualism is an 
expression of patriarchal consciousness, Gray (1981: 5) asserts that hierarchical 
dualism has been revealed as a "patriarchal myth that rationalise and justify a 
society that puts women down and men up". 
In her book Green Paradise Lost (1981 ), Gray, who is a theologian, maintains 
7 This line of argument is particular to the social/ist stream within ecofeminist thinking. 
8 As we shall see, this lack of a thorough engagement with the nature and functioning of 
dualism can be shown to be the reason why cultural ecofeminists apparently have difficulty to 
adequately and convincingly move beyond dualism. 
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that the domination of both women and nature can be ascribed to philosophical 
dualism which generates "a vision of reality as hierarchical with God and man 
above and women and nature below" (Gray, 1981: 4). Accordingly, man and 
God are perceived to be closer to the spiritual as opposed to those occupying the 
lower sphere, who are perceived to dwell in the realm of the fleshly, unspiritual 
and subsequently, inherently evil. This hierarchical framework, argues Gray, 
sanctions the mistreatment, violation and killing of the members of the lower 
order - whether female, child, animal or plant - according to the needs of 
members of the higher order (Gray, 1981: 2-6). 
Another significant feature of philosophical dualism is that its structure shapes 
and dominates our perceptions to such an extent that it creates severe 
distortions, these distortions pertaining specifically to the question of difference. 
That is, as Gray declares "when confronted with differences we distort 
differences ... so intimately is it a part of how we perceive that we never seem 
to assess difference as just that- different" (Gray, 1981: 19). 
For Gray, the oppression of women and nature can ultimately be traced back to 
the masculine/feminine, mind/body, spirit/flesh dualisms. Identified with the 
superior realm of mind and spirit, Man (representing God's authority on earth), 
has historically occupied the privileged pole of a number of dualist pairs, whilst 
women and nature have been designated to the inferior realm of the physical and 
the material (Gray, 1981: 5-8). This identification of women and nature with the 
realm of the physical has served as a justification of the domination and 
exploitation of both. In contrast, the subject of philosophical reflection is 
portrayed as coinciding with the superior realm of the mental, and exhibits an 
explicit aversion to and denial of the body. She (Gray, 1981: 22-23) proceeds to 
quote Becker (1973: 25-27) who, in awe of what boils down to a narcissistic 
reflection of himself, illustrates this point succinctly: 
His body is a material fleshly casing that is alien to him in many ways 
- the strangest and most repugnant way being that it aches and 
bleeds and will decay and die .... [Yet] he has an awareness of his 
own splendid uniqueness in that he sticks out of nature with a 
towering majesty ... 
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In conclusion, Gray ( 1981: 26) maintains that the domination and inferiorisation 
of women and nature as grounded in hierarchical dualism, is also a manifestation 
of deeper-lying emotions and widely held assumptions prevalent in Western 
culture. She writes: 
Our culture's view of nature is deeply embedded not only in a 
hierarchical view of reality, but also in deeply felt attitudes towards 
what it views to be the bearers of sheer physicalness, namely sex, 
women, mother and death (my emphasis, FM). 
The above quotation anticipates a different approach some cultural ecofeminists 
(King, 1989; Griffin, 1989; 1990; Gray, 1981; Spretnak, 1993) follow to 
account for the twin dominations of women and nature. The psychological 
account that is offered for the domination of women and nature, is related to 
dualism as discussed above, but, as dualism is ultimately offered as the 
manifestation of these factors, I treat it as part of a separate argument within 
cultural ecofeminism. (Although, as we will see, separating the two, does lapse 
into circularity.) 
3.2 A psychology of fear of the other 
For ecofeminists such as Griffin (1989) and King (1989), the specifically 
masculinist self dominant in Western patriarchal culture, is one that is 
constituted through the severing of connections with and negation of the other. 
It is argued that this sharp separation from and denial of the other is evidence of 
a deeper impulse, fear: that is, fear of women and nature and ultimately the fear 
of mortality. In this regard King cites De Beauvoir (1968) who has pointed out 
that patriarchal culture gives expression to the male fear of mortality of which 
women and nature, who are associated with the physical, the vulnerable and 
change, are constant reminders (King, 1989: 21 ). This fear finds its expression 
in the objectification and domination of nature and women, turning both into 
others to be appropriated and controlled (Griffin, 1989: 12; King, 1989: 21-23). 
According to King (1989:22) the process of objectification is made possible and 
is based upon a profound forgetting by men. This is a denial of their dependence 
on the realm of what is generally considered as necessity, and therefore taken 
for granted: 
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in their early helpless years, and are dependent on nonhuman nature 
all their lives, which allows first for objectification and then for 
domination. 9 
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Linking up with the above, but focusing specifically on nature, Griffin elaborates 
on what she identifies as a fundamentally "split culture". According to Griffin 
(1989: 9-17), such a split is brought about by the severing and denial of the 
self's connection with nature. 10 Picking upon King's line of argument, she asserts 
that underlying the perception of the self as superior to nature, lies a dreadful 
fear, "and the fear that lies under this thought, like all fear, turns into rage" 
(Griffin, 1989: 1 0). For Griffin then, the control of nature signifies the ongoing 
struggle to deny the self's connectedness with the natural which culminates in 
Western culture's death-denying obsession to ameliorate our technology so as to 
escape the natural cycles and rhythms of nature, and ultimately death: 
The very images that express our power over Nature take us back to 
our own memory and knowledge of Nature's power both within and 
outside ourselves. Therefore our delusion demands that we gain a 
greater control over nature. We must escalate our efforts. We must 
improve ~ur technology (Griffin, 1989: 12). 11 
To resist the infinite regress that an attempt to explain the existence of the male 
fear of mortality (as opposed to its apparent absence in life-affirming women), in 
this context necessarily leads us to, I would like to take this opportunity to shift 
the focus of this discussion somewhat. 12 Apart from the fear of mortality, which 
9 Focusing on the denial of dependence of women and nature, the socialist feminist roots of 
much ecofeminist thinking is brought to light. 
10 Griffin's focus on nature is characterised by a blurring of a distinction between women and 
nature. That is, to speak of nature is almost to speak of women. In defense of Griffin however, 
Davion (1994:9), and Caralssare (1994: 226-228), have argued that her book Women and 
Nature, The Roaring Inside Her (1978) offers a detailed illustration of how women and nature 
have been associated with each other and how this association has operated to the detriment 
of both. The problem as we will see, is not her exposure of the (material) relationship between 
women and nature, but her tendency to also promote a relation of identification between 
women and nature. 
11 This point of critique links up with the ecofeminist critique of instrumental rationality, which 
is discussed in the following section, titled, Western science and Cartesian-Newtonianism. 
12 This shift in focus is my suggestion. The inability to give a persuasive explanation of the 
source of this fear of mortality, that is, one that does not lapse into a circular argument, makes 
cultural ecofeminism vulnerable to criticism that has led to its dismissal by many a critic. As 
we shall see, this kind of argument is consistent with the shattering charge of biological 
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illuminates the male psyche, another psychological theory is offered to account 
for the male domination and suppression of women and nature. Not wholly 
inconsistent with the view of the male psyche as possessed by a deep lying fear, 
some cultural ecofeminists look toward object relations theory for insight. 
Drawing upon Chodorow's (1974, 1978) object relations theory, Gray (1981) 
asserts that the twin dominations of women and nature is the effect of a specific 
psychosexual orientation that is revealed if we analyse the process that shapes 
masculine identity. The line of reasoning of object relations theory is that the 
infant's relation to the mother (who most often is the primary caretaker), is of 
special significance in the development of male and female gender identities. 
This relation to the mother has a particularly profound impact on the male 
perception of women and the feminine. 
According to Chodorow, at first both sexes experience a primary identification 
with the mother. When they start developing their own separate identities 
however, the experience of the two sexes differs significantly. The girl-child 
discovers that she has made her primary identification with a member of her 
own sex, and is encouraged to continue modeling herself after the female. The 
boy-child however, discovers that his identification with the mother is 
inappropriate, and that he has to model himself after a father figure that is 
mostly absent. The boy experiences an intense identity crisis that requires a 
severing of the ties with mother and an internalisation of this process of 
separation. Gray (1981: 37) quotes Chodorow (1974: 50) who articulates the 
boy's response to this crisis as follows: 
A boy, in his attempt to gain an elusive masculine identification, often 
comes to define himself in largely negative terms, as that which is 
not feminine or not involved with women ... Internally the boy tries to 
reject his mother and deny his attachment to her and the strong 
dependence that he still feels ... He does this by repressing whatever 
he takes to be feminine inside himself, and importantly, by 
denigrating and devaluing whatever he considers feminine in the 
essentialism that is brought against cultural ecofeminism. This "reverse demonisation" makes 
obvious cultural ecofeminism's continued entrapment in dualist thinking. Moreover, as we 
shall see in the final section of this chapter, titled An evaluation of cultural ecofeminism, 
accounting for the twin dominations of women and nature in psychological terms are also 
received with severe skepticism. 
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outside world. As a societal member, he also appropriates to himself 
and defines as superior particular social activities and cultural (moral, 
religious, and creative) spheres - possibly in fact, "society" ... and 
"culture" ... themselves (emphasis Gray's). 
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What the above psychological account of the development and maintenance of 
masculine gender identity illustrates is that, and perhaps most significantly in 
this context, also why women and by implication nature, are experienced as 
threatening to the masculine self. As we have seen then, this identity is 
reinforced and affirmed through the systematic domination and subjugation of 
both women and nature. 13 
Charlene Spretnak (1993) concurs with Griffin, King and Gray and claims that 
"the elemental power of the female" threatens the security of the male self 
which is maintained by "guarding [his] autonomy and independence through 
domination and control" (Spretnak, 1993: 121 ). In keeping with the above 
analysis, Spretnak (1993) shows how the constitution of the (male) self in 
opposition to the "female" is reflected in the characteristics that are displayed by 
the masculinist self, which in turn accounts for the male fear of women or the 
feminine: 
For men raised in (patriarchal) societies the informing obsession is to 
be 'not-woman', not emotionally invested in relationships, not 
'vulnerable' through empathy, not weak in physicality, not docile. 
Autonomy is the goal, and there is great pleasure in distinguishing 
oneself from the pack. Life is often experienced as atomized, 
-----
13 What is of course frustrating and inadequate about Chodorow's account is that her 
argument is ultimately of a circular nature. She shows how certain gender patterns (read: 
male domination) are repeated by mothering performed by women. However, the explanation 
she offers itself appeals to male domination, that has its basis in the perceived inferiority of 
women (Nicholson, 1986: 86). This brings us to another shortcoming in Chodorow's theory, 
and that is that she does not explain why this gender pattern perpetuates itself, what is it that 
enables boys to establish their identities in the fashion explicated above (Scott, 1986: 1 063). 
Conversely, as (Flax, 1990b: 47) points out, object relations theory "cannot explain why 
women have the primary responsibility in childrearing". Moreover, skepticism is also 
expressed about the suggestion that it is simply a question of socialisation and shared 
parenting that would "set things right" (Frazer and Nicholson, 1990: 30). In this regard, Gross 
(1990: 192) writes: " ... such an equality, even if it is possible, will not provide a solution to 
patriarchal power relations, in so far as the same behaviour in the sexes will retain a different 
(unequal) meaning unless the very structures of significance and meaning, and not just social 
practices, are tackled. Chodorow's position does not address the intermeshing and 
interdependence of social and significatory practices". 
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alienating . . . Rage, fear and loneliness are common psychological 
themes for men raised under patriarchy; detachment of feeling is the 
acceptable coping strategy (Spretnak, 1993: 119-120). 
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Back to the theme ·of male disconnectedness, the threat that women, and to a 
certain extent nature, pose to the establishment and maintenance of the rational, 
autonomous and independent (masculinist) self is consistent with a notion of the 
self that is alienated and disconnected from the other. Moreover, this fear of the 
other provides an explanation for the oppression and domination of both women 
and nature. From a cultural ecofeminist perspective, the psychological link that 
connects these two forms of domination is revealed. As I have shown, for 
cultural ecofeminists, this link is fear, and not any kind of fear, but a fear of an 
existential kind. A further aspect that links these two forms of domination that 
has been alluded to in the above discussion, regards the epistemological 
framework which expresses a relation of control and suppression of both women 
and nature. It is on this epistemological connection that I would presently like to 
focus. 
3.3 Western science and Cartesian-Newtonianism 
Western science, specifically Cartesian-Newtonian science, is sharply criticised 
by cultural ecofeminism for embodying a mode of thinking that is hostile to both 
women (the feminine) and nature (Shiva, 1888, 1989; Griffin, 1989; Spretnak, 
1993). This can be discerned not only in the images of women and nature that 
are employed in modern scientific discourse, but also the characterisation of 
scientific knowledge and by implication, its methodology. The former is revealed 
as promoting and legitimising the domination and subjugation of women and 
nature, whilst the latter, articulated in genderised terms, reinforces the 
denigration and inferiorisation of women and nature and therefore sanctions the 
mastery of both. 
In The Death of Nature Carolyn Merchant (1983)14 argues that the domination of 
14 Coinciding with the critique of Western rationalism and its offshoots articulated by 
ecofeminists (Piumwood 1991, 1993; Merchant, 1990; King, 1989, 1990) who have their .roots 
(partly) in the German tradition of Critical Theory, Merchant's analysis focuses on the rise of 
mechanistic science as the moment in history that announced the death of nature. Here, I am 
giving an exposition of aspects of her account, with the aim to illuminate what remains an 
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women and nature is linked to the rise of modern science, which conceives of 
the nature in mechanistic terms as opposed to that of an organism. She (1980: 
xvii) articulates the intersection of the domination of women and nature with the 
ascent of mechanistic science as follows: 
In investigating the roots of our environmental dilemma and its 
connections to science [and] technology . . . we must reexamine the 
formation of a world-view and science that, by reconceptualising 
reality as a machine rather than a living organism, sanctioned the 
domination of both women and nature. 
Merchant contrasts what turns out to be a mechanistic worldview with a 
preceding organic era which "view of nature and society was based on the 
organic analogy between the human body, the microcosm, and the larger world, 
the macrocosm" (Merchant, 1983: 5). Significantly, during this period the 
natural environment was conceived of as nurturing mother, which functioned as 
a constraint on the behaviour of people. 15 Merchant proceeds to give a historical 
account of how this view of nature as living organism gradually diminished to 
the status of lifeless matter. With the scientific revolution during the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, the view of nature as nurturing mother gave way to 
be dominated by images of nature as wild woman: uncontrollable, to be tamed 
and subdued. Employing female imagery of nature oft quoted "father of modern 
science" Francis Bacon transformed scientific knowledge and method to a form 
of human power over nature: man was to enslave nature and torture her secrets 
from her (Merchant, 1983: 169). 
Mechanistic philosophy, which views the world as consisting of interchangeable 
atomised parts that could be repaired and replaced from outside, was developed 
during the 1620's and 1630's by Descartes (Merchant, 1993: 272-276). 
Invoking the metaphor of the machine to describe the complex constitution and 
functioning of the natural environment was the final step in the declaration of 
unsatisfactory cultural ecofeminist analysis and critique of the role of Western scientific 
thinking, in particular Cartesian-Newtonianism, in the destruction of the natural environment. It 
is in Chapter 2 that a critique of Western rationalism takes on a slightly different countenance. 
15 Merchant (1996: 77) also points out that at the same time, another female image of nature 
as "wild and uncontrollable nature that could render violence, storms, droughts and general 
chaos" was also prevalent at this time, which as we will see, later became the dominant view 
of nature. 
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the death of nature. Nature was reduced to passive and inert brute matter, 
subject to man's scientific and technological endeavours. Similarly, the image of 
nature was transposed onto women who were perceived as passive, emotional 
objects in opposition to her active, rational male counterpart (Braidotti et a/, 
1994: 30). 
Feminist critics of science (Bordo, 1986; Fox-Keller, 1985) have revealed how, 
analogous to the manner in which nature has systematically been turned into the 
object of knowledge by means of female imagery, the exclusion and suppression 
of the feminine in scientific discourse has functioned to the detriment of women. 
First and foremost, scientific thought is articulated in specifically masculine 
terms, as rational, objective, and universally true, thus uncontaminated by the 
emotional, subjective and specific - qualities that are associated with the 
feminine. The knowing subject, in opposition to the body, emotionality and 
specificity, is depicted as representing mind, rationality and objectivity. The 
methodology that science employs, is one that invokes a sharp split between the 
knowing subject and the object of knowledge, a division which as we shall 
shortly see, is in keeping with the articulation of the scientific mode of thinking 
as masculine and the knower as male. Evelyn Fox-Keller (1985: 79), who was 
one of the first critics to point out the gendered and instrumental character of 
western science, argues that scientific thought and methodology are intertwined 
and articulated in explicitly masculinist terms, and conceived of in opposition to 
women and the feminine: 
Having divided the world into two parts - the knower (mind) and the 
knowable (nature) - scientific ideology goes on to prescribe a specific 
relation between the two. It prescribes the interactions which can ... 
lead to knowledge. Not only are mind and nature assigned gender, 
but in characterising scientific and objective thought as masculine, 
the very activity by which the knower can acquire knowledge is also 
genderised. The relation specified between knower and known is one 
of distance and separation ... The modes of intercourse are defined so 
as to ensure emotional and physical violation of the subject. The 
scientific mind is set off from what is to be known ... and its 
autonomy is guaranteed by setting apart its modes of knowing from 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
those in which that dichotomy is threatened. In this process, the 
characterisation of both the scientific mind and its modes of knowing 
as masculine are indeed significant. Masculine here connotes ... 
autonomy, separation and distance. It connotes a radical rejection of 
any comingling of subject and object, which are ... quite consistently 
identified as male and female. 
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The sharp separation enacted between the subject and object of knowledge 
serves to reinforce the masculine character of the scientific mode of thinking, as 
this separation makes possible the acquisition of knowledge that is rational and 
objective. The metaphors used to describe the knowing subject's approach to 
the object further links a masculine mode of scientific thinking with the 
domination not only of nature but also women. In keeping with the images of 
domination that are utilized by Bacon in his description of scientific and 
technological enterprise, scientific methodology is articulated in highly sexualised 
terms. In this regard, the metaphor of penetration is significant (Fox-Keller, 
1985: 51), as is vision or the scientific gaze as the instrument of penetration 
(Bordo, 1986). Through the eroticisation of scientific knowledge and the power 
it yields, the gendered nature of science is connected with the domination of 
nature, women and the feminine. 
These genderised images of science and scientific knowledge, coupled with 
explicit images of domination and control are synonymous with a particular 
characterisation of the modern scientific project. If we recall, the image of nature 
as organism was replaced with an image of nature as disorder (wild and 
uncontrollable). This new image of nature paved the way for that which 
Merchant (1996: 77) identifies as "an important modern idea, that of power over 
nature". In keeping with this line of thinking, Griffin, invoking and exposing the 
non-innocence of the adage "knowledge is power", maintains that power over 
nature is attained through knowledge of nature, "[i]n order to control Nature, we 
must know Nature" (Griffin, 1989: 1 0). The mastery and control of nature, 
which lies at the core of the project of Modernity, culminates in what is 
commonly referred to as instrumental rationality (Eckersley, 1992: 97-1 04; 
Dobson, 1993: 191-194; Adorno and Horkheimer, 1973: 4-13). On the one 
hand, instrumental rationality denotes a view of nature as resource, instrument 
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to the endeavours of man. On the other, in its application of technology to turn 
nature into resource, it links up with the belief that through the application of 
scientific knowledge in advanced technology, humans can liberate themselves 
from the constraints of nature. 
The cultural ecofeminist critique of science then, implies a critique also of 
instrumental rationality (Gray, 1981: 46-47; Griffin, 1990: 46-47; Diamond, 
1994: 20-21 ), (although in cultural ecofeminist thinking proper, it is not 
accompanied by a thorough discussion or explicitly brought in relation with the 
instrumentalisation of nature). Griffin however, does allude to this explicitly. In 
addition to her critique of the implementation of technology as control (read: 
domination) of nature, Griffin writes: "we live not through the understanding of 
Nature, but through the manipulation of Nature" (Griffin, 1989: 14). As Griffin 
(1989) has also touched upon, from a cultural ecofeminist perspective, the view 
of science and its close associate, technology, as liberatory has paradoxically 
had catastrophic results in the form of environmental destruction and 
degradation. Moreover, toxic waste, chemical products and their by-products, a 
depleted ozone layer, acid rain and the risks involved in the use of nuclear 
energy, are but a few of the threats that are posed to the well-being and health 
of humans and ultimately- the survival of the planet (Diamond, 1994: 20). 16 
Having discussed the philosophical, psychological and epistemological factors 
that are respectively offered by cultural ecofeminism to account for the twin 
dominations of women and nature, I would now like to focus on one response to 
the environmental crisis which has particular implications for how we conceive 
of our selves in relation to the natural environment. What comes to the fore here 
is a notion of the self that diverges sharply from the dominant self in patriarchal 
Western culture. 
16 Echoing this point of critique, albeit shifting the focus somewhat to the ecofeminist critique 
of the forms of development that the West imposes on developing countries, Shiva 
emphasises how it is the vulnerable, women and the poor in Third World countries who are 
disproportionately affected by environmental destruction. Shiva (1989, 1990) argues the 
distinctly social/ist ecofeminist point that development projects foreign to indigenous social 
organisation, renders Third World women in particular, vulnerable. And this is not only in 
terms of their health and wellbeing, but also their continued survival. 
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4. Reconceiving the self 
The different, but related notions of the self that are endorsed by cultural 
ecofeminists, are articulated in reaction and in opposition to the dominant 
conception of the self within patriarchal society. As I have illustrated in the 
preceding section, the masculinist self is conceived of oppositionally, in terms 
that designate the other to the realm of inferiority. It is argued by cultural 
ecofeminism that this relation between self and other sanctions the 
subordination and denigration of women and nature. To establish relations that 
move beyond the oppression and devaluation of nature and women, cultural 
ecofeminists endorse and affirm a revaluation of that which is systematically 
devalued and suppressed in patriarchal culture. 
The view of the self that is alternatively celebrated and affirmed, is one that 
embodies a fundamental connection to nature so as to replace a masculinist self 
that is characterised by severe alienation and disconnectedness (Griffin, 1989, 
1990; Gray, 1981; Metzger, 1989; Spretnak, 1989, 1991). It is believed that 
healing this split will transform the domination and control of nature. However, 
as the dominant self is conceived of not only in opposition but also a~ superior 
not only to nature, but also women and the feminine, the self that cultural 
ecofeminist endorse entails also a different appraisal of women and the feminine. 
In this regard, Davion ( 1 994: 23) refers to the enthusiastic affirmation among 
cultural ecofeminists, of that which is often referred to as "the feminine 
principle", the reason being that this principle offers a unique understanding of 
human connection with the natural world. Such a positive appraisal of the 
feminine is often found in literature on Goddess spirituality, which represents one 
strand within cultural ecofeminist thought. 17 In her illustration of the 
convergence between Goddess worshipping and ecological consciousness, Eisler 
( 1 990) argues that a positive valuation of the feminine principle instills respect 
and brings about a relation of care towards nature, thus offering a fruitful avenue 
for us to explore in transforming our treatment of the natural environment. She 
17 Other prominent representatives of Goddess spirituality are Christ (1990, 1991); Starhawk 
(1989); and Spretnak (1989, 1991). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
( 1990: 23-24) writes: 
Prehistoric societies worshipped the Goddess of nature and 
spirituality, our great Mother, the giver of life and creator of us all. 
But even more fascinating is that these ancient societies were 
structured very much like the more peaceful and just society we are 
now trying to construct. In short they were societies that had what 
we today call an ecological consciousness: the awareness that the 
earth must be treated with reverence and respect. And this reverence 
for life-giving and life-sustained power of the earth was rooted in a 
social structure where women and 'feminine' values such as caring, 
compassion and non-violence were not subordinate to men and the 
so-called masculine values of conquest and domination. Rather, the 
life-giving powers incarnated in women's bodies were given the 
highest social value (my emphasis, FM). 18 
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It is against this background that Spretnak (1989, 1991) articulates her 
understanding of how women are predisposed to establishing an ecologically 
sound relation with nature. Picking up on the life-giving powers of women and 
nature, she sets out to give content to how we can create an understanding of 
our selves as continuous with nature. An important aspect of Goddess 
spirituality is the honouring of the "earth body" via our "personal bodies" 
(Spretnak, 1991: 133). In contrast to the domination and denigration of women 
in patriarchal culture then, Spretnak calls upon her audience to celebrate and 
honour the "sacred elemental power" of the female (Spretnak, 1991: 191 ). This 
power finds its expression in the potentiality to grow people of "either sex from 
her flesh, to bleed in rhythm with the moon, to transform food into milk for 
infants" (Spretnak, 1991: 116). Moreover, the earth body and the female body 
are depicted here as significantly connected, the one continuous with the other, 
and it is asserted that the image of nature strongly emulates the above 
description of the female body. Spretnak, (1991: 134) writes: 
18 Quite astonishingly, Eisler forgets that "respect" and "reverence" for women's life-giving 
powers is quite consistent with the oppression and subjugation of women. As such, respect 
for celebrating women's life-giving potentialities offers no guarantee that this will not be 
employed to "keep women in their place"! This is not to say that women's childbearing abilities 
should not be acknowledged and treated with due respect, on the contrary. However the 
romanticisation thereof, obscures the complex (socio-economical and political) issues that 
surround childbearing and necessarily childrearing - usually to the disadvantage of none other 
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. . . the bountiful manifestations of the Earth as emanating from a 
fertile body - an immense female whose tides moved in rhythm with 
the moon, whose rivers sustained life, whose soil/flesh yielded food, 
whose caves offered ritual womb-rooms for ceremonies of sacred 
community within her body, whose vast subterranean womb received 
all humans in burial. It is not difficult to understand why they held her 
sacred. 
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Honouring and celebrating the creative powers of the female is believed to 
generate renewed respect and humility toward the sacredness of the earth. 
Sharing the same creative potential and flowing with natural rhythms and tides, 
it follows for Spretnak (1991: 138) that women's experience of their bodies 
endow them with a "consciousness of a larger reality" that bestows upon them 
the potential to reveal "nature's mysteries" (Spretnak, 1989: 129).19 The female 
self thus perceived, clearly embodies a different relation to nature, one that is 
not characterised by rigid division and fear of loss of boundaries, but rather by 
connectedness that induces a sense of harmony: 
A woman often experiences a sense of soft boundaries of her body 
on the first day of menstruation. In the postorgasmic state, many 
women experience a peaceful, expansive mindstate of freefloating 
boundarylessness. (Many men, especially young men, describe their 
postorgasmic state as a sensation of weakness and vulnerability; 
some call it Ia petit mort, the little death) (Spretnak, 1993: 138). 
In keeping with the above, Spretnak maintains that the experiences inherent to 
women's sexuality express the "essential holistic nature of life on earth, they are 
"body parables" of the profound oneness and interconnectedness of all 
matter/energy" (Spretnak, 1989: 129). Women's "oceanic feeling of oneness 
with the universe" (Spretnak, 1991: 138) and "experience of running on cosmic 
time" is offered as exemplary of a self defined as continuous with nature 
(Spretnak, 1989: 128). Setting women's experience off against men's, Spretnak 
than women themselves. 
19 In conjunction with Spretnak, Griffin invokes an almost spiritualist epistemology according 
to which women's closeness to nature endows her with special powers. Griffin (1978: 175) 
writes: "[w]e can read bodies with our hands, read the earth, find water, trace gravity's path. 
We know what grows and how to balance one thing against another ... and even if over our 
bodies they have transformed this earth, we say, the truth is, women still dream". 
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(1989: 128) argues that men's "moments of heightened experience" is the result 
of their relative exclusion from the process of giving birth and nurturing 
(Spretnak, 1989: 129). She (1989: 129) writes: 
They have often written that such instances occur during the hunting 
of a large animal, the landing/killing of a large fish, the moments 
before combat. Not feeling intrinsically involved in the process of 
birthing and nurture, nor strongly disposed to emphatic communion, 
men turned their attention for many eras toward the other aspect of 
the cycle, death. 
In an attempt to avoid an overgeneralisation and inferiorisation of male 
experience as marked by an essential disconnectedness, Spretnak later qualifies 
this statement by expressing the view that men too, can have life-affirming 
experiences. Inconsistent with this gesture however, she (1989: 131) concludes 
her essay by stating that "the authentic female mind is our salvation" (whatever 
that may be!), revealing a continued privileging of a notion of a female self, in 
opposition and as superior to a male self. 20 
Like Spretnak, Gray ( 1981: 1 09-114) views women as the "bearers of a 
different consciousness", also via her physical connectedness to "nature" (Gray, 
1981: 1 09). Again the different bodily experiences of men and women are 
invoked as having significant bearing upon their perceptions of the world. Male 
bodily experience is "quite lacking in experiences which would help him forge an 
adequate worldview and relationship to nature or concept of limits" (Gray, 1981: 
1 0). Women on the other hand, have a definite advantage as female bodily 
experience places an inescapable limit upon her physical existence, one that she 
has to adapt to and learn to live with. Given this awareness of limits, Gray 
asserts that this would prevent women from "dream[ing] up a sense of self as 
unlimited and all-conquering mind" (Gray, 1981: 111). Menstruation also 
provides women with an "inescapable connection with the natural world, a 
sense which is further heightened by the experiences of pregnancy and 
childbirth" (Gray, 1981: 111 ). 21 
20 Here it is hardly possible to ignore the suggestion that womankind, thanks to her biological 
constitution, embodies the answer to our ecological problems. 
21 The emphasis that is consistently placed on women's connectedness with nature via her 
childbearing capacities and the power this endows upon her is also echoed by other cultural 
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In keeping with the above line of arguments, Gray views pregnancy, the 
awareness of the growing of life inside her, as instilling in women an orientation 
towards caring for future generations. For Gray, an awareness of long term 
implications is something that women are "intuitively" attuned to, whether it 
involves "women, or other social groups or the environment" (Gray, 1981: 112). 
Women's perceptiveness and intuitiveness, lauded as qualities that flow directly 
from their bodily experiences, are starkly contrasted with male consciousness. 
According to Gray, " ... there is a definite limit in the perception of men which is 
imposed upon their consciousness by the lack of certain bodily experiences 
which are present in the life of a woman" (Gray, 1981: 113).22 
In an argument that is ultimately self-defeating, Gray concludes that the male 
perception should not be rejected, but that a balance should be created by 
integrating what, in the final analysis remains a male and complementary female 
perspective: 
I suspect, a balance between male and female perceptions needs 
to emerge. A balance which would be based upon recognition that 
humans come in two diverse forms. This more inclusive human 
experience of reality has been prevented by the powerful social 
conventions of patriarchal society from ever shaping for us a more 
adequate worldview. Thus the problem is not that men perceive like 
men, - but that the male perception is not the entire human 
perception. What has been lacking is articulation of and attention to 
perceptions rooted in female experience (Gray, 1981: 116).23 
In the light of the preceding discussion it is thus evident that the self that 
ecofeminists. Affinity ecofeminist, Andree Collard (1989: 1 06) is of the opinion that "nothing 
links the human animal and nature so profoundly as woman's reproductive system which 
enables her to share the experience of bringing forth and nourishing life with the rest of the 
living world. Whether or not she experiences biological mothering, it is in this that woman is 
most truly a child of nature and in this natural integrity lies the wellspring of her strength". Also 
in affinity ecofeminist mode, Salleh (1984: 340) echoes this view by asserting "[w]omen's 
monthly fertility cycle, the tiring symbiosis of pregnancy, the wrench of childbirth and the 
pleasure of suckling an infant, these things already ground women's consciousness in the 
knowledge of being coterminous with Nature". 
22 It is here that the "feminine" takes on a decidedly biological countenance. 
23 Revealing her socialist and materialist feminist roots, what Gray is ultimately arguing for 
here, is what is often referred to as the argument for some form of androgyny, characteristic 
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cultural ecofeminists view as offering a model for an ecologically sound relation 
to nature, is one that is specifically female. The ecological appeal of a female 
self lies in a connectedness to nature through biological capacities that are 
distinctly female. The characteristics, attributes, and values that are identified as 
feminine and held in high esteem, particularly due to their ecological significance, 
are mostly presented as directly linked to women's connectedness to their 
bodies and by implication, nature. Moreover, women's experiences of their 
bodies bestow upon them a different consciousness that generates the 
establishment of a relationship with nature that is marked by care and 
compassion. As nature is also depicted as female, it follows that women occupy 
a privileged relation to nature: one that is based on women's identification with 
nature through the female body. 
Having discussed and outlined the self that cultural ecofeminism endorses as 
alternative to a male self or masculinist self then, I would now like to turn my 
attention to the ethic that is endorsed by cultural ecofeminism. In the process, 
the notion of the self that is affirmed in cultural ecofeminism will be further 
illuminated. As it was shown in the exposition above, a notion of connectedness 
between self and other is particularly significant in this regard, as this is 
perceived to provide a foundation or basis for ethical conduct in the relation 
between self and nature in particular. As I have also shown, cultural 
ecofeminism often depicts this connectedness between self and nature in terms 
of a biological relationship with nature via the body. In the forthcoming section, 
it will be shown that an ethic based on care as opposed to rights, emphasises 
connectedness and alternative values. However, in my discussion I will also 
argue that a shift can be discerned in cultural ecofeminism in that their focus 
shifts from a perception of women's seemingly inherently caring characters to a 
view of a female gender identity that is socially constructed. The implication of 
this shift for an ethic of care will also be discussed. 
of gender theoretical thinking. 
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5. An Ethic of Care24 
In this section, I focus on the cultural ecofeminist use of a vocabulary of care. 
What becomes pivotal to this discussion, is the notion of the self that informs an 
ethical relation to nature that is marked by care. As we have seen, references to 
conduct towards the natural environment that involves care, nurturing, 
conservation, intuition and so forth, are found in abundance in cultural 
ecofeminist literature. An ethical relation to nature that deviates from a 
traditional rights based ethic is therefore evident. Although an ethic of care is not 
explicitly articulated by cultural ecofeminists themselves, 25 their endorsement of 
an ethical relation with nature marked by nurturing and care, coincides with 
contemporary developments in feminist ethics,26 and the ecofeminist (implicit or 
explicit) critique of moral extentionist environmental ethics (Donovan, 1993; 
Salleh, 1984; Warren, 1990; Plumwood, 1991, 1993). Bringing the cultural 
ecofeminist vocabulary of care in relation with Carol Gilligan's ethic of care 
(Gilligan, 1982) is useful for two reasons. 27 Firstly, it illuminates and situates the 
cultural ecofeminist use of a vocabulary of care. Secondly, an ethical relation 
marked by care denotes a specific conception of the self as relational. The notion 
of the relational self that is articulated here, whilst not conceived of in biological 
terms, coincides with an endorsement of a specifically female self to the extent 
that both express some notion of relationality with the natural environment. 
Moreover as I will demonstrate, the relational self articulated in terms of female 
gender identity moves beyond a restriction to women. 
24 In the section on ethics in Chapter 2, that aspects of an ethic of care are also received 
positively by critical-transformative ecofeminists will become evident. I do, however, also 
show how an ethic of care is engaged with in a manner that differs significantly from the 
cultural ecofeminist use of a vocabulary of care along with the conception of the female self 
that lies central to such an ethic. 
25 See Warren (1990) for a creative ecological feminist appropriation of Gilligan's ethic of 
care. Warren's ethic is not included in this discussion as it also moves beyond an ethic of care 
as discussed here. Because of this, aspects of her contribution to the formulation of an 
ecofeminist ethic are included in Chapter 2, titled Critica/-transformative ecofeminism. 
26 Interestingly, as Card (1991: 3-18) observes, feminist ethics branches out into two main 
streams, one that can be described as a "female ethic" and another that consists of a feminist 
reworking of existing ethical theories. To a certain extent the two streams coincide with the 
distinction that is drawn between difference feminism and equality feminism, the latter of 
which signals a reformist approach, whether liberal or socialist (Braidotti, 1991: 194-195; 
Grosz, 1990: 338). This distinction is however schematic, in the same way that feminist theory 
has moved beyond these categorisations, the same might be said of feminist ethics, at least, 
as we shall see, within the context of critical-transformative ecological feminist thinking. 
27 Other leading figures in the articulation of an ethic of care are Ruddick (1980) and Noddings 
(1984). 
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In the first part titled "Rights, care and nature" I will briefly show how the 
feminist critique of mainstream ethics transfers onto the ecofeminist rejection of 
mainstream environmental ethics.28 To illustrate the central features of the ethic 
of care, I discuss Gilligan's (1982) notion of an ethic of care which can be 
shown to overcome the shortcomings of a rights based ethics as instance of 
moral extensionism. In the section that follows, titled "Ethics, relationality and 
female gender identity", an exposition is given of Chodorow's account of the 
formation of female gender identity. This is appealed to not only by Gilligan to 
explain the occurrence of a care-orientated approach in women, but 
complements the ecofeminist appeal to the different roles that women fulfill as 
offering alternative values to inform our engagement with the natural 
environment. In the discussion of an ethic of care an alternative notion of the 
self comes to the fo.re that is socio-psychologically grounded and therefore 
distinguished from a self that is biologically grounded. Like the female self that is 
conceived as significantly connected to nature, this feminine self is also a 
relational self, but being derived from a notion of female gender identity, it is 
grounded in women's socialisation. 29 
5.1 Rights, care and nature 
Feminists have analysed and criticised ethical theories based on the "doctrine of 
natural rights of man" (Zimmerman, 1987: 29) and argued that it reflects a 
typically male set of experiences and values which replicate aspects of 
patriarchal dualist thinking. As such, rights based ethics has been criticised 
extensively by feminists who have argued that it is androcentric, atomistic, 
hierarchical, dualist, atomistic, universalist and abstract (Zimmerman, 1987: 29; 
King 1991: 76-80). These points of critique converge to challenge a central 
assumption that informs rights based ethics. This is the presupposition of a 
moral agent that is male, or less overtly, defined in masculine terms, that is, 
28 The analysis and critique of rights-based ethics from an ecofeminist perspective below, is 
one that is not performed by ecofeminists themselves. The ecofeminist use of a vocabulary of 
care does however indicate a firm rejection of rights-based ethics, which is why King (1991) 
and Zimmerman (1987, 1994) can apply the feminist critique so successfully. 
29 Whereas earlier values were grounded in women's childbearing capacities, here the 
emphasis shifts for values to be grounded in women's child rearing r.oles. The shift echoes the 
"nature vs. nurture" arguments. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
50 
rationalist, individualist and autonomous- holder of the "natural rights of man". 
The ecofeminist rejection of the strategy to extend rights-based ethics to the 
natural environment (a renunciation expressed predominantly by the use of a 
vocabulary of care), invokes and is grounded in the above points of critique. The 
assessment is as follows: because of the masculinist definition of the human, 
the conception of the human that informs rights based ethics is androcentric; it 
is atomistic because it conceives of humans as isolated individuals; and it is 
grounded in a hierarchical and dualistic structure because of its privileging of 
certain qualities as opposed to others that are perceived as inferior and sharply 
distinct from those valued, thus creating a hierarchy between those who are 
morally considerable and those who are not (Zimmerman, 1 994: 241; King, 
1991: 77).30 The latter two aspects of a rights based ethic are criticised for 
enforcing a culture of sameness that leaves no space for differences - neither 
women's nor nature's (King, 1991: 78). A further point of critique regards the 
abstract and universalist character of rights based theories which "rely on 
abstract distinctions formulated in universalistic principles". These theories 
ignore the significance of emotions as basis for ethical conduct on the one hand, 
along with the particular traits and needs of the individuals involved, yet again 
erasing differences (King, 1991: 77; Zimmerman, 1994: 241 ). 
Moreover, a rights-based ethics that is formulated in abstract universalist terms, 
invokes also a particular understanding of the human that is consistent with the 
liberal view of humans as atomistic beings that act primarily out of self-interest. 
As such, human beings are regarded as inherently egotistical (Zimmerman, 
1987: 29).31 When laid bare for its constructedness however, this powerful 
30 In the context of environmental ethics, this point of critique is leveled at moral extensionism 
in particular. Moral extensionism is a strategy that is followed by proponents of animal 
liberation (Singer: 1975, 1985), and animal rights (Regan: 1982), who argue for the extension 
of the sphere of moral considerability to include animals. In this way the intrinsic worth of 
animals can be recognised, which, along with humans, endow them with rights. Inclusion of 
animals in the domain of moral considerability takes place on the basis of exhibiting certain 
specifically human qualities such as consciousness. This strategy is however anthropocentric 
and grounded in a hierarchical, dualist framework (Warren, 1994: 132; Plumwood: 1993: 131-
133). 
31 Salleh (1984) articulates very similar points of critique, although she directs it at deep 
ecology. This in itself is misdirected, because, like ecofeminism (and social ecology) deep 
ecological thinking is a branch of radical ecology. Deep ecology is articulated in response to 
the shortcomings in what Naess (1985) refers to as "shallow ecology" or reformist 
environmentalism. Moral extensionism of which rights based environmental ethics is an 
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assumption becomes increasingly less inevitable or persuasive.32 To illustrate the 
difference between an approach marked by care as opposed to an ethical 
approach that is rights based, I will briefly sketch Gilligan's description of the 
contrasts between the two approaches with the aim of illuminating the 
characteristics of an ethic of care. Interestingly this is a powerful example of the 
critical force and potential of feminist thinking. 
Placing the significance of relationships central, Carol Gilligan's (1982) 
exposition of an ethic of care and the conception of the self that informs it, 
differ markedly from the notion of the self and ethics as it is traditionally 
conceived.33 The identification of an ethic of care as representative of a 
"different voice" was generated by a study of female moral decision-making, 
which renders this ethic gender related.34 Contrasting the care approach with 
rights, Gilligan (1982: 1 0) illuminates some salient features of the ethic of care 
example, is also grouped with such a reformist approach. The main shortcoming of shallow 
ecology lies in the attempt to address and remedy our ecological problems with the same 
means that are responsible for the destruction and degradation of the natural environment in 
the first place. 
32 Here 1 refer to "constructed ness" in the sense that the view of humans as egotistical is part 
of a system of thought that has a history of say 300 years. It coincides with an interrelated 
cluster of social and historical "developments", comprising the industrial revolution, the 
consequent rise of capitalism, Liberalism, Cartesian-Newtonian science and especially (neo)-
classical economics. The analysis of these theoretical and historical developments reveals 
assumptions that we take for granted as just that: not fixed or inevitable, but very much 
constructed and therefore subject to change and transformation. In this regard the 
significance of the contributions of feminist critiques can not be stressed enough. That is, in 
their analyses and critiques, feminist thinkers have made a generous contribution to 
deconstructing "self-evident truths", and have shown how a feminist analysis can open up 
new and different possibilities, earlier regarded as unheard of. 
33 As such, Gilligan's ethic of care has generated widespread debate, both regarding the 
gendered character of an ethic of care and the latter's seeming opposition to rights based 
political theories. A discussion of the care vs. justice debate is conducted by Kymlicka (1995: 
262-292) and Flanagan and Jackson (1993: 69-85). The question as to whether the "feminine 
voice" is property only of women, is discussed in numerous essays in (amongst others) an 
excellent anthology on an ethic of care edited by Larrabee (1993). In this collection of essays, 
other controversies surrounding an ethic of care, its scientific merit, for example, are also 
documented and subjected to an in depth analysis and discussion. 
34 Gilligan's study was inspired by the psychologist Kohlberg's interpretation of the findings of 
his studies, that girls' moral development progresses slower than that of boys. Instead of 
accepting the apparent regressiveness of female moral decision making, Gilligan set out to 
demonstrate that and in which respects female morality is different, and perhaps even more 
desirable than moral reasoning that is abstract and emotionally detached (Marshall, 1994: 
1 02; Larrabee, 1993: 4; Scott, 1986: 1 065). As such, many have interpreted Gilligan's work as 
endorsing a specific female morality, but she insists that this is not the case. According to 
Gilligan, that an ethic of care is found mostly among (white middle class) females, neither 
suggests biological determinism, nor that it is exclusive to women (Gilligan, 1982: 2). The 
reasons that she puts forward to explain why women tend to display a care attitude more 
frequently than their male counterparts, will however be elaborated upon in the course of this 
explication. 
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as follows: 
In this conception, the moral problem arises from conflicting 
responsibilities rather than from competing rights and requires for its 
resolution a mode of thinking that is contextual and narrative rather 
than formal and abstract. This conception of morality as concerned 
with the activity of care centers moral development around the 
understanding of responsibility and relationships just as the 
conception of morality as fairness ties moral development to the 
understanding of rights and rules (my emphasis, FM). 
52 
According to Gilligan, the two respective approaches to moral problems can then 
also be discerned that are related to gender: 
The moral imperative that emerges repeatedly in interviews with 
women is an injunction to care, a responsibility to discern and 
alleviate the ~real and recognisable trouble' of this world. For men the 
moral imperative appears rather as an injunction to respect the rights 
of others and thus to protect from interference the rights to life and 
self-fulfillment. Women's insistence on care is at first self-critical 
rather than self-protective, while men initially conceive obligation to 
others negatively in terms of non-interference (Gilligan, 1982: 1 00, 
my emphasis, FM). 
The above passages are also suggestive of another aspect of the care ethic that 
pertains to the notion of the self that such an ethic presupposes. Intertwined 
with an ethic of care, lies a specific conception of the self, one that is conceived 
not in isolated individualistic terms, but as in-relationship-with others. Gilligan 
(1982: 74) writes: 
[t]his ethic, which reflects a cumulative knowledge of 
relationships, evolves around a central insight, that self and other are 
interdependent . . . the fact of interconnection informs the central, 
recurring recognition that ... the activity of care enhances both others 
and self (my emphasis, FM). 
In the light of the feminist critique of rights based ethics, it is not surprising that 
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an ethic of care has been embraced by feminists and ecofeminists alike.35 The 
central features of an ethic of care outlined above, indicate how the 
shortcomings identified in rights based ethics can be overcome. First, that an 
ethic of care does not presuppose a moral agent conceived in masculinist terms, 
is self-evident: caring which denotes the involvement of emotions, casting doubt 
on the self as distinctly rational. That the self is conceived of in relational terms, 
is also of particular importance as it challenges not only the conception of the 
self as an individualist autonomous entity, but also the view of the self as an 
atomistic entity that acts primarily out of self-interest, thus challenging the 
assumption that the self is necessarily egoist. From an ecofeminist perspective 
the relational self is of specific importance, as this enables us to conceive of our 
selves as also related to the natural environment. Relationality can also 
destabilise the hierarchical dualist relation between self and other, as 
interrelatedness bridges the dis-connection between self and other, thus making 
possible, but not necessarily guaranteeing, an ethical response to non-humans 
not simply on the basis that they resemble humans. As we have seen, the 
contextualist character of an ethic of care thwarts the abstract and universalist 
character of rights based ethics. This enables us to view relationships as sources 
of ethical behaviour and makes possible an acknowledgement of the specific 
needs and interests of those we stand in relationship with. 36 
Having outlined the main features of the ethical approach marked by care, I 
would now like to turn to a discussion of the notion of the relational self that 
informs an ethic of care. As I will show, this notion of a feminine self coincides 
with the cultural ecofeminist appeal to women's social roles as offering us 
alternative ecological values. 
5.2 Ethics, relationality and female gender identity 
In the preceding section I have shown that central to an ethic of care lies a 
notion of the self that is conceived of in relational terms. The cultural 
35 Although, as we have seen, with regard to the latter, it is more a case of a vocabulary of 
care that is adopted. 
36 That an ethic of care thus appropriated, is of particular significance from an ecofeminist 
perspective, is no doubt the case. However, as attractive as it may seem at first glance, it is, 
within the context of cultural ecofeminism at least, not wholly unproblematic. The causes for 
concern will be elaborated upon in further detail in the last section of this chapter. 
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ecofeminist conception of the female self that was discussed in the section 
"Reconceiving the self", can be said to offer one particular interpretation of the 
notion of relationality, specifically with regard to the relationship between 
women and nature. In this section I discuss a different but coinciding account of 
the relational self as feminine self that is endorsed by cultural ecofeminism. This 
is illustrated with reference to Chodorow's theory of the formation of female 
gender identity, brought to light by her ideas on the reproduction of 
motherhood.37 Chodorow's thoughts on the reproduction of motherhood is 
invoked also by Gilligan (1982) to account for the tendency of women to display 
an approach marked by care. In the following discussion I hope to show how 
Chodorow's account of mothering theory, illuminates why an ethic of care is 
consistent with a feminine notion of the self. According to Grant (1993: 59) 
mothering theory can be defined as follows: 
Mothering theories are theories that claim that women have learned 
certain values of their practice as mothers that can be used to 
understand gender, and to build an alternative ethic that is centered 
around "feminine values", such as nurturing and caring. 38 
As such, Chodorow's account of female gender identity sheds light on the notion 
of the self that lies central to the more socially inclined ecofeminist appeal to 
values that are specific to social/gender roles performed by women. Ecofeminist 
Gray (1981: 35-38) for example also draws on Chodorow's (1974, 1978) 
37 Chodorow's articulation of the fonnation of female gender identity has been subjected to 
sharp criticism. The problems with Chodorow's account are manifold and complex, but here I 
will highlight the main objections. It is pointed out that she universalises childrearing practices 
in her employment of a model of the family that is white and middle class (Spelman, 1988; 
Bordo, 1990: 138). Moreover, she assumes the existence of a basic and stable masculine 
and feminine "deep self' that cuts across cultures, race, class and ethnicity rendering it both 
essentialist and universalist (Diquinzio, 1993: 1-9; Frazer and Nicholson, 1990: 30). 
Furthennore, she fails to take into account how factors such as race, class and ethnicity 
influence the fonnation of identity, thereby ignoring differences also between women 
~Nicholson, 1990: 30; Diquinzio, 1993: 1-9). 
8 Here, it must be stressed that Chodorow wants to distinguish her account of female gender 
identity from an account that views gender identity to be simply a product of socialisation, as 
in her view, the relational character of female gender identity, coinciding with the social, has a 
deeper, psychological, basis (Frazer and Nicholson, 1990: 30). To this definition of mothering 
theory then, it must be added that it is not only the practice of motherhood that sheds light on 
female gender identity, but also that mothering is performed by women, and the deep 
psychological impact this has on the fonnation of the respective gender identities. The 
question that Chodorow asks, is not "how we define female gender identity", as such, "but 
what keeps women subordinate, what are the reasons for the tenacity of the traditional 
gender patterns?". It is via this avenue then that she arrives at the account that is given of the 
respective gender identities. 
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insights regarding the effects that mothering by women has on the formation of 
male and female gender identities. As we have seen in the section "Patriarchal 
culture: self, women and nature" the formation of a boy's gender identity is 
marked by radical separation from the (m)other, which enables autonomy and 
independence. In contrast, a girl's gender identity is marked by perforated 
boundaries from the outset. At the same time that the boy realises that the 
person with whom he is identifying is from the wrong gender, the girl-child who 
identifies herself as female, continues to experience herself as continuous with 
the mother. The effect that the girl-child's identification with the mother has on 
female self understanding, is most significant: 
Because of their mothering by women, girls come to experience 
themselves as less separate than boys, as having more permeable ego 
boundaries. Girls come to define themselves more in relation to others 
(Chodorow, 1974: 93). 
The gender roles that girls are expected to adopt are built upon and reinforce the 
aspects of the female self described above. The socialisation of girls to occupy 
the role of caretaker or mother is facilitated by the girl's identification with the 
mother and it is this relationship with the mother then that is the primary source 
of socialisation (Chodorow, 1974: 54). This results in a sense of connectedness 
and involvement with others along with the manifestation of character traits 
such as caring and nurturance. The early relationship and identification with the 
mother is then offered as basis upon which further socialisation is built: 
.. . her later identification with her mother is imbedded in and 
influenced by their ongoing relationship . . . Because her mother is 
around, and she has had a genuine relationship with her as a person, 
a girl's gender and gender role identification are mediated and depend 
upon real affective relations. Identification is . . . a personal 
identification with her mother's general traits of character and values 
(Chodorow, 1974: 51, my emphasis, FM). 
The traits of character and values that are associated with the role of 
motherhood, include empathy, sympathy, caring, nurturing, love and 
attentiveness. As such then, mothering theory, because of the account it gives 
of female gender identity and the traits and values that accompany this feminine 
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self, coincides significantly with an ethic of care (Cuomo, 1992; King, 1991; 
Grant, 1993). This feminine self is invoked by other ecofeminists who appeal to 
women's socialisation and the social roles that women occupy as providing us 
with alternative values to inform our treatment of nature (Plant, 1989; Salleh, 
1984; Gray, 1981 ).39 In affinity ecofeminist mode, Collard links the identity of 
women and nature with the activity of mothering.40 Moreover, she argues that 
women's "experience of mothering" ultimately places her in a better position to 
address the ecological crisis.41 She (1988: 137-138) writes: 
The identity and destiny of woman and nature are merged. 
Accordingly, feminist values and principles directed towards ending 
the oppression of women are inextricably linked with ecological 
values and principles directed towards ending the oppression of 
nature. It is ultimately the affirmation of our kinship with nature, our 
common life with her, which will prove the source of our mutual well-
being . . . Good women have kept house on the model of Mother 
Nature for as long as there have been mothers ... Women's 
experience with oppression and abuse, as well as their experience of 
mothering, can make them more sensitive to the oppression and 
abuse of nature as well as better situated to remedy it. 
In line with the ecofeminist appeal to women's social roles (and the inevitable 
return to motherhood), Collard affirms that mothering also provides us with 
values that can contribute to ending the oppression of nature. The conception of 
39 Here, the emphasis is on the values that are contained in the social roles that women fulfill, 
rather than an explicit endorsement of a specific notion of the self. The appeal that is 
conversely made to women's "socialisation" suggests that the notion of the self operative 
here, is not inconsistent with the relational self discussed above. As mentioned earlier, this 
position that appeals to women's social roles is a social/ist ecofeminist position, which is 
included in this discussion of cultural ecofeminism also because it coincides with the spiritual, 
affinity and nature (amongst others) ecofeminist revaluation of "feminine" values. 
40 Invoking the image of mother to identify women with nature has come under criticism from 
a number of ecofeminists as reinforcing a view of nature that is damaging not only to nature, 
but also to women in that it amounts to an underpersonification of women and 
overpersonification of nature which reduce both as existing primarily to provide for the needs 
of others (Roach, 1991; Vance, 1993; Merchant, 1990; Gray, 1981 ). Establishing a link 
between women and nature in these terms is also characteristic of a social/ist ecofeminism. 
This is derived from the socialist feminist analysis of the oppression of women in terms of the 
sexual division of labour. 
41 This is of course not all she is saying, but for the moment I would like to focus on these 
aspects. The argument that, women are better situated to address the environmental crisis 
because of a shared experience of oppression, is of course a specifically social/ist feminist 
argument. 
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female gender identity that is articulated within the context of an ethic of care is 
therefore shown as coinciding with the notion of the self described in the 
context of mothering theory. This notion of the self is consistent with the 
ecofeminist affirmation of the values that are contained by the social roles that 
women occupy as mothers or those closely related to that of motherhood. From 
a cultural ecofeminist perspective then, this conception of the self can be shown 
to make a specific contribution to the articulation of an ecological feminist notion 
of the self. 
In the exposition above, I have discussed the central features that distinguish an 
ethic of care so as to illuminate the vocabulary of care that is employed by 
cultural ecofeminists. I have also shown how an ethic of care coincides with 
mothering theory in terms of the alternative values that distinguish an ethic of 
care, and also the notion of the self that lies central to such an ethic. As such, 
the cultural ecofeminist employment of a vocabulary of care and revaluation of 
women's social roles as presenting us with alternative ecological values is 
consistent with the conception of female gender identity as articulated by 
Chodorow. Accordingly, the relational self is embraced as informing an 
alternative feminine notion of the self that lays the basis for ethical conduct, also 
towards the natural environment. 
In this chapter I have also discussed the aspects of patriarchal culture that 
cultural ecofeminists analyse and criticise as responsible for the twin 
dominations of women and nature. This was followed by a response in the form 
of an introduction to alternative notion/s ·of a relational self that would foster 
relations of care towards the natural environment. In the following section, I 
would like to assess the contributions that cultural ecofeminist thinking makes 
towards the articulation of an ecological feminist notion of the self and ethic 
beyond dualism and essentialism. 
6. An evaluation of cultural ecofeminism 
In what follows, I perform a critical evaluation of cultural ecofeminist thinking, 
-.....---£· --- ---···--· ··-·- -- ---- .• ,. _____ _ 
paying attention in particular to the notion(s) of the self and the concomitant 
ethic that are endorsed. I start off by examining the central cultural ecofeminist 
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argument that patriarchy is the root cause of the domination of women and 
nature. This focus on patriarchy is criticised as reductionist and the assumptions 
that accompany it, are also questioned. To regard patriarchy as the cause of the 
domination of both women and nature is to oversimplify the twin dominations of 
women and nature and to lose sight of the complexities involved in the 
articulation of an ecological feminist notion of the self. These points of critique 
are discussed in the section titled "Patriarchy as root cause of the domination of 
women and nature". 
In the section that follows, titled "The link between the domination of women 
and nature", I evaluate the different accounts that are respectively offered for 
the twin dominations of women and nature in patriarchal culture.42 Here it is 
remarked that a focus on dualism is a potentially fruitful avenue to explore, but 
that the analysis of dualism as performed by cultural ecofeminism needs to be 
deepened and refined. The psychological account given of the twin dominations 
of women and nature is also criticised as reductionist.43 
As we have seen, contained in the critique of different aspects of patriarchal 
culture, is a critique of the dominant masculine/ist notion of the self, which is 
articulated and manifests itself in opposition and as superior to both women and 
nature. In contrast, cultural ecofeminists affirm a female self and a feminine self, 
both of which are offered as desirable from an ecological and feminist 
perspective. In the section tilted "The failure to overcome dualism, essentialism 
and universalism", I show how a conception of the female self verges on 
affirming and endorsing a biological essentialist view of women. The feminine 
notion of the self, although offered as an account of relationality that moves 
beyond biological essentialism, itself is unsatisfactory, as it is complementary to 
the masculine notion of the self. This feminine self, which is derived from an 
42 Because the critique of Western science and Cartesian-Newtonianism moves into the 
domain of feminist epistemology and politics, I refrain from discussing it further and therefore I 
do not evaluate it here. As we shall see however, in Chapter 3, titled Cyber-(eco)feminism, 
the notion of the "situated self', which is one notion of the self that Haraway endorses, is 
articulated within the context of feminist epistemology. The inclusion of a critique on Western 
science and Cartesian-Newtonianism in the discussion of cultural ecofeminism, fulfilled the 
purpose of introducing the reader to one of the central lines of critique in ecofeminist thinking, 
one which is elaborated on, albeit with a different focus, also in Chapter 2, titled Critical-
transformative ecofeminism. In the context of cultural ecofeminism, this critique illuminates 
the cultural ecofeminist rejection of the instrumental treatment of nature as mere matter. 
43 See also footnote nr.12. 
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account of female gender identity, is also shown to be problematic for its 
seeming disregard for the differences between women. This shortcoming is 
further illuminated by a critique of the appeal to "women's experiences" which 
fails to take into account differences between women. 
The sections that follow consist of an evaluation of different aspects of the ethic 
of care. In the section titled "An uncritical affirmation of the feminine principle" 
the values that are endorsed in a cultural ecofeminist ethic of care are subjected 
to critical scrutiny. Another concern that is raised with regard to the ethic of 
care, are the altruistic undertones that such an ethic conveys. This is discussed 
in the section titled "Altruism and care". In the final section of this evaluation, 
"Women's relationship with nature", another aspect of the cultural ecofeminist 
use of a vocabulary of care is discussed. As we have seen, relationships are 
central to an ethic of care and here the assumption that women necessarily view 
themselves as in relationship also with nature is examined. When asked what the 
basis of this relationship is, the cultural ecofeminist view of women's 
connectedness to nature by means of her childbearing capacities is invoked. 
What exactly is cared for when cultural ecofeminists appeal to a relation of care 
for nature, is put into question. In conclusion, I will highlight the important 
contributions that cultural ecofeminist thinking make to the articulation of an 
ecological feminist notion of the self. 
6.1 The focus on patriarchy as root cause of the domination of women and 
nature 
Cultural ecofeminist thinking has evoked strong criticism not only from 
ecological, but also from feminist quarters. From an ecological perspective, the 
claim that patriarchy is the root of the domination of both women and nature (or 
as this implies, all forms of oppression) is criticised as reductionist. According to 
Eckersley ( 1992: 68), "it is one thing to note parallels in the logic of symbolic 
structures of different kinds of domination ... and another thing to argue that the 
kinds of domination that radical feminists and radical ecologists are addressing 
stem from one source". Moreover, the focus on patriarchy suggests that the 
principal focus in bringing about ecologically sound practice must be patriarchy 
rather than anthropocentrism. To maintain this argument however, Eckersley 
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(1992: 68) points out that it needs to be shown that patriarchy not only 
predated, but also gave rise to dualism and anthropocentrism, thus that there is 
a necessary connection between the events. A further question that arises is 
how do we explain a harmonious co-existence with the natural environment in 
patriarchal premodern societies. Furthermore, it is also asked what guarantee 
exists that the liberation of women will necessarily be followed or accompanied 
by the liberation of nature? As Eckersley (1992: 68), points out, the 
emancipation of women need not necessarily lead to the liberation of the natural 
world or vice versa. 
Another consequence that a limiting focus on patriarchy has is that such an 
analysis slides into gross overgeneralisations regarding "men" and "women". 
l 
That the dominant masculine notion of the self has been constituted by the 
suppression and denial of the other, specifically women, the feminine and 
nature, carries ground. Implying that all men unproblematically fit into this 
description, and to suggest that all women fit the feminine version, is to weaken 
the force of this analysis considerably (Segal, 1994). Moreover, to regard male 
domination of women as the fundamental relation of domination that all forms of 
domination can be traced back to is to overlook the complexities involved in the 
network of different forms of domination. Taking these complexities seriously is 
crl!.£al to the endeavour of articulating an ecological feminist notion of the self. 
The tendency to generalise and oversimplify matters, features also in the 
analyses conducted of the link between the twin dominations of women and 
nature. If we recall, this entailed an analysis and critique of the philosophical, 
psychological and epistemological aspects of patriarchal culture, which will be 
assessed presently. 
6.2 The link between the domination of women and nature 
The argument that the domination of women and nature is a function of 
philosophical d!..lalism represents a potentially fruitful approach to account for the 
twin dominations of women and nature. However, Gray's focus on the 
masculine/feminine, mind/body and spirit/flesh dualisms as grounding the 
domination of women and nature, is restrictive which renders her analysis 
insufficient and in need of further refinement. Limiting the engagement with 
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dualism to the masculine/feminine, mind/body, spirit/flesh dualisms, obscures the 
reach of dualism, that is, how the different interrelated dualist pairs that form 
part of a dualist conceptual framework forms an extensive network of dualist 
pairs that overlap and reinforce one another. Of course, exposing the 
conceptual/symbolic foundations of the domination of both women and nature is 
most illuminating. This is achieved by showing how the perceived superiority of 
the masculine due to its association with the mind, as opposed to the perceived 
inferiority of the feminine and nature that is associated with physicality, 
functions to the detriment of both women and nature. However, not enough 
attention is paid to the role of other related dualist pairs such as the 
human/nature, reason/nature dualisms, and how they contribute to and 
complexity the dominations of women and nature. These shortcomings call for a 
more detailed analysis of the nature and functioning of dualism (Piumwood, 
1986: 128). 
Locating the domination of women and nature in psychological factors has 
problems of its own. The most prominent deficiency of this account lies in its 
attempt to explain the existence of different forms of domination (the domination 
of women and the domination of nature) as an effect of the psychological 
constitution of individuals. Such an analysis reduces the domination of women 
and nature to the psychological constitution of men. As such, it seems to want 
to relate the whole spectrum of factors that together contribute to the 
domination of women and nature, to a single psychological orientation that is 
neither satisfactory nor convincing. As Plumwood (1986: 130), puts it: "[i]f it 
aims at a total explanation it seems excessively reductionist, since it aims to 
explain the whole complex structure of interlinked [forms of domination] in terms 
o.f individual psychological experience and structure". Having assessed the 
cultural ecofeminist analysis and critique of aspects of Western patriarchal 
culture that are respectively viewed as the root cause of the twin dominations of 
women and nature, I would now like to turn to an evaluation of the notion/s of 
the self and the ethic that it implies that are endorsed by cultural ecofeminism. 
6.3 The failure to overcome dualism, essentialism and universalism 
With regard to the notion/s of the self that are endorsed, cultural ecofeminist 
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thinkers have been accused both of perpetuating dualism and reinforcing 
essentialist views of women. The first type of essentialism that has been 
identified in cultural ecofeminist thinking, is naturalism and its close associate, 
biologism, as a result of their view of women as essentially connected to the 
natural world. Here I would like to stress that the positive valuation and 
affirmation of the body and nature are both very necessary and important in a 
culture in which its devaluation and subordination is crucial for the continued 
privileging of an elite (mostly white male) class of citizens. How this affirmation 
is performed, is however of utmost importance. The strategy of celebrating and 
valorising female connectedness with the body and nature in the manner 
discussed above is extremely problematic, if not dangerous. Numerous 
ecofeminist critics have pointed out that the cultural ecofeminist valorisation of 
female connectedness to the natural amounts to reinforcing stereotypical images 
of women. Ironically these images are also the product of the patriarchal culture 
that is criticised, and continue to be employed by conservatives to keep women 
subordinate to men, which is the very reason why feminism came into existence 
in the first place (Aicoff, 1988: 407; Biehl, 1991: 9-20; Davion, 1994: 24-25; 
Zimmerman, 1987; Eckersley, 1992: 66-67). 
Invoking images of that overidentify women with the body and nature, 
particularly in terms of reproduction, is a short step away from reinforcing a 
conception of women as inherently intuitive, nurturing, caring, life-affirming and 
relational. Whilst acknowledging that caring and nurturing are values that would 
be highly prized in an ecological society, ecofeminist Janet Biehl criticises 
cultural ecofeminist theories for its "psycho-biologism". This psycho-biologism is 
ascribed to their tendency to depict certain personality traits as inherent to 
women. She states that, in contrast to feminists who have tried to dismantle 
gender stereotypes constraining women's development as "full human beings", 
these feminists enthusiastically embrace some of these same biological 
stereotypes.44 She asserts that "when ecofeminists root women's personality 
44 Of course what is meant by "full human being" is in itself a question of huge contention. 
This is the problem that social ecofeminists particularly Biehl (1991) conveniently overlooks. 
The uncritical assertion that women should "simply become human", is one of the central 
problems addressed in this thesis. What is overlooked here is that the notion of the human 
itself has been articulated in opposition not only to nature but also the feminine and by 
implication women. This gives further substance to the argument that neutrality is not a 
desirable feature to strive towards. 
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traits in reproductive sexual biology, they tend to give acceptance to those male-
created images of women as primarily biological beings" (Biehl, 1991: 12). 
In partial defense of cultural ecofeminist thinking, it has to be conceded that not 
all cultural ecofeminists endorse a conception of the female self that is 
essentialist in this sense. Seeking to avoid the charge of essentialism, some 
cultural ecofeminists (albeit often inconsistently) argue that female identity is not 
biologically grounded, but socially constructed, or a product of women's 
socialisation (Spretnak, 1993; Gray, 1981; Plant, 1989; Salleh, 1984: 342). 
Spretnak for example, (inconsistent with her earlier close identification of the 
female body with the earth body), has argued that the genders of both men and 
women are acquired through a process of "acculturation". It is not altogether 
clear what this process of ''acculturation" refers to (Spretnak, 1991: 128). As I 
have shown, a view of female identity as socially constructed, in turn coincides 
with the notion of the self presented in the section titled "Relationality and 
female gender identity". This feminine self as relational, intuitive, empathetic, 
caring and nurturing, it is argued, is an effect of mothering by women and early 
socialisation that takes place as a result of the girl child-mother relationship. This 
represents the constructivist aspect of cultural ecofeminism.45 In my view 
however, this attempt to overcome the charge of essentialism, is not altogether 
satisfactory or convincing either. 
In the first place: this notion of the self is an explicitly feminine conception of 
the self that remains complementary and supplementary to the masculine self 
and therefore remains trapped in dualism.46 Still in the realm of the problem of 
dualism, privileging of a feminine notion of the self as opposed to a masculinist 
45 Constructivism as it is used here, denotes a shift from the perception of women as 
inherently caring and nurturing which is grounded in her childbearing capacities, to a view of 
women as caring and nurturing that is a result of her psychological constitution that is 
constructed in the mother-daughter relation and further built upon by her being socialised to 
become a mother. As we have seen the social strand of cultural ecofeminism also 
emphasises the social roles that women occupy as presenting us with alternative values to 
transform our relation to the natural environment. That the identity of women is a result of 
their being socialised to occupy certain roles is suggested, but not elaborated upon in much 
depth. 
46 It may be countered here that the relational aspect of the female self as articulated in the 
section "Relationality and female gender identity" is evidence that the feminine self 
overcomes dualism. At closer inspection this fails to be convincing, as this notion of the self 
continues to fit perfectly in the traditional model of a feminine self that is complementary and 
supplements a masculine self. 
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notion of the self, entails the reversal of the masculine/feminine dualism. As 
such, the content is changed whilst the structure of dualism remains the same. 
Moreover, this conception of female gender identity does not take into account 
differences between women. That is, adequate acknowledgement is not given to 
how factors such as race, class, and ethnicity shape the formation of gender 
identity. As such, this amounts to the denial of differences between women and 
an universalisation of female gender identity (Frazer and Nicholson, 1990: 30; 
Diquinzio, 1993: 1-9). As it will be made clear in Chapters 2 and 3, these 
deficiencies link up with the reductive analysis of the oppression of women and 
nature in terms of patriarchy on the one hand, and an inadequate engagement 
with dualism and essentialism on the other. That is, the manner in which 
different dualisms overlap and reinforce one another to complexity different 
identities, is not adequately acknowledged or engaged with. For these reasons, 
affirming the feminine self as an alternative ecological feminist self is 
undesirable. As we have seen, Gray's argument that the male and female 
perspective should be integrated, spills over into an endorsement of some form 
of androgyny that consists of a combination of positively valued masculine and 
feminine characteristics. As I have observed in the Introduction, an androgynous 
notion of the self is fraught with problems as a result of its pretense to 
neutrality. Such an appeal to neutrality has proven untenable, as such a claim 
has historically been conflated in a masculine viewpoint held to be rational, 
objective and universally true. 
Universalising and essentialising female gender identity is closely connected to 
the frequent appeal that is made to women's experience by ecofeminists. What 
is invoked here is women's fulfillment and experience of certain social roles, 
which, along with women's experience of oppression grounds female gender 
identity. Together these factors serve to unite women and ultimately place them 
in a better position (ethically and politically) to address the environmental crisis. 
This appeal to "women's experience" made by white feminists universalises 
female experience and differences between women are lost out of sight. That is, 
factors such as race, class and ethnicity are axes of differentiation that are not 
adequately acknowledged or addressed by such an invocation of "women's 
experience" (Diquinzio, 1993: 5).47 
47 That experience is not im-mediate either is also not reckoned with. See Scott (1992: 22-40) 
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This critique of the erasure of differences between and amongst women, 
overlaps with the reductionism of cultural ecofeminism's focus on patriarchy as 
source of the domination of both women and nature. The reason for this is that 
both arguments assume women's innocence regarding both racism and naturism. 
A focus on patriarchy and the call upon the uniting power of "women's 
experience" carries the implicit suggestion that women are incapable of being 
oppressors themselves (Davion, 1994: 20). In this regard, Third World women in 
particular have pointed out that white feminists in the West often participate in a 
consumer culture involving the technological and economic exploitation of poor 
people in the South (Zimmerman, 1994: 238). Moreover, the benefits those 
women from the North reap from the environmental destruction and degradation 
in the South is also disproportionate to the benefits of poor women in the 
South. 48 Once these factors are taken into account then, women's exemption 
from involvement or benefiting from environmental destruction and degradation, 
can also no longer be uncritically assumed. This also serves to somewhat 
relativise the claim that women are necessarily in a better position to address the 
environmental crisis. In the light of this critique then, the simplistic distinction 
drawn between oppressor and oppressed is undermined (Eckersley, 1992: 76; 
Davion, 1994: 18-20). 
6.4 An uncritical affirmation of the feminine principle 
This brings us to an evaluation of the ethic of care, or the cultural ecofeminist 
use of a vocabulary of care. The articulation of an ethic of care which is brought 
in relation with mothering or motherhood, shows how qualities and values that 
are traditionally associated with women, such as intuition, nurturance, care, 
compassion, conservation and relationality etc., if acknowledged and revalued, 
provide us with a foundation for an (ecological) alternative ethic. Conceiving of 
an ethic of care in these terms has been subjected to criticism that resonates 
with the criticism leveled at the cultural ecofeminist endorsement of a female 
and feminine self. An affirmation of the feminine principle is criticised for 
and Flax (1992: 445-463) for a discussion of experience as necessarily mediated in and 
through language. 
48 Of course it goes without saying that this is not for one moment to suggest that the North 
and South can be that clearly divided, or rather, that there are no divisions within the North 
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romanticising women's childbearing capacities, the role of motherhood and 
female virtues that not only raise unreasonable expectations of women, but also 
reinforces stereotypical images of women (Seager, 1993; Segal, 1994; Grant, 
1993; Roach, 1991; Alcoff, 1988). According to Mellor (1992: 246), the 
uncritical endorsement of what is also referred to as the "feminine principle" 
amounts to endorsing an ,,ecofeminine rather than an ecofeminist position". 
Although the notions of relationality and caring, for example, have the potential 
to contribute to the articulation of an alternative environmental ethic, feminists 
and ecofeminists alike have pointed out that caution needs to be taken in 
particular with regard to a simple affirmation of values that are the product of 
women's oppression. In this regard Cuomo (1992: 354) writes: 
Despite the potential of such a reclamation, theorists must remain 
mindful of the fact that any ,,aspects of our socialisation" are 
byproducts of the same oppressive system that promotes the 
devaluation of compassion and caring. 
According to Cuomo, these values need to be thoroughly scrutinized and 
recontextualised before they can be reclaimed and considered useful. That is, the 
very notions of caring and nurturing should be redefined in a manner that 
transcends the powerlessness that these activities denote. Moreover, as caring 
and nurturing have been fundamental cornerstones in sustaining patriarchy and 
other oppressive relations, Cuomo rightfully points out that "caring cannot be 
evaluated if the object and purpose of care are not made clear" (Cuomo, 1 992: 
354-355). 
6. 5 Care and altruism 
In keeping with the concerns expressed above, an ethic of care is sometimes 
interpreted as espousing altruism, or as displaying a tendency to lean toward 
altruism (Tronto, 1986; Grant, 1993; Hoagland, 1991; Cuomo, 1992; Curtin, 
1991; Grimshaw, 1986). As we have seen, feminists and ecofeminists find that 
an ethic of care that uncritically endorses feminine or female traits and values 
may in fact promote the oppression of women. Another question raised from a 
feminist perspective, is whether the blurring of boundaries that marks the 
and South itself. 
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feminine self, is indeed an appropriate starting point for a feminist ethic. Concern 
is expressed with regard to the merit of this notion of the self given that women 
have been and still are expected to sacrifice their needs and interests for the 
s~ke of o,thers, or so as to tend to those of others.49 The absence of clear 
boundaries has indeed facilitated women's historical inclination towards self-
sacrifice. The cultural ecofeminist emphasis on (what culminates in) an other-
orientatedness neglects to stipulate measures that can be taken to avoid a 
relapse into self-denial or self-sacrifice. In this regard, Cuomo (1992: 355) 
writes: 
given our socialisation and our present material conditions, like 
many other oppressed people, we must begin to feel ourselves, 
identify our feelings and what is in our own best interest. This 
experience should be our point of departure for any ethical decision 
making and theory building. Identifying one's own feelings and 
interests may be a necessary prerequisite to empathizing with 
another. If so then, ego denial is contrary to the kind of empathy that 
allows one to appreciate the oppression of another living being. 
Identifying and acknowledging our own feelings and interests is of utmost 
importance and should most certainly form part of the process towards fostering 
ethical relations with others. The potential problem with Cuomo's exhortation is 
that caring about the oppression of others does not necessarily follow from 
identifying one's own feelings and interests. It is here that the significance of the 
undertaking towards a reconceptualisation of an ecological feminist notion of the 
self becomes pertinent. In the light of this then, some concept of relationality 
gains relevance, particularly from an ecological perspective. If we recall, a notion 
of the self articulated in terms of relationality was shown to have the potential to 
overcome the sharp separation between humans and nature, which in turn can 
contribute to fostering alternative relations to that of domination and 
instrumentalisation of the natural environment. Endorsing a relational self as 
articulated by cultural ecofeminism as ecological self, is however not sufficient 
49 Both Chodorow (1974, 1978) and Ruddick (1980) are sensitive to this problem. In this 
regard, they suggest that women also develop a firm sense of self. What I am presenting the 
reader with here is the dominant reception and interpretation of an ethic of care along with 
cultural ecofeminism's appropriation of aspects of an ethic of care, which reflects similar 
tendencies. 
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for a number of reasons. Given its complementary structure, the relational self as 
conceived in terms of Chodorow' s account of the feminine self, is not a desirable 
model for women to affirm, nor a convincing one for men to strive towards. 50 
The suggestion that the feminine notion of the self offers an alternative notion of 
the self that is desirable for men and women is problematic in another sense 
also. Again from a feminist perspective, this, what ultimately boils down to a 
striving towards gender neutrality, will effect an erasure of differences between 
men and women, rendering insignificant differences that are indeed significant -
in terms of power and meaning. 51 
To close this evaluation, it might be interesting to discuss the reception of the 
cultural ecofeminist appeal to relationality and its translation into practice from 
an ecological perspective. 
6.6 Women's relationship with nature 
In his analysis of an ethic of care as an alternative environmental ethic, King 
points out that the "appropriation of a vocabulary of care by some ecofeminists 
entails the appropriation of an ethic of care as the voice of women's experience 
of morality and of the 'givenness' of relationship" (King, 1991: 80). Here I would 
like to focus on King's reading of an ecofeminist ethic of care as assuming the 
"givenness of relationship" in particular with respect to the natural environment. 
In his search for the basis of such a relationship, King observes that women's 
identities and experiences are not universal and that factors such as class, race, 
sexual orientation, religious belief, nationality, ethnicity contribute to 
particularising an individual woman's conception of her relatedness to others. As 
such, the "givenness" of women's relatedness to nature too, becomes less than 
self-evident. In further support of his questioning of what is apparently assumed 
50 This is a reading that is also discussed by Plumwood (1987). 
51 As Gray (1981) makes explicit, the suggestion is made that the positive aspects of the 
feminine should be integrated with those of the masculine. Predictably, as Chodorow herself 
suggests for men this will be facilitated by an increased involvement in the activity of 
mothering. Although the suggestion and argument that childrearing responsibilities should be 
shared equally between men and women is supported wholeheartedly, the assumption that 
this will establish equality between men and women, is severely doubted. As Grosz (1990) 
has observed, the manner in which the social intermeshes with the symbolic is not adequately 
addressed. As a whole, this line of argument, in favour of some kind of gender neutrality (also 
suggested by Eisenstein (1984: 94-95)), is not a convincing strategy to follow to bring about 
equality between men and women. 
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as given by cultural ecofeminists, he points out that in the increasingly urbanised 
and technologically advanced societies of Western Europe and North America, a 
relation to nature is no more given for women than it is for men. King (1991: 81) 
writes: 
Both women and men are increasingly cut off from direct experiential 
relationships with natural, as opposed to artificial and urban, 
environments, and thus although we are unavoidably in relation with 
the non-human world, we do not, many of us, experience the relation 
to nature as given in all its concreteness and complexity. 
What is it then that lays a basis for the argument that women occupy a position 
of being in-relationship-with nature, which then lays the foundation for caring for 
nature? This inevitably brings us to the cultural ecofeminist argument that 
women are connected to nature via her childbearing capacities. Apart from the 
already discussed problems of such an essentialist' conception of women's 
relation to nature, the emphasis on reproduction as basis for an ethical relation, 
is inadequate for another reason. Here the crucial question is raised as to what 
exactly is cared about when caring about nature. This is succinctly captured by 
King ( 1 991 : 80) who writes: 
Many ecofeminists have focused on those aspects of environmental 
destruction that impinge directly or indirectly on women's 
reproductive ·nature, that is on the consequences of the 
environmental crisis for individual and local community health and the 
conditions necessary for nurturing the life and growth of future 
generations of human beings. 
What King finds problematic about the endorsement of an ethic of care based 
upon women's connectedness to the natural via the body, is that care for the 
environment is only conceived of in terms of the well-being of human beings 
(women in particular), thus rendering such a version of an ethic of care 
anthropocentric. 52 What lacks, according to King then, is a concern for nature in 
52 Here a central debate in environmental ethics and politics is touched upon, namely the 
anthropocentrism-ecocentrism debate, the one being human centered, as opposed to the 
other which is eco, or nature centered. Anthropocentrism is not a uniform position; a 
distinction can be made between a strong and weak anthropocentrism. A strong 
anthropocentrism sees nature as resource of humans, and the preservation of nature is 
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its own right. The constant return to the welfare of human beings as standard 
for moral consideration is not only anthropocentric, but reproduces the dualism 
between what counts morally and what counts not (King, 1989: 82-83). This is 
of course a valid point of critique, _but the contributions that these women's 
environmental activism has made to raise people's consciousness, must not be 
underestimated. Granted, the self-referentiality of these actions are limiting, but 
it may also been seen as one step towards caring for nature in its own right. A 
similar point can be made with regard to the essentialist strategies that have 
been employed in the political mobilisation of women. That these strategies are 
highly problematic is no doubt the case, but that significant results have been 
achieved, is nonetheless so (Mellor, 1997; Seager, 1994). 
It is clear from the above that women's relatedness with the natural environment 
is less than self-evident if we do not want to posit an essentialist connection 
between women and nature. As I have argued throughout this chapter, this is 
not the only way to engage with the notion of relationality. Once the assumption 
of "self-evidence" is discarded, a path is opened up for conceiving of relationality 
in different terms. As we have seen, the more socially inclined ecofeminist 
strand engages with relationality in social terms, perceiving the self as being-in-
relationship with others. Here relationality is explained by appealing to mothering 
theory. Translated in ecological terms, the argument is that caring for those in 
need can be widened to include nature. What is problematic here, is the cultural 
ecofeminist tendency to restrict caring to mothering and motherhood. Although 
the activity of motherhood is an activity (amongst other) that embodies 
significant values and develops extremely valuable social skills, in the final 
analysis, I would argue that it is ineffective to model relationality and an ensuing 
ethical interaction with the natural environment to an orientation that is totally 
synonymous with motherhood. 53 Another observation that I would like to make 
is that to argue that we necessarily occupy a position of relationality to nature, 
and that for this reason we have to ethically engage with nature, is a very valid 
argued for in these tenns. A weak anthropocentrism remains human centered but would 
include sustainable development and the wellbeing of future generations as part of this 
position. For an in depth discussion of stronger and weaker fonns of anthropocentrism, see 
Eckersley (1992: 35-45). 
53 The observation has also been made that such an employment of motherhood as model for 
ethical relations idealises motherhood, forgetting that not even motherhood or mothering is 
pure. 
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point to make. As I have argued elsewhere, the question I ask myself, however, 
is whether the account of relationality given above, is sufficient. Here I would 
like to make the suggestion that within an ecofeminist context at least, a shift in 
focus towards a non-anthropocentric reconceptualisation of nature (and for that 
matter, woman) is required so as to strengthen the basis for the ethical 
treatment of nature. 
This brings us to another aspect of cultural ecofeminist thinking that needs 
further attention, and that is the conception of nature that is endorsed. As we 
have seen, in keeping with the cultural ecofeminist celebration and affirmation of 
difference, nature is revalued and celebrated via its connection with women's 
bodily differences. Although liberated from the status of mere matter by 
emphasising regenerative qualities of nature, this approach tends towards a 
reinforcement of the physicality of nature. This identification of both nature and 
women with the physical has however functioned to the detriment of the natural 
environment and women. The more spiritualist valuation of nature as an 
expression or manifestation of the goddess entails an anthropomorphic projection 
onto nature, whereby nature is imbued with spirit (Piumwood, 1993: 126-127). 
This image of nature tends towards a mystification of nature, and is therefore 
firmly located in the dualist framework discussed above. As such, it cannot be 
accepted without further refinement. The other more socially orientated 
ecofeminists discussed in this chapter offer little thought on how we can 
reconceive of nature, except that nature's status as mere matter is firmly 
rejected. 
7. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have discussed the notion/s of the self and the concomitant 
ethic that are endorsed by cultural ecofeminism. As we have seen, the cultural 
ecofeminist response to the environmental crisis is an affirmation of women's 
difference, and what is perceived as constituting this difference. The implicit or 
explicit argument that is forwarded by cultural ecofeminists is that women are 
better equipped to address the environmental crisis, both ethically and politically. 
In this discussion, I have tried to limit my focus to the ethical aspects of their 
arguments, although the two can necessarily not remain completely apart. 
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Despite its shortcomings, there are two main contributions that cultural 
ecofeminism makes toward the articulation of an ecological feminist notion of 
the self and ethic. This lies in the cultural ecofeminist insistence that we should 
reconceptualise our relation with the natural environment in terms that overcome 
the disconnectedness and alienation that fuel the domination and subjugation of 
nature (and slightly differently framed, also women). If we recall, this 
endorsement of some form of relationality is expressed in the female and 
feminine self that are affirmed in cultural ecofeminist thinking. 
Insofar as a revaluation and celebration of women, nature and the body signals 
an unambiguous rejection of the patriarchal .inferiorisation of women and nature 
which sanctions the domination of both, cultural ecofeminism's strategy to 
affirm women's difference can be positively appraised. Notwithstanding the 
magnitude of the problems surrounding the cultural ecofeminist valorisation and 
celebration of women, the body and nature, an emphasis on difference opens up 
the way for the daunting task of thinking and rethinking difference, also in the 
context of ecological philosophy. However, as I have tried to show, to effect 
lasting transformation in a culture that is marked by dualistically construed 
hierarchical power relations, more is required than the largely uncritical 
affirmation of what is devalued and regarded as inferior in Western patriarchal 
culture. 
The most prominent inadequacies that have been identified in this position 
concern the dualist and essentialist or universalist character of the notions of the 
female and feminine self in cultural ecofeminist thinking. As I have argued and 
illustrated, these problems can be traced back to the focus on patriarchy as the 
cause of the oppression and subjugation of both women and nature, along with 
an inadequate engagement with the nature and functioning of dualism. A 
rejection of the male and masculine self is followed by an appeal to "women's 
experience" and a more or less uncritical affirmation and privileging of the female 
and feminine self. Apart form being criticised for reinforcing dualism through the 
strategy of reversal, the endorsement of these notions are revealed as bearing 
witness to the naive assumption that women are not implicated in naturism or 
racism. 
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A continued entrapment in dualism manifests itself in a number of ways. For 
example, the essentialism (which is part and parcel of dualism) of the female self 
as a result of its unambiguously biologistic and naturalistic character, is 
untenable from both a feminist and ecological perspective. As I have shown, the 
strategy to replace a male self with a female self boils down to a simple reversal 
of dualism and reinforcement of damaging essentialist images of women. From 
an ecological perspective, the message that is thus conveyed is that men are 
inherently disconnected form the natural environment whilst women are 
connected and should be put in charge of "taking care of nature". Here we come 
face to face with another questionable effect insisting on women's privileged 
relation with nature, whether this is grounded in biological or social argument. 
Not only does this amount to a reversal of dualism, it also prevents other social 
groups to also shoulder their share of the responsibility for environmental 
destruction. As such we have a scenario where it is once again women who (are 
expected to) "clean up the mess", so to speak. As we have seen, women's 
privileged relation with nature is employed with another (related) objective in 
mind, and that is that women are capable of making a superior contribution to 
solving environmental problems. Once again we are faced not only with the 
reversal of dualism, but also the problems of essentialism or universalism. 
In the light of this, it would seem appropriate to distinguish one central challenge 
of ecological feminist thinking. This is to carve out a strategy that overcomes 
these shortcomings noted above, but without forsaking a continued insistence 
on women's difference and their alliance with nature. The reason why this 
challenge is presented as pivotal to the ecofeminist project is because an 
insistence on difference is misdirected if it is employed to suggest that women 
are "better" than men. This amounts to a distortion of the feminist project in its 
entirety. An insistence on difference is a political act that demands 
acknowledgement and respect (read: ethical treatment) not only insofar as one 
conforms to the norms and criteria of those in power, but also as an insistence 
on the freedom to challenge and subvert existing structures of meaning and 
relations of power. 
The second, feminine notion of the self that is endorsed by cultural ecofeminism 
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does not manage to secure a convincing position of difference for cultural 
ecofeminists either. Albeit not essentialist in biological terms, the feminine self of 
cultural ecofeminism is still hugely problematical. This is a result of its 
complementary character and subsequent continued entrapment in dualism, 
along with its - as already suggested above - universalisation of female gender 
identity. Moreover, to suggest that the relational self can function as alternative 
self (for men and women), specifically for its ecological significance has been 
shown to be unacceptable precisely for its complementary character. To 
overcome this complementarity by supporting an androgynous self is also 
undesirable for its ultimate erasure of differences. 
This brings us to another prominent challenge to ecological feminist thinking 
which pertains to the feminist character of the ecological self. Such a notion of 
the self demands the articulation of a notion of relationality that stresses 
continuity but not at the expense of acknowledging differences. These 
differences pertain to the differences between selves, but also between humans 
and nature. Moreover, to conceive of an adequate notion of an ecological self, 
requires that the self moves beyond anthropocentrism. This requirement is 
revealed in the relation of identification that is endorsed by cultural ecofeminists. 
Such a relation of overidentification between women and nature necessarily 
results in self-referentiality, which maintains a disregard for the needs of nature 
in its own right. What is needed then, is a notion of relationality that does not 
merely rely on the assertion that we are in-relationship-with nature either. This 
claim does not adequately address the problem of anthropocentrism, as it tends 
to emphasise human dependency on nature, in terms of which nature is valued 
for its "usefulness" for humans. To convincingly move beyond anthropocentrism, 
a different strategy is required. This calls for a shift in focus to a 
reconceptualisation of nature and showing how the self is related to nature. As 
we have seen, this is an undertaking that is not successfully completed by 
cultural ecofeminism. The images of nature that are employed consist of an 
affirmation of the regenerative qualities of nature and depicting nature as female, 
along with a mystification of nature as imbued with spirit. These strategies are 
inadequate, as they too, remain trapped in dualism. 
In the chapter that follows, titled Critical-transformative ecological feminism, I 
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will give an exposition of the notion/s of the self and the concomitant ethic that 
is articulated by this stream of thought. The aim of the discussion is to 
determine the contribution that this position makes towards the articulation of an 
ecological feminist notion of the self which can serve as basis for an ethical 
relationship towards nature, which at the same time transcends the problem of 
dualism and essentialism. As such, it will also be shown where and to what 
extent the shortcomings identified in cultural ecofeminist thinking are overcome. 
Conversely, it will also be shown if, and to what extent critical-transformative 
ecofeminism can conceive of difference and relationality in a manner that 
productively informs an ecological feminist notion of the self as well as ethics. In 
the process, the manner in which cultural and critical-transformative ecological 
feminist thinking can be shown to coincide and diverge from each other will also 
be elaborated upon. 
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1 . Introduction 
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In the preceding chapter, I have discussed the contributions of cultural 
ecofeminism towards the articulation of an ecological feminist notion of the self 
beyond dualism and essentialism. In their critique of patriarchal culture, cultural 
ecofeminists bring to light the systematic suppression and devaluation of women 
and nature and what is perceived as "feminine values". Although cultural 
ecofeminists do make a significant contribution towards the articulation of an 
ecological feminist notion of the self, I argued that the notions of the self that 
are endorsed fail to overcome dualism and essentialism. These deficiencies can 
be ascribed to the reductive analysis of the twin dominations of women and 
nature, which manifests in a rather uncritical affirmation of what is perceived as 
constituting women's difference. The shortcomings that are identified in the 
notions of the self are transferred onto the ethic and values that are endorsed 
from a cultural ecofeminist perspective. As such, the contributions that cultural 
ecofeminism makes towards the articulation of an ecological feminist notion of 
the self, are in need of further refinement. In this chapter, I turn my attention to 
the ecological feminist position that is interchangeably referred to as 
"philosophical" (Buege, 1994), "conceptual" (King, 1991), "critical" (Piumwood, 
1993; Andrews, 1994), and "transformative" ecofeminism (Warren, 1 994). In 
my understanding, it is the critical and transformative qualities in particular that 
distinguish this ecofeminist perspective from others. As such, a classification of 
this position as "critical-transformative" ecofeminism seems well suited. 
In the following chapter I give an exposition of the critical-transformative 
ecological feminist notions of the self and the ethic that is associated with it. 
The purpose of this exposition is to explore the contributions that are made 
towards the articulation of a feminist notion of an ecological self and an 
ecological notion of a feminist self beyond dualism and essentialism. Another, 
albeit implicit, aim of this discussion, is to determine whether and to what 
extent the deficiencies that are identified in cultural ecofeminism can be . 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
77 
overcome. As Val Plumwood is the main proponent of critical-transformative 
ecofeminism, specifically with regard to articulating an alternative feminist 
notion of an ecological self, I focus mainly on her contributions. Where relevant, 
1 will show how other ecofeminists such as Warren (1987, 1994), and Cheney 
(Warren and Cheney, 1991 ), Plant (1989), King (1989, 1990), Cuomo, (1998) 
and Mellor (1992, 1997) to a greater or lesser extent, share or enhance her 
views. 1 
As in the previous chapter, I start off this chapter with a brief contextualisation 
and background. This will be followed by a discussion of the critical 
transformative analysis of the twin dominations of women and nature in a 
section titled "Women and nature and the realm of the other". Critical-
transformative ecofeminist thinkers locate the source of the domination of 
women and nature in what is described by Warren (1994: 132) as an 
"oppressive conceptual framework" that involves a "logic of domination", or in 
Plumwood's case, a "logic of colonisation" (Andrews, 1996: 142). As we have 
seen, the argument that the oppression of women and nature can be traced 
back to dualism is not entirely new. However the critical-transformative 
ecofeminist analysis of the nature and functioning of dualism entails a particular 
engagement with dualism that distinguishes it markedly from the cultural 
ecofeminist position. It deepens our understanding of dualism and extends the 
reach of dualism so that the complexities involved in transforming a dualistically 
construed notion of the self and its relation to nature are brought to light. In my 
understanding, it is this feature that signifies the fundamental difference 
between the two approaches. 
In the fourth and fifth sections of this chapter I give an exposition of critical-
transformative ecofeminism's contributions towards the articulation of a feminist 
notion of an ecological self and an ecological notion of a feminist self. In my 
engagement with the literature at hand, I have come to distinguish a number of 
moments that together constitute the ecological feminist notion of the self that 
is articulated from a critical-transformative ecofeminist perspective. Although the 
different facets are to a greater or lesser degree part of a larger unfinished 
1Piant (1989) and King's (1989) positions, although sharing the view of the critical-
transformative perspective on some points, are however hugely ambiguous. 
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whole, they are discussed separately. The first two notions that are examined, 
are a pluralist feminine self and a degendered human self. Plumwood's 
engagement with female gender identity and the human marks an attempt to 
create a setting against which an ecological self that does not do away with 
differences, can be articulated. In the section titled "A critical affirmation of 1 
' female gender identity", Plumwood's proposal for the reconceptualisation ofj 
female gender identity beyond dualism and essentialism, is discussed. This; 
notion of female gender identity finds expression in a pluralist feminine self. The 
notion of the degendered human that signifies an attempt to transcend the false .· 
~ -. 
choice between either endorsing a masculine or feminine model of the self is l I; 
~iscussed in t~e section titled "The degendered _hum~n". The ~egendered human~;. 
1s shown to s1gnal a movement towards the art1culat1on a not1on of the self that 'I · 
lends itself to ecological selfhood. The critical-transformative notion of an ~~d 
ecological self starts to unfold before us in a third moment which consists of a 
transformation of nature as continuous with the human. In the section titled 
"The human, intentionality and nature", show that Plumwood's 
reconceptualisation of the self and nature as alike but also unlike, is 
accomplished. Acknowledging continuity along with difference, is a theme that 
occupies a central place in the critical-transformative engagement with 
transforming the relation between self and nature. It is in the section on critical-
transformative ecofeminist ethics that the ecological self emerges in more detail. 
The sixth part of this chapter titled "Critical-transformative ecofeminist ethics", 
consists of an exposition of a critical-transformative ecofeminist critique of 
environmentalists' continued adherence to ethics in abstract and universalist 
terms and the notion of the self that informs it. Plumwood (1991, 1993) and 
Warren (1994) propose a transformation of environmental ethics so as to include 
the contributions articulated from a feminist perspective. Instead of articulating a 
detailed account of an environmental ethic, Plumwood (1991, 1993) focuses on 
the relation between self and other that would provide a sound basis for the 
successful functioning of such an ethic. Here, another aspect of the critical-
transformative ecofeminist notion of the self comes to the fore. Taking issue 
with what she argues reveals deep ecology's confusion of dualism with holism, 
Plumwood articulates a feminist notion of an ecological self beyond dualism. 
p, ;\ 
)! ; 
1/ 
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This section is divided into two parts, "Beyond environmental ethics" and 
"Ethics and the mutual self". 
Throughout this exposition, relate and compare critical-transformative 
ecological feminism with cultural ecofeminism so as to show up similarities and 
differences between the two positions. Where appropriate, I will make critical 
comments to illuminate problem areas that will be discussed in further detail in 
the final section titled "An Evaluation of critical-transformative ecofeminism ". 
The objective of this evaluation is to elucidate the strengths and weaknesses of 
this position with regard to the contributions that are made towards the 
articulation of an ecological feminist notion of the self beyond dualism and 
essentialism. As in the previous chapter, I will now proceed to briefly 
contextualise critical-transformative ecofeminism. 
2. Contextualisation and background 
Val Plumwood and Karen Warren represent a stream within ecological feminist 
thinking that considers the domination and subjugation of women and nature to 
be an effect of an oppressive conceptual framework. 2 Not denying the extent to 
which patriarchy contributes to the oppression of women and nature, Plumwood 
departs from the cultural ecofeminist assertion that patriarchy is the source of all 
forms of oppression, including the domination of nature. 3 
2 This approach distinguishes their work from other social/ist ecofeminists such as Salleh 
(1992, 1984), Shiva (1989, 1990), Mellor (1997), Mies and Shiva (1993), whose analyses 
tend towards a more traditional materialism. 
3 Warren is ambiguous on this point (Grond, 1993; Pepper, 1996), not only because she 
fluctuates between phrases like "patriarchal conceptual framework" (1987, 1990, 1993) and 
"oppressive conceptual framework" (Warren, 1994) to explain the twin dominations of women 
and nature, but also for the reason that she gives for this fluctuation. Quite surprisingly, she 
elucidates this by stating that "there may be some patriarchal conceptual frameworks, (e.g., 
in non-Western cultures) that are not properly characterized as based on value dualisms" 
(Warren, 1994: 125). This explanation is surprising not because this is erroneous, but 
because even in Western culture, this would be oversimplifying the problem, a problem 
which is starkly illuminated by a thorough analysis of the domination of women and nature in 
terms of dualism. Warren's unsatisfactory explanation for the shift from a "patriarchal 
conceptual framework" to a focus on "oppressive conceptual frameworks", can perhaps be 
explained by the fact that she herself does not take her analysis of dualism further. That is, 
unlike Plumwood, Warren does not make a contribution towards the articulation of an 
ecological feminist notion of the self. 
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The analysis of the twin dominations of women and nature conducted by Warren 
and Plumwood is both historical and conceptual. 4 In Plumwood's case, this 
forms part of a critique of two prominent streams in ecological thinking. Both 
deep ecology and social ecology refuse to acknowledge the significance of the 
link between the domination of women and nature. 5 Plumwood's approach is 
also a response to the historical account that is offered by ecological thinkers 
such as Merchant (1982) who, supported by Capra (1982), argues that the 
domination of nature and women can be traced back to the rise of Cartesian-
Newtonian science. 
According to Merchant, the Cartesian-Newtonian view of nature as lifeless 
matter signifies a radical departure from a more organic approach to nature that 
prevailed during the pre-sixteenth century. In the light of the witch-hunts that 
took place during this so-called organic era, Plumwood responds by questioning 
Merchant's positive valuation of this historical period. She (Piumwood, 1986: 
127), writes: "[t]he pre-seventeenth century organic view of nature seem rosy 
indeed, and the contrast between pre-seventeenth century organism and later 
mechanism far too simple". Plumwood's critique is based on the observation 
that such a historical account fails to explain the rejection of the physical and 
the treatment of women as inferior during the pre-Enlightenment era. For 
Plumwood, this shortcoming signals the need for a more thorough inquiry that 
stretches back further in history. 
The kind of inquiry that Plumwood has in mind is contained in her critique of 
Merchant's discussion of the conceptual link between women and nature. She 
points out that in Merchant's analysis, the link between women and nature 
remains "little more than mere metaphor or convention" (Piumwood, 1986: 
136). For a more comprehensive account, Plumwood (1986, 1991, 1992, 1993) 
argues that we can trace the conceptual link between the domination of women 
and nature back to the time of the classical Greek philosophers. 6 This is not to 
deny an intensification of the radical separation between man and nature in 
4 Historical should here be understood in the literal, rather than the Marxist sense. 
5 Main exponents of deep ecology are Arne Naess (1985a, 1985b, 1989) and Warrick Fox 
(1990), and the founder of social ecology is Murray Bookchin (1989). 
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Cartesian-Newtonian thinking, which bolstered the instrumental treatment of 
nature. Locating the domination of women and nature in dualism provides a 
more complete picture of an overlapping network of power relations underlying 
the simultaneous domination and subjugation of women and nature. 
Treating the link between the domination of women and nature as the result of a 
dualist conceptual framework, Plumwood's position corresponds with 
ecofeminists such as Gray who, as we have seen, also focuses on hierarchical 
dualism. Plumwood (1986: 125) points out that Gray's analysis of 
transcendental dualism tends to restrict itself to the rejection of the sphere of 
physicality. Although she does not dispute the significance of this link, 
Plumwood (1986: 128) asserts that to liberate nature and women from their 
entrapment in a dualist structure, a closer inquiry in the nature and functioning 
of dualism is required. In her view then, a thorough engagement with dualism 
can overcome the deficiencies displayed by these analyses which in turn obscure 
the ways out of relations between self and other marked by domination and 
subordination. This is what we will discuss in further detail in the section that 
follows. 
3. Woman and nature and the realm of the other 
The analysis and characterisation of an oppressive conceptual framework that 
Warren and Plumwood respectively submit coincide on certain points but also 
diverge notably. 7 Plumwood's focus on dualism as characteristic of oppressive 
conceptual frameworks will be my point of entry into this discussion, as she 
situates dualism within the context of Western philosophical thought. The 
account she offers of the nature and functioning of dualism is more suited to this 
discussion than Warren's (1994) analysis. In what follows, I give a concise 
account of Plumwood's critique of the rationalist philosophical tradition whose 
dominance in Western philosophical thinking has proved to be inimical to both 
women and nature. The manner in which reason was construed so as to effect 
6 Here Plumwood follows Rosemary Radford Reuther (1974) who traces the twin dominations 
of women and nature back to the time of the Greek philosophers; she however diverts from 
Reuther's view that "the subjugation of woman is the first subjugation" (Mellor, 1997: 50). 
7 See Warren (1994: 124-134) for an exposition of how the domination of women and nature 
is grounded in an oppressive conceptual framework. 
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power over nature receives special attention here. This is followed by a 
discussion of the main features of dualism that lies central to the rationalist 
philosophical tradition. The manner in which this focus on dualism situates 
critical-transformative ecofeminism, is also elaborated upon. In the final part of 
this section, I illustrate Plumwood's strategy to open up an avenue to move 
beyond dualism, and most importantly, to take up the challenge of articulating 
an ecological feminist notion of the self. 
3.1 A critique of rationalism and the instrumentalisation of nature 
In an in depth analysis of the dominant rationalist tradition in Western 
philosophical thought, Plumwood (1993: 69-119) reveals how the concept of 
the human as embodiment of the Western ideals of rationality, has been 
articulated in fundamental opposition to nature, woman and the feminine. 8 Since 
the time of Plato, reason is not only contrasted with nature, the sphere of the 
natural includes the body, passions, emotions, the animal, the senses, non-
human landscape, the slave, the feminine, reproductive nature and matter as 
chaos. The deficiency of all these others, is their distance from "logos" ordering 
reason, which grounds the mastery of some, and sanctions the domination and 
control of others (Piumwood, 1993: 88). The ingredients for the perception of 
the human as essentially disconnected from nature and the sphere of the natural 
by virtue of a capacity for rationality are therefore already present in pre-
Enlightenment thought. Not disputing the role of Cartesian-Newtonian 
mechanistic science in the domination and instrumentalisation of nature, 
Plumwood points out that the dualist structure of Platonic thinking provides the 
foundation for an intensification of dualism in Enlightenment thinking. It is in 
Enlightenment thinking then, that we are presented with a fundamentally 
alienated account of the human and a conception of reason that fosters relations 
of control and mastery of nature. During this period, old dualisms that were 
8Here Plumwood links up with feminist writers such as Lloyd (1984) and Bordo (1987). In their 
respective analyses of the history of Western philosophical thought, Lloyd reveals how 
reason is construed in opposition to women and the feminine, whilst Bordo shows how the 
preoccupation with "objectivity" in Enlightenment thinking marks a "flight from the feminine". 
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shaped by Platonic thinking, pave the way to be occupied by new ones 
(Piumwood, 1993: 75). 9 
This brings us to the manner in which "the western mechanistic conception of 
nature" is grounded in dualism (Piumwood, 1993: 1 04). Focusing on the human-
nature dualism in particular, Plumwood (1993: 1 07) offers the following account 
of its development: 
The first step . . . is the construction of the normative (the best or 
ideal) human identity as mind or reason, excluding or inferiorising the 
whole rich range of other human and non-human characteristics or 
construing them as inessential. The construction of mind or reason as 
oppositional to nature is the second step. The construction of nature 
itself as mindless is the third step, one which both reinforces the 
opposition and constructs nature as ineluctably alien, disposing of an 
important area of overlap between humans and animals and non-
human nature. 10 
The first two steps are present in Plato's texts, and the third is implicit in his 
treatment of original matter as chaos upon which rational order must be 
imposed. The third step is the one that Descartes makes explicit. It builds upon 
and presupposes the earlier steps and together with these features, the great 
divide between the human and nature is construed. This is a significant change 
that occurs in the work of Descartes that distinguishes his thought form Plato's. 
Plato's position expresses a preoccupation with the "primacy of reason over 
internal nature, with dominating and disciplining the body, emotions and senses" 
(Plum wood, 1993: 1 09). According to Plumwood, Plato does not seem to think 
of the "natural world itself, external nature as a field of control, something 
9 In her analysis of western philosophical thought, Plumwood (1993: 141) shows how the 
human as embodiment of reason or later, rationality as defined in opposition and superior to 
the realm of nature and the feminine, found its expression in different but related sets of 
dualisms at different periods in history. The rational as the distinctive mark of the human or 
individual, is also appropriated in the service of dominant political (liberal democracy), ethical 
(utilitarianism) and economic (liberal capitalist) ends. This analysis is also revealing of 
Plumwood's socialist feminist leanings. 
10 An exception Plumwood notes is found in Aristotelian thought where rationality of the 
human sphere corresponded to a rational order in nature. However, she (Piumwood, 1993: 
1 05) writes: "[t]he Aristotelian position left more room for continuity than is typically left in the 
rationalist tradition. But it was a continuity organised around hierarchy". 
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humans have power over or have to struggle with", in fact he regards it as an 
inferior sphere of little intrigue (Plum wood, 1 993: 1 09). 
What has changed with the rise of technology in the twelfth century is not so 
much the perception of the separateness and inferiority of nature, but the 
"confidence in controlling it" (Plum wood, 1993: 1 09). This shift in the 
perception of human power in relation to nature is implicit in the images of 
nature that Descartes employs at a later stage. Nature is conceived as passive, 
and as wax easily molded. Another dominant image of nature as machine further 
bolsters the allure of the power to control. Conceiving of nature as machine 
reinforces a restricted instrumental view of nature that is consistent with the 
technological outlook. Plumwood (1993: 1 09) puts it succinctly: 
The machine's properties are contrived for its maker's benefit, and its 
canons of virtue reflect its users' interests ... A machine is made to 
be controlled and knowledge over its operation is the means to power 
over it. 
In this way, reason finds a new purpose. Rather than escaping the natural world 
and rising above it, it is to exercise control over the natural world. 11 The 
mechanistic view of nature defined as null and void of meaning is employed in 
the service of scientific mechanism. It is seen as passive, non-agent, non-
creative and inert and action is viewed as imposed on it by an external force. 
Defined negatively in relation to the primary term the human, .nature lacks 
interests and significance of its own and humans determine any purpose or value 
it might have. Not surprisingly then, this view of nature as devoid of meaning or 
purpose opens up the way for conceiving of nature in purely instrumental terms: 
For if something is conceived in these mechanistic terms, as lacking 
any of the qualities of autonomy and agency which are required for 
us to be able to accord respect to it as its own thing, it can merely be 
seen as our thing. If it lacks its own goals and direction, it can 
impose no constraints on our treatment of it; it can be seen as 
something utterly neutral on which humans can and even must 
11 Here Merchant's (1982) point of "power over nature" as a particularly Modern idea is 
echoed. 
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mechanistically conceived nature lies open to, indeed invites the 
imposition of human purposes and treatment as an instrument for the 
achievement of human satisfactions (Piumwood, 1993: 110-11, 
emphasis Plumwood's). 
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The goal of science which is to obtain rational knowledge of nature, (in itself an 
act of control) so as to mold it into an instrument that serves human ends, is 
fully consistent with the account of nature given above. 12 Instrumental 
rationality that lies at the core of the Western scientific project since the 
Enlightenment is grounded in the dualistically construed notion of nature as a 
mindless entity with no goal or purpose of its own. 13 To address the particular 
shape that the domination and instrumentalisation of nature takes on in Western 
culture, this dualistic view of nature, has to be transformed so as to challenge 
the human/nature dualism that grounds the instrumental treatment of nature. In 
the section of this chapter titled "The human, intentionality and nature", this will 
receive detailed attention, and will be further elaborated upon in the section 
"Critical-transformative ecofeminist ethics". But before such an undertaking can 
be embarked upon, we have to take a closer look at the structure of dualism as 
it is discussed in critical-transformative ecofeminism. 
3.2 The structure of dualism 
In keeping with her suggestion that an in-depth analysis of the nature and 
functioning of dualism is required so as to devise a strategy to move beyond 
dualism, Plumwood examines the main features of dualism. For Plumwood, 
hierarchy and radical separation are architectonic to dualism. In a dualist relation, 
the qualities that are associated with the hyperseparated other are 
12 If we recall, this point links up with the critique of Western science and Cartesian-
Newtonian thinking discussed in Chapter 1. 
13 As I have observed in the previous chapter, instrumental rationality denotes a view of 
nature as resource for human use, and also the inclination to view everything and all things in 
instrumental terms, that is, reductively in terms of their use value only. This point of critique 
reflects critical-transforrnative ecofeminism's affinity to the tradition of German Critical 
Theory that delivers a powerful critique of instrumental reason. For an in depth discussion of 
the relevance of Critical Theory for ecological thinking, see Eckersley (1992: 97-117) and 
also Dobson (1993: 191-194). 
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systematically constructed and depicted as inferior. The structure of dualism is 
subsequently articulated as follows: 
Dualism is a relation of separation and domination inscribed and 
naturalised in culture and characterised by radical exclusion, 
distancing and opposition between orders constructed as 
systematically higher and lower, as inferior and superior, as ruler and 
ruled, which treats the division as part of the natures of beings 
construed not merely as different but as belonging to radically 
different orders or kinds, and hence not open to change (Piumwood, 
1993: 47). 14 
According to Plumwood (1993: 47-55) the logical structure of dualism can be 
illuminated with reference to five main characteristics. The features that she 
distinguishes all function together to support and maintain the hierarchical 
structure of dualism and the ensuing relations of domination it effects. Before 
discussing these main features, it is insightful to take note of Plumwood's (not 
necessarily exhaustive) list of the key sets of oppositional pairs (Piumwood 
1993: 43): 
Self other 
human nature 
reason nature 
culture nature 
male female 
mind body (nature) 
mind, spirit nature 
reason matter (pure physicality) 
subject object 
reason emotion 
masculine feminine 
rationality animality 
14 Essentialism as denoting a fixed and ahistorical truth is therefore necessarily implied in 
dualism. This is consistent with one of the main thrusts of the poststructuralist critique of 
dualism, a most prominent contributor being the French-Algerian philosopher, Jacques 
Derrida (1976, 1981). Exposing these fixed and ahistorical truths as constructed opens up the 
possibility for (among other things), reconstruction and change. 
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civilised primitive 
master slave 
universal particular 
production reproduction 
freedom necessity 
public private 
The qualities that are displayed on the left side of the division are associated 
with the self and those on the right side, are associated with the other. The 
self/other dualism can be shown to represent the wide range of interrelated and 
mutually reinforcing dualist pairs. For this reason then it is with reference to this 
pair that the characteristics are discussed. 15 
A main feature of dualism is the element of radical exclusion, which serves to 
establish an oppositional relation between the two categories that constitute a 
dualist pair. In terms of radical exclusion, the other is conceived of as radically 
different and hyperseparated from the self. The other's differences are 
emphasised and maximised so as to create maximal separation between self and 
other. To illustrate the artificiality of this distinction, Plumwood (1993: 49) 
writes that "[f]or otherness there need be only a single characteristic which is 
different, possessed by the one but not the other ... " What this construction 
thus achieves, is the radical exclusion of the other from the self, thus eliminating 
any recognition of continuity between self and other. Coupled with the 
inferiorisation of the other, radical exclusion is employed to sanction the 
domination of the other by the self. Moreover as Plumwood remarks, this 
construction serves to "naturalise domination, making it appear to be part of the 
nature of each and in the nature of things, and yields two hyperseparated orders 
of being" (Piumwood 1993: 51). 
The relationship described above, is however fraught with tension. One source 
of tension regards the dependence of the self on the other in order to maintain 
unity and position of privilege. This is dealt with by backgrounding which 
15 The features that Plumwood identifies and discusses as characteristic of dualist structures, 
namely hierarchy, exclusion, backgrounding, incorporation and homogenisation are 
consistent with the feminist poststructuralist analysis and critique of dualist structures that 
draws strongly on Derridian deconstructivism (Scott, 1988; Grosz, 1990). 
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negates this relationship of dependence (Piumwood, 1993: 48-49; King, 1989: 
19-23). 16 Whilst being facilitated by polarisation and hierarchy, backgrounding at 
the same time reinforces polarisation and hierarchy. Backgrounding also entails 
the assumption that the perspective of the other is inessential, whilst the view 
of the self is set up as universal (Piumwood, 1993: 48; Grosz: 1990: 150). From 
this viewpoint, it never occurs to the self that there might exist a perspective in 
which he is the background. This inessentialness of the other and the 
essentialness of the self, is however an illusion, as it is the self who requires the 
other to define his identity as it is defined essentially in opposition to the other. 
Thus, according to Plumwood (1993: 49), paradoxically, it is the other the self is 
indebted to. 
This brings us to a third characteristic of dualism, namely incorporation 
according to which the identity of the other is constructed always in relation and 
with reference to the self. That is, the other is constructed in opposition to the 
identity and needs of the self, the latter of which is taken as primary and 
defining of social value, whilst the other is defined as negative or lack. In this 
way the power of the self over and above the other is construed. As Grosz has 
observed, when the self serves as ultimate point of reference in the definition of 
the other as in opposition (or complementary) to the self, what is in effect 
achieved is sameness (Grosz, 1990: 150). In this culture of sameness, the other 
is not encountered as fully independent other. Given the dependence of the self 
on the other to preserve its superiority and maintain the relation of domination, 
"the master consciousness cannot tolerate unincorporated otherness" 
(Piumwood, 1993: 52). Consequently "the other is only recognised to the extent 
that it is assimilated to the self, or incorporated to the self and its system of 
desires and needs: only as colonised by the self" (Piumwood, 1993: 52). In the 
light of the above, it is clear that radical differentiation (exclusion) and 
incorporation are two sides of the same coin. These features of incorporation 
and radical exclusion are linked to the fourth and fifth characteristics of dualism, 
namely instrumentalisation and homogenisation. 
16 This relationship of dependence operates on a conceptual as well as material level. 
Social/ist ecofeminist Mellor (1997) focuses on this relationship in her materialist analysis of 
the relation between women and nature. For an excellent analysis and discussion of this 
materialist connection between women and nature, see Mellor (1997: 162-192). 
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The oppositional terms in which the other is defined in relation to the self and 
the inferior value that is attributed to the characteristics of the other together 
create a justification for the self's domination of the other. According to 
Plum wood ( 1 993: 53) this is enacted through a process of objectification and 
the instrumentalisation of the other. The lower sides of the dualism are required 
to set aside their own interests to serve those of the upper sides, and are 
conceived of as instruments, as means to his ends. Through objectification, the 
other is depicted as having no needs of her own, as the ends of the other are 
defined in terms of the ends of the self. Furthermore, due to the other's 
exclusion from the realm of the self, the self does not recognise the other as 
morally considerable, (having needs and ends of its own), thus rendering him 
free to impose his will. 
Another feature that characterises dualism and the ensuing relation between self 
and other that is marked by domination, is homogenisation. Homogenisation 
refers to the manner in which differences between members of an inferiorised 
group are ignored which intensifies polarisation, which in turn functions also in 
the service of incorporation. The homogenisation of the identity of the other 
precludes differentiation that could challenge the "assimilated otherness" the 
self is dependent upon to maintain its integrity and privilege. Because radical 
separation or exclusion hinders the recognition of continuity between self and 
other, any confusion regarding this point is further eliminated through 
homogenisation. It is therefore not surprising that the instrumental treatment of 
the other is promoted by homogenisation. The dominated other must appear 
homogenous if it is to confirm, and conform, to its "nature", a "nature" which 
justifies and maintains an instrumental relation between self and other. 
Having discussed the main features of dualism, Plumwood asserts that in order 
to transform the dualist structure of the relation between self and other, the 
particular characteristics of dualism need to be carefully reflected upon. The 
strategy that Plumwood offers in the light of the above analysis will be 
elaborated upon in due course. First, I would like to take a moment to situate the 
critical-transformative ecofeminist position in the light of the critique of the 
domination and subjugation of women and nature as grounded in dualism. 
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3.3 Situating the woman-nature connection 
To focus on dualism as grounding the twin dominations of women and nature, a 
different light is cast upon the kind of connection that exists between the 
domination of women and nature. First, this connection is conceptual, but also 
finds expression in material reality. Plumwood makes clear that this conceptual 
structure manifests itself in social relations. 17 An analysis of dualism enables us 
to observe that and how the twin dominations of women and nature are 
intertwined with a whole range of other dualisms. These dualisms Plumwood 
asserts, form an interrelated web that functions in a mutually supportive manner. 
Focusing on dualism illuminates a wide range of exclusions that draws our 
attention to the fact that it is not only women and nature that have been 
oppressed. That is, others who have also been designated to the realm of 
otherness have shared the same fate. 
Most significantly, the expansion of the realm of the other to include also a 
number of different others, expands and complexities also the identity of the 
self. The characteristics of the self that we have to address in an endeavour to 
transform the relation between self and other marked by domination and 
subjugation are therefore broadened. It is in the light of this that Plumwood 
(1993: 42) writes: "[t]hus it is the identity of the master (rather than a 
masculine identity pure and simple) defined by these multiple exclusions which 
lies at the heart of western culture". 18 This notion of the master is constituted 
by a wide range of exclusions that include human and non-human others, and 
serves to problematise what is often assumed by cultural ecofeminists as 
unproblematic. The cultural ecofeminist tendency to depict women as innocents 
as opposed to men, who are universally condemned, is significantly challenged 
by showing how the identity of the master is not necessarily specific to men. 
This is at the same time not to deny that the manner in which this symbolic 
17 Plumwood's materialist roots are thus laid bare, but as I read her, Plumwood ultimately 
wants to overcome the conceptual/material dichotomy. As we shall see, this is most markedly 
portrayed in her discussion of the mutual self as post-rationalist feminist subjectivity that is 
adapted to articulate an ecological self beyond dualism and essentialism. 
18 Plumwood's use of the term "master", especially in combination with what she refers to as 
a "logic of colonisation", signals that the self-other dualism is a model that reaches wider into 
Western culture that can be shown to transfer onto the broader political, social and economic 
spheres: Western imperialism and its offshoots being exemplary in this regard. As such 
Plumwood's socialist roots are obvious. 
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structure has organised Western culture, has rendered the identity of the master 
the property of (an elite group of white) males. However, by showing how the 
master/slave dualism is connected to and supported by other dualisms, a 
consideration of exclusions in terms of race, class and species for example, 
reveals how women too, can be and have been implicated in the identity of the 
master, also with respect to the exploitation of the natural environment. 
Plumwood's departure from opposing simply a "male" or "masculine" identity, 
brings to light the complex functioning of power relations that problematises the 
simplistic distinction between oppressor and oppressed. 
Not denying that women's association with nature, and nature's association 
with the feminine, has and still continues to inform the treatment of both women 
and nature, Plumwood's analysis of dualism as the source of the oppression of 
the other moves one step further by disrupting the cultural ecofeminist 
privileging of the woman-nature-feminine connection. Detaching women's 
identification with nature and the feminine somewhat, it is made visible how 
being cast with nature and the feminine has functioned also to the detriment of 
others who suffer at the hands of the master. She points out that male slaves 
for example too, have been cast in the role of other and both feminised and 
naturalised (Piumwood, 1993: 50). What this illustrates is that an uncritical 
endorsement of a female or a feminine self as alternative ecological feminist self 
is a function of a too restrictive engagement with the twin dominations of 
women and nature. For Plumwood then, the articulation of an ecological feminist 
notion of the self requires more than replacing what is perceived to be simply a 
male or masculine notion of the self with a female or feminine notion of the self. 
Plumwood's contributions towards the articulation of such an ecological feminist 
notion of the self beyond dualism and essentialism will be elaborated upon in due 
course. 
Approaching the domination and subjugation of women and nature in terms of 
dualism is significant in another sense. As we have seen, according to critical-
transformative ecofeminism, dualism grounds a range of different but related 
forms of oppression, the one not reducible to the other (as in the case of cultural 
ecofeminism). Following Warren (1987), Plumwood (1994a, 1994b) asserts that 
ecofeminism can be described as a liberation movement that opposes all forms 
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of oppression, that is, the domination of non-human nature by humans and the 
domination of humans by humans. 19 In this regard Warren (1987: 18) writes: 
. . . [t]ransformative feminism would expand on the traditional 
conception of feminism as a movement to end women's oppression 
by recognising and making explicit the interconnections between all 
systems of oppression . . . Feminism, properly understood, is a 
movement to end all forms of oppression A transformative 
feminism would build on these insights [of black and socialist 
feminism] to develop a more expansive and complete feminism, one 
which ties the liberation of women to the liberation of all systems of 
oppression (Warren's brackets). 
According to Plumwood (1994: 215), this is not to suggest that different 
liberation movements are to come together as one, but to acknowledge different 
forms of oppression as related. It is argued that such an acknowledgment of and 
sensitivity to the interconnectedness between different forms of human 
domination and the domination of nature, can only serve to deepen and enrich 
the analyses of different ecological positions along with the notion/s of the self 
that are endorsed. 
This brings us to another distinguishing feature of the critical-transformative 
ecofeminist position. The argument that the oppression and devaluation of 
nature and women is grounded in a dualist conceptual framework suggests a 
specific approach towards addressing the twin dominations of women and 
nature. The strategy that Plumwood follows represents a shift, although not a 
departure, from the tendency of cultural ecofeminist to restrict their focus 
somewhat to the masculine/feminine, male/female dualisms in terms of which 
the domination of nature is explained and addressed. Instead, Plumwood 
broadens her focus by placing the human/nature dualism central to her analysis. 
By focusing on the human, not only the gendered character of the human is 
brought to light, but also the key role that reason played in the domination of 
nature and women. Taking into account the involvement of the reason/nature 
dualism in the domination of nature is consistent with Plumwood's assertion that 
19 King (1989), Merchant (1992), Mellor (1997), and Salleh (1992, 1994) also share this 
understanding of ecofeminism. 
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to expose the identity of the self that has to be transformed, a more thorough 
analysis of the identity of the master needs to be conducted. She (1993: 69) 
writes: 
The contraction by this feminist critique of the identity of the master 
to an identity that is simply male tends to obscure the real political 
issues and the real measures which are needed to bring about change 
(hooks, 1989: 20). To shake the conceptual foundations of these 
systems of domination we must unmask more fully the identity of the 
master. 
From a critical-transformative ecological feminist perspective, the identity of the 
master finds its expression in the human. Subsequently, the human/nature 
dualism is concentrated upon as containing the masculine/feminine and 
reason/nature dualisms. To the extent that it focuses on the masculine/feminine 
dualism, critical-transformative ecofeminism shares with cultural ecofeminism a 
critique of the masculinity of the dominant notion of the self. However, an 
approach that includes the reason/nature dualism sensitises us to the range of 
other forms of domination generated by a dualist construal of reason. As such, it 
also opens up different possibilities towards the articulation of an ecological 
feminist notion of the self. 20 That is, a point of entry is provided that can be 
explored to conceive of a feminist notion of an ecological self that moves 
beyond the restrictions of a notion of the self defined in opposition to the 
masculine. Moreover, it makes possible an approach towards conceiving of 
nature beyond its limited and limiting association with the feminine. Lastly, 
refusing an erasure of differences, it encourages a conceptualisation of female 
gender identity beyond dualism and essentialism. 
20 If we recall, in the previous chapter on cultural ecofeminism, the ecofeminist critique of 
Western science and Cartesian-Newtonian thinking is discussed which shows up the role of 
these related dualisms in the domination and subjugation of nature, the feminine and women. 
This discussion was however performed with the aim of elucidating the cultural ecofeminist 
references to the manner in which Western science and Cartesian-Newtonian thinking 
contribute to the instrumentalisation of nature, whilst simultaneously being inimical to women 
and the feminine. These points of critique implies the rejection of the reason/nature dualism, 
but as we shall see, Plumwood engages with this and related dualisms in a particular 
manner. 
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3.4 Moving Beyond Dualism 
Speaking from within the context of critical-transformative ecofeminism, 
Plumwood (1993: 59-68) maintains that a first step towards addressing a 
dualistically structured relation between self and other, is to overcome the 
radical exclusion and inferiorisation that marks the relation between self and 
other. This, Plumwood (1991: 4-22; 1992: 18-23; 1993: 61-62, 27-34) asserts, 
must however be distinguished from two different but related strategies, that are 
followed to address the domination and inferiorisation of the other. These 
strategies are incorporation and uncritical affirmation. According to the strategy 
of incorporation, the other is assimilated into the sphere of the self by extending 
the qualities of the self to the other. Uncritical affirmation is a strategy that 
involves a positive affirmation of otherness in defiance of the inferiorisation of 
the other by the self. The inadequacy of both of these strategies lies in their 
reinforcement of, and thus failure to move beyond the structure of dualism. In 
the case of incorporation radical separation is overcome, but this strategy is a 
superficial challenge to dualism. Whilst the other is assimilated to the realm of 
the self, the dualistically construed sphere of the self is left perfectly intact. In 
the case of the uncritical affirmation, the inferiorisation of the other is defied. In 
spite of giving acknowledgement to the other, however, the oppositional relation 
between self and other is not sufficiently challenged. This is only possible if an 
affirmation of otherness is accompanied by a reconstructive moment. 
From the perspective of critical-transformative ecofeminism, these pitfalls can be 
avoided by following an alternative strategy that is best described as a 
transcendence of dualism. For Plumwood (1993: 66-68) moving beyond dualism 
requires a rearticulation and transformation of the relation between self and 
other through the establishment of some kind of continuity, whilst holding on to 
differences. 21 This approach towards a movement beyond dualism is more 
intricate than it seems at first, posing a particular challenge for bringing about 
change. This challenge is captured in Plumwood's insistence that moving beyond 
dualism so as to transform relations of domination requires a reconceptualisation 
of both the other and the self (Piumwood, 1992: 20; 1993: 66-68). For 
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Plumwood, continuity can not be established on a basis that is identical to 
characteristics of categories that are dualistically construed. It is this 
requirement that contrasts critical-transformative ecofeminism with the two 
strategies noted above. 22 As we have seen, in the case of the strategy of 
incorporation, transformation occurs on the side of the other; but to the extent 
that it is incorporated into the sphere of the self, the self remains unchallenged 
and unchanged.23 The second strategy that positively affirms the other's 
difference threatens to intensify the already existing hierarchical relation of 
radical separation between self and other. Although an affirmation and 
celebration of difference is important and challenges the self to a certain extent, 
this strategy lacks the power to effect lasting change. 24 As such everything 
remains, more or less, the same. 25 Plumwood's course can be said to mark an 
attempt to carve out an avenue between these two strategies - but with a 
different twist. For continuity to be established, a transformation of self and 
other is required which in turn alters the basis of continuity. The success of this 
strategy depends on the continued flourishing of differences, but these 
differences are multiple and subject to change, thus signifying also different 
differences. 
In the following sections, I discuss the ecological feminist notion of the self 
articulated from a critical-transformative ecological feminist perspective. As we 
have seen, Plumwood places the interconnectedness of the masculine/feminine, 
21 Plumwood proposes that in principle, this strategy could be followed with regard to all 
dualisms, but it is clear that some concepts would better lend themselves to such a 
transformation than others. 
22 This point is argued in a slightly different context by feminists who maintain that, given the 
asymmetrical power relations between self and other, a relation of continuity cannot be 
established between the self and other in their present form. As it is precisely incorporation 
and uncritical affirmation that is aimed at being avoided, a critical affirmation of the other is 
required so as to effect structural change without obliteration differences. It is only on this 
basis that existing social and discursive power relations can be challenged and transformed. 
23 Regarding the notion of the self endorsed, a stream of thought in feminist philosophy, 
referred to as "feminism of equality" has been criticised extensively for succumbing to this 
strategy (Grosz, 1991; Braidotti, 1991). The notion of the self endorsed by liberal feminism in 
particular, as instance of "feminism of equality", has come under sharp criticism also in 
ecofeminist thought (Warren, 1987; King, 1990; Plumwood, 1986, 1992). 
24 Within the context of ecofeminism, this strategy that lacks a constructive moment is of 
course the one that is followed by the cultural ecofeminists. 
25 The question can of course be raised as to how we can be sure that the self will undergo 
transformation along with the other. Differently formulated, what guarantee exists that the 
self will be willing to give up his privileged position, as this is after all what is required. Of 
course no guarantees can be offered, but that the arguments offered by this strategy places 
the other in a significantly better position to negotiate, is nonetheless the case. 
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human/nature, and reason/nature dualisms central in her analysis and critique of 
the dominant notion of the self that is defined in opposition to women and 
nature. Articulating her contributions towards conceiving of an ecological 
feminist notion of the self from a critical-transformative ecofeminist perspective, 
this endeavour entails amongst others, an engagement with female gender 
identity. This is followed up by the articulation of a notion of the human that 
signals a shift away from a female or feminine self as offering an alternative to a 
male or masculine self. This shift in focus to a human self that is neither 
masculine nor feminine, has the objective of opening up a space for the 
articulation of the other dimensions that are to constitute an ecological self. 
4. Reconceiving the self 
The following section consists of a discussion of Plumwood's engagement with 
female gender identity and the notion of the human. In my discussion, female 
gender identity is treated as informing her notion of a pluralist feminine self. 
Female gender identity and the human self are engaged with in response to the 
shortcomings identified in cultural ecofeminism. If we recall, the cultural 
ecofeminist position endorses a feminine model of the self that, despite its 
endorsement of a relation with nature marked by connectedness, remains 
trapped in a dualist framework, and by implication, fails also to overcome 
essentialism or universalism. The discussion below in the section titled "A 
critical affirmation of female gender identity" consists of an attempt to untangle 
a feminine self {as discussed in Chapter 1) from its dualist construal and to 
liberate it from its universalist character. 
In the second part, titled "The degendered human", a notion of the degendered 
human is offered as a model of the self for both sexes. This concept of the 
human is articulated as an alternative to both the dominant "masculine" self and 
its rival "feminine" self. As such, the degendered self is a step in the direction of 
articulating an ecological self that is not necessarily gender specific. This marks 
a shift in the debate from whom is closer to nature to how our joint relation to 
nature can be conceived of differently. However, the degendered self still is not 
an ecological self, but lays the basis and opens up the way for the articulation of 
other facets that would together constitute an ecological self. This is embarked 
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upon in the section titled ''The human, intentionality and nature", which offers a 
non-anthropocentric account of continuity between humans and nature in terms 
of the notion of intentionality. The ecological self is however elaborated upon in 
further detail in the section on critical-transformative ecological feminist ethics. 
4. 1 . A critical affirmation of female gender identity 
In the previous chapter, it was argued that endorsing a feminine self as opposed 
to a masculine self is problematic for a number of reasons. Affirming what 
amounts to a traditional feminine model of the self is questionable given its 
continued entrapment in dualism and universalism. The reason for this is that a 
notion of the feminine self remains a complementary model constructed to 
supplement the masculine self (Piumwood: 1986: 20; Mellor, 1992: 246). Even 
if, as we have seen, female gender identity is acknowledged to be socially 
grounded, it remains problematic given its universalist character. Plumwood 
responds to this by pointing out that in its failure to conceive female identity in 
pluralist terms, major differences between women are obscured (Piumwood, 
1993: 62). As we shall see shortly, the notion of the self that Plumwood 
articulates here, is a pluralist feminine self. 
Acknowledging the dangers involved in positing a differentiated female gendered 
identity, Plumwood argues that an altogether departure from the concept 
"woman" would be undermining to feminist politics, as taken to its logical 
conclusion, it would render the claim that women are oppressed meaningless 
(Alcott, 1988: 420 in Plumwood, 1993: 62). To follow the route to dissolving 
female identity in fear of being charged with essentialism is therefore not a 
viable alternative. With reference to poststructuralist feminists such as Judith 
Butler (1990), Plumwood asserts that the poststructuralist strategy of 
subversion by continually destabilising female gender identity is not desirable 
either. According to Plumwood (1993: 63), "these anti-identities continue to be 
defined in relation to the objects of parody which originate in the problematic of 
colonisation", thus never managing to untie itself form the master identity in 
opposition to which it is constructed. 26 
26 This is of course a very one-sided interpretation of the meaning of the poststructuralist 
strategy of subversion of identity. As we shall see in the final chapter, Plumwood's own 
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For Plumwood, such an engagement with female gender identity also 
undermines the important role that giving positive content to the identities of 
women "can and must play in the empowerment, connection and liberation of 
women" (Piumwood, 1993: 62). Moreover, she also argues that simply rejecting 
female identity would negate the creative ways in which women themselves 
have engaged with the identities that have been assigned to them, thus 
reinforcing the perception of women as passive recipients of what has been 
made of them. Aware of the dangers implied in giving "positive content" to 
female gender identity, but willing to take up the challenge, Plumwood (1993: 
62) qualifies this statement by writing: 
They are, to be sure, never problematic given the power relations 
which shape social identities generally and traditional gender 
identities in particular. But they are capable of liberatory or subversive 
reconstruction without total demolition or abandonment. Despite the 
difficulties of the type of affirmation involved in reversal, there is 
ultimately no viable alternative to a creative and affirmative 
reconstruction of post-colonised identity (my emphasis, FM). 
According to Plumwood (1993: 63), affirmation is "essential to counter the logic 
of the master subject" that entails an inferiorisation and devaluation of the 
feminine. However, recognition and compensation for this devaluation must be 
conducted in a critical mode and thus consist of an affirmation in modified form. 
These arguments shed light on Plumwood's endorsement of a pluralist notion of 
female gender identity that purports to move beyond dualism, essentialism and 
universalism. Approached from a specifically ecofeminist perspective, it is clear 
that her strategy is double edged. First, she (1993: 35) addresses the issue of 
(biological) essentialism by stating that the perception of women as for example 
closer to nature, is erroneous. For Plumwood, the connection between women 
and nature is not an essential connectedness, but a result of their different social 
and historical positioning. 27 This is accompanied by an acknowledgement of the 
proposal regarding the reconstruction of female gender identity, is rather ironically not wholly 
incompatible with the proposals made by other poststructuralist feminist thinkers with regard 
to the articulation of a female feminist subjectivity. 
27 Here it is clear that critical-transformative ecofeminism is also a social/ist ecofeminist 
position. That women are located differently as a result of their social and historical 
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fact that some activities that have traditionally been performed largely by 
women can offer useful insights towards creating alternative relations with our 
natural environment. In this regard, she (1993: 35) writes: 
To the extent that [many] women's lives have been lived in ways 
which are less directly oppositional to nature than those of men, and 
have involved different and less oppositional practices, qualities of 
care and kinds of selfhood, an ecological feminist position could and 
should privilege some of the experiences and practices of women 
over those of men as a source of change without being committed to 
any form of naturism (my brackets, FM). 28 
As we have seen, Plumwood stresses that it is crucial that affirmation is 
accompanied also by critical reconstruction. In a second move then, female 
gender identity must be reconceptualised in a manner that involves neither an 
uncritical affirmation, nor complete rejection of what constitutes female gender 
identity. For Plumwood, female gender identity can be reconceived as both 
continuous with, but also different from how it has traditionally been conceived. 
Moreover, to avoid universalisation Plumwood (1993: 62), citing Spelman 
(1988) and hooks (1984), endorses a plural notion of female gender identity, so 
as to acknowledge the differences that exist between women. 29 
positioning, is the point of convergence. Here the reference to women's social and historical 
position denotes more than the social position of women in terms of the roles they 
traditionally occupy. Because Plumwood focuses on the conceptual as well as historical and 
material association between women and nature, a movement is made towards an 
acknowledgment of the manner in which the symbolic is inscribed in material relations and 
how female subjectivity is socially and discursively constructed. Of course Plumwood herself 
does not articulate these views given her stronger leaning towards the materialist as opposed 
to conceptualist position. At the same time her position does differ significantly from other 
materialist/socialist (eco)feminists in the contributions she makes towards the 
reconceptualisation of an ecological notion of a feminist self and a feminist notion of an 
ecological self, which necessarily locates her in the realm of the conceptualists. 
28 Again Plumwood's convergence with social/ist ecofeminism is evident, however, as I have 
argued and will show shortly, she moves beyond the acknowledgement of roles and kinds of 
selfhood that is consistent with the roles that have traditionally been performed by women. 
29 Here it may be asked to what extent Plumwood, by focusing on female gender identity, is 
not creating the same difficulties for herself as those that have been identified in the cultural 
ecofeminist position. Not only does it seem reductionist to focus only on gender identity 
which, as we will see, is engaged with in terms of qualities such as nurturance for instance. 
This approach also verges dangerously on the assumption that there exits a stable female 
gender identity that finds its expression in different contexts, such as race, class, generation, 
sexual orientation and so forth. I will return to this point in the course of this discussion and 
also in the evaluation conducted in the last section of this chapter. 
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A good example of how such a critical (re)appropriation can be carried out, is 
through the notion of nurturance. As nurturance has traditionally denoted 
powerlessness, Plumwood maintains that in the case of women, this quality 
should be critically affirmed so as to move beyond its inclusion in 
powerlessness. This would entail a denouncement of nurturing in contexts 
where it serves to maintain women's subordination whilst strengthening and 
sustaining the power of the master. What this amounts to is that the notion of 
nurturance should be reconceived beyond the active/passive, reason/emotion 
dualisms. In this way then, the qualities associated with the feminine are 
transformed in such a manner that it transcends its construction in dualist terms 
(Piumwood, 1993: 65-66). 30 
The above described strategy to transform female gendered identity marks an 
attempt to move beyond women's situatedness as radical other whilst resisting 
her incorporation into the dominant model of self or culture. As we have seen, 
this critical affirmation of difference signals an acknowledgment of differences 
not only between men and women but also between women themselves. Whilst 
such a pluralist feminine self has subversive potential that can be fruitfully 
applied, this process of transformation must be accompanied by the 
simultaneous transformation of the dominant self and culture. According to 
Plumwood (1992: 12) this would have to entail the following changes: 
Women must be treated just as fully human and as fully part of 
culture as men. But b~th men and women must challenge the 
dualised conception of human identity and develop an alternative 
30 Here the objection might be made that Plumwood's discussion of female gender identity 
with reference to nurturance suggests that she does indeed share the assumptions and 
arguments that inform the description and formation of female gender identity as articulated 
by Chodorow (1974, 1978). In this regard I would argue that it does not necessarily follow that 
a discussion of female gender identity with reference to nurturance, is to embrace 
Chodorow's arguments wholeheartedly. Moreover that Plumwood is explicitly critical of a 
notion of female gender identity as articulated by Chodorow, is evident. Given that nurturing 
is an activity associated largely with women (at least in the West) and often performed by 
different women in different contexts, such a discussion is not necessarily redundant, nor 
does it necessarily imply a simplistic reduction of female gender identities to nurturance and 
other related qualities. Rather, it signifies an attempt to revalue and transform these qualities 
that along with women, have historically been marginalised, and which, specifically from an 
environmental perspective, can contribute to foster alternative relations with the natural 
environment. 
culture which fully recognises human identity as continuous with, not 
alienated from nature (my emphasis, FM).31 
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But before an understanding of human continuity with nature can be arrived at, 
we first have to challenge our conception of the human as part of the larger 
project of articulating an ecological feminist notion of the self. Plumwood's 
engagement with the human has the objective of conceiving of an alternative 
understanding of #closeness to nature#. What is at stake here is to conceive of 
an alternative to the masculine ideal of domination and maximal distance from 
the natural sphere whilst resisting an appeal to a feminine #closeness to nature". 
For Plumwood, because this feminine alternative involves the denial of capacities 
for reason, intelligence and control of life conditions, it does not present a 
desirable alternative. In this regard Plum wood (1988: 23) writes: # ... it is 
precisely such a denial which has formed much of the feminine #closeness to 
nature" and been part of women's historical experience". At the same time 
Plumwood (1993: 36) stresses that women should position themselves neither 
in a relation of identification with nature neither in opposition to nature, but with 
nature. A critical affirmation of female gender identity as performed above, 
seems to be an attempt at situating women in a relation to nature that is not one 
of identity, but affinity. 
Plumwood's conception of the degendered human takes further her project to 
conceive of an alternative understanding of closeness to nature. In what follows 
I discuss the notion of a degendered human, which forms part of her endeavour 
to rearticulate and therefore transform the human relation of domination and the 
instrumentalisation of the natural environment. 
4.2 The degendered self 
A second aspect of the self is illuminated by Plumwood's (1988) 
reconceptualisation of the traditional model of the human self. As has already 
been suggested in the section titled #Women, nature and the realm of the 
other," three different but related critiques converge in an engagement with the 
31 That Plumwood's arguments also coincide strongly with those of social ecofeminism is 
made starkly evident here. However, as I have argued above, Plumwood moves on to 
occupy a much more sophisticated position. 
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human self. An attempt towards a reconceptualisation of the human self 
therefore necessarily implies also an attempt to address these points of critique. 
In brief, they consist of a critique of masculinity and the valuing of traits that are 
traditionally associated with it; a critique of rationality, "not only regarding its 
masculine and instrumental character", but also, writes Plumwood (1988: 18): 
... its overvaluation and use as a tool for the exclusion and oppression 
of the contrasting classes of the non-human (since rationality is often 
taken to be the distinguishing mark of the human) and of women 
(because of its association with maleness). 
Last but not least, it takes into account the critique of anthropocentrism as the 
human domination and instrumental treatment of nature and the low value 
placed on nature in relation to human and cultural spheres (Piumwood, 1988: 
18). 
Plumwood's articulation of a degendered model of the human is a response to 
the conception of the human as it is traditionally perceived. Focusing largely, 
although not exclusively, on the masculine character of the self, it involves a 
proposal of an alternative notion of the human self that moves beyond the false 
choice of either endorsing a masculine, or rival a feminine notion of the self. 
What is significant about Plumwood's strategy is her rejection of both the 
masculine and the opposite, feminine model of the self as inadequate for both 
men and women. From a critical-transformative ecofeminist perspective, a 
rejection of a masculine model of the human is by now self-evident. Whilst the 
masculine model is problematical given its definition as in opposition to women, 
nature and others, the feminine model is also problematic. This is due to an 
overidentification with nature, which as we have seen, is often formulated in 
essentialist terms. If we recall, it is not only the female self that is problematic. 
The feminine self which is held to be relationally inclined and thus conceived of 
in less oppositional terms with the natural environment, is also unsatisfactory as 
alternative model of the self, as it remains complementary to the dominant 
model of the self. Rejecting both masculine and feminine models of the self, 
Plumwood (1988: 22) writes the following: 
. . . women are in fact not more significantly connected with nature 
than men (except as all oppressed groups are connected and as an 
alleged connection has been used to inferiorise both) . . . what is 
needed is an account of both sexes, which accepts the undesirability 
of the domination of nature associated with masculinity. This would 
be a strategy that rejected the masculine concept of the human, but 
because it denied any significant connection between nature and the 
feminine, was not committed to a rival feminine ideal. The fact that 
the concept of the human is up for remaking doesn't mean that it has 
to be remade in the mold of either the masculine or the feminine 
(Piumwood's emphasis). 
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As I read her, Plumwood's engagement with the human self is consistent with 
her overall project to make a significant contribution towards the 
conceptualisation of an alternative ecological feminist notion of the self. This 
rejection of the masculine, along with an alternative feminine notion of the self is 
consistent with her articulation of a feminist notion of an ecological self. Apart 
from the obvious untenability of both the masculine and feminine self as 
alternative model for an ecological self, this route is followed also with the 
intention of ultimately articulating an ecological self that is not necessarily 
gender specific. This is an approach that is supported also by other ecofeminists 
(Plant, 1989: 3; Eckersley, 1992: 69-71 ). Such an ecological self can facilitate 
change across gender boundaries, in a way that does not privilege one gender 
over and above the other. The transformation of the human self in a manner that 
diverges from both a masculine and a feminine self, is also consistent with a 
central undertaking of Plumwood which, in addressing the dualistically 
structured relation between humans and nature, is to move beyond dualisms: 
The rejection of both masculine and feminine character ideals is 
linked with the traditionally associated dualisms of mind/body, 
rationality/emotionality, public/private, and so on, which are also 
rejected as false choices, so that the transcendence of the traditional 
gendered characters become part of, is linked with the systematic 
transcendence of the wider set of dualisms (Piumwood, 1988: 22-23, 
emphasis Plumwood's). 
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As to what the degendered model of the self should look like, Plumwood 
suggests that a selection of characteristics should be made on the basis of 
independent criteria of worth. These characteristics could be associated with 
one gender rather than another, and may turn out to more closely resemble the 
characteristic feminine rather than the characteristic masculine traits. As we 
shall shortly see, the selection of such traits will be made not in a 
straightforward, unproblematic manner. She stresses that "they're degendered in 
the sense that they won't be selected because of their connection with one 
gender rather than the other, but on the basis of independent considerations" 
(Piumwood, 1988: 23). These considerations would include the feminist critique 
of masculinity and would reflect the requirements for conceiving of a notion of 
the human that would contribute to fostering relations with the natural 
environment other than domination and instrumentalisation. 
To prevent sliding into an oversimplification of what this process is to entail, and 
in recognition of the images of uniformity that the term "degendered" invokes, 
Plumwood is quick to qualify her strategy. This she does by drawing a distinction 
between a degendered and androgynous model of the human, and by articulating 
the degendered human in terms that allow for the play of differences. Stressing 
that the degendered model of the human should not be confused with the 
androgynous model, Plumwood shows how the two are to be distinguished. The 
androgynous human character denotes a human character ideal that can be 
achieved through a combination of already existing ingredients, suggesting that 
the good points of each gender can be selected and put together and the bad 
ones simply discarded.32 The weakness of this model lies in its fusion of already 
existing qualities, which Plumwood (1988: 23) disapproves of in no uncertain 
terms: 
... such a model is far too simple and shallow, ignoring relations of 
exclusion, complementation and so on between traits and suggests 
that their allocation to respective sex is arbitrary. It treats the 
problem as if it could be solved by an amalgam of existing 
characteristics thrown together ... (emphasis Plumwood's). 
32 If we recall, this is reminiscent of Gray's proposal to integrate what she views as the 
masculine and feminine perspective. In this regard, see Chapter 1, section 4, titled 
Reconceiving the self. 
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Plumwood proceeds and asserts that the "androgynous strain" should be 
distinguished from the "transcendence strain", the latter of which would produce 
a third set of characteristics that overcomes its interpretation as either 
masculine or feminine. Continuity between men and women will thus be 
accomplished by a display of qualities that are transformed beyond their dualist 
construal. Counteracting the neutralisation such a proposal could enact, 
Plumwood maintains that this is not to imply that all differences are to be 
erased. In a concerted attempt not to do away with all differences, she (1998: 
23) writes: 
The adoption of a degendered model does not imply either that a 
uniform character ideal must be adopted for both sexes, or that there 
will be no differences between the sexes in terms of character. 
Transcending the gender categories and the systematic network of 
false choices does not imply the dissolution of all differences ... 
Plumwood thus offers quite clear indications as to how continuity between men 
and women is to be established, but remains vague with regard to the content of 
differences. 
The implications that a degendered model of the human has from an ecological 
feminist position are, as suggested above, significant. The notion of a 
degendered human conceived above, opens up the possibility of articulating a 
different concept of "closeness to nature" than the one that has been the result 
of an exclusion from valued features of human culture. The question that we are 
confronted with then, is how we can reconceive of the relation between self and 
nature as one of significant connection. Conceiving of a notion of the self as 
continuous with nature is an important part of the process of articulating an 
ecological feminist notion of the self. This explains perhaps the ecofeminist 
reluctance to give up women's privileged relation with nature, which is 
expressed in an endorsement of a female or feminine self. Reconceptualising the 
human self in less oppositional terms however, creates the potential for 
establishing human continuity with nature that moves beyond a restriction to 
and fixation on gender. Moreover such a notion of a degendered human self 
facilitates an engagement with nature beyond its mechanistic definition. From a 
critical-transformative ecofeminist perspective, a notion of the self's continuity 
\ 
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with nature that resists both incorporation and identification, is regarded as vital 
to establishing ethical relations with nature. In the following section, I discuss 
the critical-transformative ecofeminist reconceptualisation of the dualistically 
conceived relation between humans and nature that has sanctioned the 
domination and instrumentalisation of nature. 
4.3 The human, intentionality and nature 
In her endeavour to addresses the three points of critique that she has identified 
as converging in the human Plumwood shifts the focus to engage with the 
human/nature dualism. As we have seen these three points of critique pertain to 
the masculinist nature of the dominant self, rationalism and its instrumental 
application and anthropocentrism. In the section above I have shown how 
Plumwood addressed the masculine/feminine dualism by an endorsement of a 
degendered human. In this section the human/nature dualism that captures the 
problem of anthropocentrism is focused upon. 
Before proceeding with this exposition, I would like to make a remark concerning 
Plumwood's diversion of her attention away from women to the human. In the 
light of this diversion, it is perhaps necessary to remind ourselves that 
Plumwood's shift in focus is not to negate differences between humans. As we 
have seen in her discussion of the degendered human, Plumwood continually 
emphasises that differences should not be negated. This sensitivity to 
differences is also reflected by her endorsement of a pluralist feminine self. In 
keeping with her particular analysis of dualism and her strategy to overcome 
dualism then, those differences that abound between humans (in terms of 
relations of power and identity) is therefore not lost out of sight. Such an 
acknowledgement of differences also serves as reminder that the weight of 
responsibility of some as opposed to others with regard to the destruction and 
degradation of the natural environment, varies significantly. That this is a fact 
that needs to be reckoned with is also suggested. Having proposed how other 
related dualisms can be overcome without the negating differences, she 
undertakes to rethink the human/nature dualism so as to offer a basis for the 
ethical treatment of nature. As such, we are already moving into the domain of 
ethics. 
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Plumwood's reconceptualisation of the human-nature relation is first and 
foremost an attempt to address anthropocentrism. As I have indicated, 
anthropocentrism finds its expression in instrumentalism: the view of nature as 
valuable only insofar as it serves human ends, thus sanctioning an unrestrained 
utilisation of nature as resource. As such, the human acts as norm and reference 
point in relation to which nature is oppositionally conceived. Special caution 
must therefore be taken to resist the strategy of incorporation where the other is 
assimilated into the realm of the self. 33 Examples of incorporation are moral 
extensionism34 and a mystification of nature as imbued with spirit. Another 
strategy that must be resisted, is the strategy of valorising nature for its 
"regenerative" qualities. As argued in Chapter 1, in the section titled "An 
evaluation of cultural ecofeminism", these strategies of valorisation and 
mystification remain trapped in dualism, and thus fails to open up a non-
anthropocentric engagement with the natural environment. 
Consistent with her suggestions to transcend dualistically construed categories, 
Plumwood argues that to overcome the harsh separation between humans and 
nature, some notion of continuity has to be conceived to remedy this relation 
that grounds the instrumental treatment of nature. Appealing to the notion of 
intentionality, Plumwood offers an alternative to moral extensionism (one version 
of incorporation), in terms of which nature, by virtue of displaying mindlike 
qualities that resemble consciousness, is incorporated into the realm of the 
human. Departing from this narrow definition of the mental, Plumwood shows 
that there is not only one criterion of mind, but rather a whole cluster which 
includes consciousness, intentionality, experience, sentience, imagination, 
reason, goal-directedness etc. From an ecological perspective, the mental thus 
conceived presents us with a fruitful strategy to transform the mind/nature and 
related human/nature and reason-nature dualisms. 
33 One strategy of incorporation that is criticised extensively by Plumwood (1993: 124-126; 
165-189) is holism, proponents of which are Matthews (1990), Capra (1977) and Fox (1990). 
According to Plumwood holism addresses hyperseparation by stressing continuity to the 
extent that the other is assimilated into the realm of the self, thus denying difference. A 
spiritualist stream within ecological thinking that perceives nature as imbued with spirit 
endorses the opposite strategy. This often finds its expression in goddess pantheism, a 
proponent of which is Starhawk (1989). Honouring nature as mystical other, it fails to 
conceive of nature in a nonhuman-centered and non-dualist terms. 
34 See Chapter 1, section 5, titled An ethic of care. 
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By focusing on intentionality an avenue is opened up in terms of which 
continuity between humans and nature can be established. Conceiving of 
continuity in these terms overcomes the problems that a limiting association of 
the mental with consciousness imparts (Piumwood, 1993: 131 ). Intentionality is 
a category that denotes going beyond what is given, and is not confined to the 
mental, nor to human activity only. On the criterion of intentionality, it is found 
that mindlike qualities spill over beyond the boundaries of the human and //into 
the vast reaches of nature itself" undermining human discontinuity from nature 
(Piumwood, 1993: 132). In this way, the criterion of intentionality provides a 
basis of continuity between mind and nature, and therefore also humans and 
nature. Since on the criterion of intentionality a rich set of distinctions between 
the mindlike is made possible, and a basis for recognising continuity along with 
the heterogeneity of nature is created. Plumwood (1993: 134) writes: 
Intentionality provides a way to realise continuity without 
assimilation, to represent the staggering and exuberant complexity of 
nature. It provides a complex of distinctions, a web of difference 
against an overall ground of continuity and a way to reject any 
absolute cosmic division between the human and natural spheres 
based on the possession of mind. 
Intentionality is therefore an umbrella that can accommodate more specific 
criteria of mind, such as choice, sentience, consciousness, goal-directedness 
(teleology), but resists locating some break elsewhere in nature such as the 
absolute divorce between animate and inanimate nature, or sentience and the 
absence thereof. 35 In this regard, Plumwood (1993: 134) writes: 
Because intentional systems are differentiated in terms of kind rather 
than degree of variation along the same axis, it is possible to 
conceive much of the field in terms of a non-hierarchical concept of 
35 Plumwood is not clear on exactly how intentionality as one criterion of mind amongst 
many, can be singled out to accommodate also all the other criteria. I assume however that 
because all the other properties display some kind of intentionality, they can quite 
unproblematically be accommodated as instances of the criterion of intentionality. 
Intentionality, because it does not presuppose consciousness accommodates those 
properties that are related to consciousness, but makes possible a recognition of other 
entities as mindlike which previously would not have been regarded as such. 
difference, rather than of an experiential meritocracy with humans at 
the top. 
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In the light of the above, Plumwood maintains that part of creating alternatives 
to mechanism {as discussed in the section titled "A critique of rationalism"), and 
part of moving beyond the human/nature dualism is the reinstatement of 
teleology. This notion of teleology need not follow Aristotle's anthropocentric 
version, or an anthropomorphic animistic one. The notion of intentionality as 
denoting some kind of teleology, makes possible the articulation of continuity 
between humans and nature that does not require consciousness. Given the 
diverse variety of teleological concepts the consciousness-non-conscious break 
is destabilised and subverted. In this regard, Plumwood remarks that whilst " ... 
some require meta-levels of consciousness and may apply only to so-called 
higher animals, others can be applied without any anthropomorphism to non-
conscious beings" (Piumwood, 1993: 135). According to Plumwood then, all 
creatures display a teleology or all-over life goal according to which its parts are 
organised, along with exhibiting a variety of other teleological concepts. The 
unfolding, development and directedness of natural processes also involve a kind 
of teleology and intentionality.36 For Plumwood, then, notions of growth and 
flourishing are also teleological concepts that do not presuppose consciousness, 
along with concepts such as function, directionality and goal-directedness of a 
self-maintaining kind that apply to natural processes and systems in general 
(Piumwood, 1993: 135).37 
By establishing continuity between humans and nature through this broadened 
notion of intentionality and expanding a concept of teleology to include 
flourishing and growth, Plumwood claims to have overcome both human-
centeredness and the problem of providing a basis in terms of which complex 
natural phenomena such as mountains and waterfalls can be regarded as 
36 Despite referring to "natural processes" Plumwood is explicit in distinguishing her position 
from an inherent value theory that is referred to as process theory. This position that is 
associated with Alfred North Whitehead and others who argue that "the ultimate constituents 
of the universe and everything in it are events or processes which are continually unfolding 
or perishing [therefore] there is no great gulf between the human mind and nature" 
(Piumwood, 1993: 129). Without wanting to digress any further, suffice it to say that 
Plumwood rejects this position for its erasure of differences (Piumwood, 1993: 128-130). 
37 See Cuomo (1998) who strongly echoes Plumwood in her articulation of an ethic of 
nourishing that draws on a non-anthropocentric Aristotelian account of the inherent value of 
nature. 
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valuable in themselves (Piumwood, 1993: 135-136).38 It is also significant that 
the process of reconnecting humans and nature takes place in such a manner 
that not only nature is transformed from its status of lifeless matter, but also the 
human is conceived of in broader terms, that is, not in reductive terms of mind 
and its associated capacities of, for instance consciousness, but as sharing 
capacities with the natural environment. Moreover, by showing how humans are 
continuous with nature in terms of intentionality, we are made aware of the 
impressive diversity of nature, and consequently those qualities that are held to 
be distinctly human, are also relativised somewhat. 
In the next section, titled "Critical-transformative ecofeminist ethics", I will show 
how this notion of continuity between humans and nature occupies a central 
place in Plumwood's articulation of a feminist notion of an ecological self. 39 
What receives emphasis here, is Plumwood's submission that for the 
engagement between humans and nature to be ethical, a double movement is 
required: the acknowledgement of difference along with continuity. 
5. Critical-transformative ecofeminist ethics 
In the section that follows, I give an explication of a critical-transformative 
ecological feminist ethics. In the first part of this exposition I discuss the critical-
transformative critique leveled at the rationalist philosophical tradition within the 
context of environmental ethics. In response to the deficiencies identified in 
ethics conceived in rationalist terms, Plumwood introduces a conception of the 
38 Plumwood's inherent value theory can be distinguished from other ecocentric thinkers such 
as Matthews (1991) for whom ecological selfhood is articulated within the boundaries of 
autopoietic intrinsic value theory as articulated by Fox (1990: 165-175). As such, Matthews 
does not regard mountains and waterfalls as possessing inherent value other than as being 
part of an ecosystem that is self-renewing. A possible shortcoming of Plumwood's focus on a 
reinstatement of teleology is that it requires that special measures be taken with regard to the 
self-organising characteristics (teleology) of machines. This is avoided in the autopoietic 
theory where self-renewal as opposed to self-organisation is the distinguishing characteristic 
for moral considerability. In the light of Plumwood's inclusion of growth and flourishing as 
teleological concepts it can be argued that this point of critique is excessive. Flourishing and 
growth denotes self-renewal and whilst it can be applied to almost all natural phenomena, 
machines tend to fall beyond this classification. 
39 The observation may be made that Plumwood's conception of human continuity with 
nature in terms of intentionality already implies a notion of the relational self. This is indeed 
so. However, but as I hope to illustrate, Plumwood, by drawing on her conception of 
continuity in terms of intentionality, argues for a refinement of the relational self (specifically 
as employed by other ecological thinkers, such as Matthews (1990) and Naess (1985b)), to a 
notion of the mutual self, that implies a notion of relationality, but in a modified form. 
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relational self as mutual self, and revalues and reconceives previously 
marginalised moral concepts. 
It should be made clear from the outset that the engagement with ethics in 
critical-transformative ecofeminism is framed not so much in terms of giving a 
substantive account of an ecological ethic, but rather to articulate the 
requirements that a satisfactory ecological ethic must meet. As such, what is 
focused on in particular in this section, is the notion of the self and its relation to 
nature that is to inform such an ethic. Touching upon this in the first part of this 
section titled "Beyond environmental ethics", the second part, titled "Ethics and 
the mutual self", consists of an elaboration upon a feminist notion of an 
ecological self that is endorsed in critical-transformative ecofeminist thinking. 
Plumwood's notion of the mutual self as an ecological self, is articulated in 
response to the shortcomings identified in the notion of a relational self that is 
endorsed not only by cultural ecofeminists, but also other ecological positions, in 
particular deep ecology. As such, an ethic based on mutuality marks a 
movement beyond relationality and shows how continuity conceived in terms of 
the notion of intentionality promotes an encounter with nature as other, 
significant in itself. 
5.1 Beyond environmental ethics 
In a critique of contemporary environmental ethics, Plumwood (1991, 1993) 
exposes a continued adherence to the rationalist philosophical tradition that, 
given its dualist structure, is inimical not only to women but also to nature.40 
Plumwood singles out deep ecology in particular; the shortcomings of which are 
discussed below. Her critique is however also aimed at Taylor ( 1986) and Regan 
( 1 986), who respectively argue for moral considerability of nature and animals 
through cultivating respect for nature as teleological centers of life in the case of 
the former, and acknowledging the intentionality of animals in the case of the 
latter. She illuminates how both authors, despite diverting from traditionalist 
ethics, remain firmly situated in a rationalist framework. 
40 This point of critique of course links up with the discussion conducted in this chapter in the 
section titled A critique of rationalism. 
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Taylor's distrust of emotions and the significant role that relationships can play 
in establishing ethical relations reflects an implicit endorsement of the 
reason/emotion, universal/specific, masculine/feminine dualisms. In Taylor's 
account, showing respect for nature is a "cognitive matter", which is consistent 
with the understanding of ethics in abstract universalist terms (Piumwood, 
1991: 4-5). According to Plumwood (1991: 5), the problem here is "the 
inconsistency of employing, in the service of formulating an allegedly biocentric 
ethical theory, a framework" whose very structure operates to the detriment of 
nature. On similar grounds, she criticises Regan's account of moral concern 
based on rights "which requires strong individual separation and is set in a 
framework of human community and legality" (Piumwood, 1991: 8). The 
difficulties that Regan's position generate, is consistent with the problem of 
moral extensionism. Both authors implicitly rely on a rationalist-inspired account 
of the self that is dualistically conceived as atomistic, independent and 
rationalist entities. What Plumwood points out is that this conception of the self 
forms a large part of the very problem these authors are seeking to address. As 
we shall see, both Plumwood and Warren propose a movement away from a 
rationalist notion of the self, along with a consideration of moral concepts that 
have been marginalised by a preoccupation with rights and ethics formulated in 
abstract universalist terms. 
In a different but related critique, Plumwood further exposes the expediency of 
endorsing a notion of the self conceived of in rationalist terms. She ( 1 993:141) 
points out how, with the rise of capitalism, a definition of rationality as egoism 
was introduced. Whereas in science the human/nature, reason/nature dualisms 
pave the way for the Cartesian sense of objectivity that denounces the natural 
world to mere matter, the social and economic spheres are ordered accordingly. 
Built upon the perception of the human as hyperseparated from the other and 
acting primarily out of self-interest, egoism serves as further justification for the 
instrumental treatment of nature and others. In this framework, the opposite of 
egoism, namely altruism, is viewed as the sacrifice of the interests of the self, 
abandoning one's own interests and acting on behalf of the interests of the 
other. In reaction to attempts to overcome egoism, which have verged on 
endorsing altruism instead, Plumwood argues that this either-or choice relies on 
a perception of the self as hyperseparated. Thus to overcome egoism, a 
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reconceptualisation of the self is required that would reveal the choice between 
either egoism or altruism as a false one (Piumwood, 1993: 141-145). 
In contrast to the hyperseparated self underlying egoism and altruism, Plumwood 
shows how a notion of the relational self provides us with a strategy to move 
beyond the egoism/altruism dichotomy (Piumwood, 1993: 150). According to 
Plumwood, if the self is perceived in a manner that recognises relationality and 
thus interdependence between self and other, it becomes possible to see that 
"interests" in the weaker sense, are relational in that there are interests of the 
self that overlap with those of the other. The point Plumwood thus makes is that 
when we reconceive the self as in relationship with the other, selfishness is 
countered: to care for the self is to non-coincidentally also to care for the 
other.41 Self-sacrifice is also eliminated as caring for the other is at the same 
time to care for the self (Piumwood, 1993: 150-154). To overcome the false 
choice between either egoism or altruism, however, relationality has to be 
worked out more thoroughly. This will receive more attention shortly. 
For the moment, suffice it to say that part of the critical-transformative 
redefinition of ethics consists of an introduction of a relational self.42 For Warren 
(1994: 132), this signals a shift from a conception of ethics as primarily "a 
matter of rights, rules, or principles predetermined" to a conception of ethics as 
growing out of the relationships that define the self. It must however be 
stressed that this is not to imply that rights, rules or principles are not important 
and relevant, but that "that those to whom they apply are entities in relationship 
with others" which renders a critical-transformative ecofeminist ethic a 
contextualist ethic (Warren, 1994: 132). Along with Warren (1994: 132), 
Plumwood (1991: 8) maintains that a rights based ethics should move from the 
center of the stage to open up a space for previously marginalised moral 
concepts, such as respect, care, sympathy, gratitude, friendship, concern, 
compassion, and responsibility. This is further eJ_<tended by Warren (1994: 133), 
41 Here it is necessary to bear in mind that Plumwood's use of the notion of relationality is 
multiple. That is, although relationships are taken into account here, Plumwood deals with 
relationality also on another level. This becomes pertinent in her discussion of the mutual self 
where relationality is reconceptualised and where the basis that is articulated for relationality, 
gives a deeper meaning to the concept. 
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to include appropriate reciprocity, love and trust. Moreover, in reaction to the 
construal of some of these values as feminine, Plumwood asserts that at closer 
inspection these moral concepts are resistant to an analysis in terms of the 
reason/emotion dualism. That is, whilst being moral feelings, "they involve 
reason and behaviour and emotion in a way that seems inseparable" (Piumwood, 
1991: 9). In this way then, an understanding of care in dualistic terms is also 
departed from. 43 
In the section above, it was illustrated how critical-transformative ecofeminism 
addresses the manifestations of dualism of the rationalist philosophical tradition 
in an ethical context. Along with endorsing a notion of a relational self as an 
aspect of an ecological self, a set of previously marginalised moral concepts is 
endorsed. These values resist a conflation with the feminine and therefore 
discourages a lapse into altruism. According to Plumwood, however, the 
relational self needs to be worked out in fuller detail so as to avoid overstressing 
continuity at the expense of differences. It is the notion of the mutual self as 
embodiment of a relation of continuity and difference that is the subject of the 
coming discussion 
5.2 Ethics and the mutual self 
In the preceding discussion, it is argued that to reconceive of the self in 
relational terms as continuous with the other can assist in addressing the 
instrumental treatment of the other. Accordingly, a relational self is invoked by a 
number of ecological thinkers, such as Naess (1985a, 1985b, 1989) and 
Matthews (1991 ), as providing a foundation for an ecological self. For 
42 To a certain extent, Plumwood and Warren's endorsement of the relational self coincides 
with the cultural ecofeminist endorsement of a relational self, although in Plumwood's case, it 
also differs markedly. This will become clear in the section titled Ethics and the mutual self. 
43 This valuation of previously marginalised moral concepts of course coincides with the 
vocabulary of care employed by cultural ecofeminists. As illustrated above, however, these 
values are transformed in a manner that detaches them from their dualist construal, which 
signals a shift away from the cultural ecofeminist valuation of feminine values. If we recall, 
Card (1994) characterises feminist ethics as comprising a female ethic on the one hand, and 
on the other, an approach that consists of a critique and rewriting of ethics from a feminist 
perspective. It may be argued that the latter is a reformist approach (as opposed to a radical 
difference approach). Here, I would like to argue that Plumwood's position can not be located 
in either of these camps. This is because whilst she articulates a radical critique of 
mainstream ethics, she does not discard it wholly. She also includes previously marginalised 
moral concepts, but in a modified form. 
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Plumwood however, relationality between self and other is a significant aspect 
of ecological selfhood, but not sufficient, as relationality constitutes only part of 
the ecological self. This is ascribed to the fact that although perception of the 
self as relational, embedded and continuous (read: significantly connected) with 
the other overcomes the problem of exclusion and hyperseparation, it still does 
not adequately or explicitly counter its opposite - incorporation, according to 
which the other is assimilated into the realm of the self. As Plumwood 
emphasises repeatedly, resolving or transcending dualism requires that two 
interlinked features which function to the detriment of the other, radical 
exclusion and incorporation, are addressed simultaneously: 
The difference between radical exclusion and incorporation 
corresponds to two distinct elements in denying the other: radical 
exclusion corresponds to the conception of the other as alien, which 
denies kinship and continuity, while incorporation corresponds to the 
totalising denial of the other by denying difference, treating the other 
as form of the same or self (Piumwood, 1993: 155). 
The concern Plumwood expresses with regard to the danger of incorporation, is 
captured in her critique of deep ecology, specifically concerning the notion of the 
Self proposed by deep ecology (Piumwood, 1991: 12-20; 1993: 154-155; 165-
189). Plumwood (1991: 13; 1993: 125) takes on deep ecology for endorsing a 
holistic strategy that confuses dualism for atomism and subsequently for failing 
to unambiguously acknowledge the difference and distinctness of the other 
(Piumwood, 1991: 13; 15).44 According to Plumwood (1991: 12-15), the deep 
ecological emphasis on the Self's "identification" with nature, threatens to blur 
the boundaries between self and nature to the extent that there is nothing to 
guarantee that the needs of the self will not be taken as those of the other. For 
Plumwood, this is in a certain sense not surprising, as the disregard with which 
44 Making a similar point to that of Plumwood, Kheel (1985: 139-141) points out that an 
ecological ethic based on holism is problematic, given that the holistic overemphasis on 
continuity threatens to sacrifice the parts in favour of the whole. The individual entities that 
the whole consists of do not receive adequate consideration in an ecological ethic based on 
holism. It is perhaps in the light of this that we should view Plumwood's diversion from 
Matthews who focuses on natural systems in her autopoietic account of the inherent value of 
nature. Introducing concepts such as flourishing and growth, which recognises not only 
natural systems, but also individual natural phenomena as morally considerable, is part of 
Plumwood's project to address holism's overemphasis on continuity. As mentioned above, 
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deep ecology has treated the (eco)feminist critique of dualism and 
androcentrism, signals an unwillingness to sufficiently acknowledge and engage 
with differences (Piumwood, 1991: 11-17).45 Emphasising the danger of 
incorporation Plumwood argues that to avoid subsuming the other in the realm of 
the self, recognition of kinship as well as difference is required. This view is 
shared by Warren (1993: 334), who states that "[e]cofeminism's attention to 
relationships and community is not an erasure of difference, but a respectful 
acknowledgement thereof". Emphasising this "second movement", Plumwood 
(1993: 155) writes: 
The second movement is essential to capture the mutual features of 
the social, the interaction between individuals who are recognised as 
distinct centers of striving and resistance, and as others who can 
transform and be mutually transformed by the other. 
To illustrate this point Plumwood (1993: 156-158) draws on Jessica Benjamin's 
( 1988) development of a mutual self through intersubjective interaction. 
Benjamin describes the self-other relation as one which consists of an interactive 
process where each transforms and limits the other. For Benjamin, the process 
of mutual transformation forms the basis of the self, a process in which the 
external other sets a boundary or limit to the self and its desires. Central to this 
process of formation is the recognition of the other both as different so as to 
effect the transformation of the self, and alike, so as to evoke a response of the 
self to the other. At the same time, the self, being the other's other too, is 
different in that it is not fully determined by the other, thus also like the other, 
Matthews is a prominent proponent of deep ecology and in Plumwood's view, like deep 
ecology, she confuses the problem of dualism with holism. 
45 The deep ecology-ecofeminism debate is well documented in Salleh (1984, 1992, 1993), 
Zimmerman (1987, 1990, 1994), Sessions (1991), Kheel (1990), Plumwood (1991, 1993), 
Mellor (1997) and Slicer (1995). The extent of the incongeniality between these two streams 
of thought in radical ecology, is suggested by the title of a paper "Is there a Deep-ecology-
ecofeminism debate?" (Slicer, 1995). The superficial engagement of deep ecology with 
ecofeminism is starkly visible in Fox's (1993) rejection of ecofeminism which is based on an 
understanding of ecofeminism as seeing the root cause of the domination of nature as 
androcentrism instead of anthropocentrism. As Plumwood (1991: 21-22) and Slicer (1995: 
157-159) point out, Fox conveniently overlooks the more subtle nuances of ecofeminist 
thought in favour of belittling ecofeminism as a whole. For Fox's benefit, Plumwood points 
out that "anthropocentrism and androcentrism in particular are linked by the rationalist 
conception of the human self'. Ecofeminism's engagement with andro-anthropocentrism 
"provides a different and richer account of the notion of anthropocentrism" thus deepening 
the analysis of human domination of nature (Piumwood, 1991: 22). As we have seen above, 
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sets boundaries to limit the other in turn. The individual conceived in terms of 
mutuality is, like the relational self, ''bound to and in interaction with others 
through a rich set of relationships which are essential to and not incidental to his 
or her projects" (Piumwood, 1993: 156). Stressing separation, but distinguishing 
it from hyperseparation, Plumwood (1993: 156) writes the following: 
Nevertheless, he or she can and must remain a distinct individual, 
separated but not hyperseparated. He or she is not simply at the 
mercy of these relationships, dissolved, passive and defined by others 
(as some holistic accounts about relational accounts suggest), but is 
an active participant in them and determinant of them. 
Thus the mutual self is not only compatible with, but actually requires the 
existence of others that are distinct and not merged, to allow the flourishing of a 
"combination of resonance and difference" (Benjamin, 1988: 26). A meaningful 
interaction between self and other can therefore only occur when self and other 
remain distinguishable. Benjamin (1988: 47) expresses this succinctly: 
Experiences of "being with" are predicated on a continually evolving 
awareness of difference, on a sense of intimacy that is felt as 
occurring between "the two of us". The fact that self and other are 
not merged is precisely what makes experiences of merging have 
such a high emotional impact. 
Plumwood proceeds to show how Benjamin's account of the mutual self that 
expresses a specifically feminist emphasis on the acknowledgement of 
differences is not limited to interhuman relations. As a post-rationalist notion of 
the self, the mutual self offers a promising framework for the articulation of an 
ecological self. For Plumwood, the mutual self as an embodiment of continuity 
and differences meets the requirements that are necessary for the 
transformation of the dualistically construed relation between humans and 
nature. Although the notion of the mutual self expresses the relation between 
humans, Plumwood adapts it by replacing subjectivity as basis for mutuality with 
a broadened notion of intentionality. This makes possible the acknowledgement 
the failure to do so manifests itself in the endorsement of the notion of the self that verges 
dangerously on fulfilling exactly the opposite of what it claims to realise. 
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of nature as an other entity that strives and resists. 46 Grounding mutuality in this 
way, is of course perfectly consistent with Plumwood's conceptualisation of the 
human-nature relation on the basis of intentionality discussed earlier in the 
section titled "The human, intentionality and nature". The mutual self conceived 
in terms of continuity and difference then, meets the requirements of an 
ecological self beyond dualism that can foster an ethical relation of respect for 
nature. By recognising the other as a center of striving and resistance that puts 
limits on the self, the needs of the self do not disappear in the process. 
Responding to the needs of the other does not imply dissolution of the needs of 
the self. At the same time, being a separate center of striving and resistance, 
the other is not at the mercy of the relationship in which it stands to the self, 
but an active agent whose needs cannot be reduced to those it stands in 
relationship with. By retaining some sense of separation between humans and 
nature, the inadequacies of the deep-ecological "merger" self, which provides no 
guarantee that the needs of the other will not be confused with those of the 
self, is thus avoided. 
The description of this relation, applicable to intra-human and human relations 
with nature, significantly captures ecological and feminist concerns. It is 
ecological in the sense that nature is recognised as a distinct center of striving 
and resistance, thus having ends of its own which sets limits on humans, but 
not to the extent that human needs become thoroughly subordinate to those of 
the natural environment.47 That is, in this framework, the human need for 
sustenance for example, is accommodated which must however be adequately 
46 What is somewhat troubling in Plumwood's articulation of the mutual self, is that mutuality 
is established on the basis of recognising the other as a center of striving and resistance. 
This leads to the question whether a range of natural systems or phenomena, despite being 
centers of striving and resistance, are not in effect excluded from a relationship of mutuality. 
A mountain for instance, cannot fully meet the requirement of mutuality. In this regard 
Plumwood asserts that "full subjectivity" (that makes recognising the other possible) is not 
necessary for the recognition of "earth others". Here the emphasis is rather on the need for 
human recognition of kinship with nature along with recognising nature as different center of 
striving and resistance (Piumwood: 1993: 157). That earth others respond to the presence of 
others is however the case. She writes: "[o]ther kinds of intentional interaction occur without 
subjectivity in ecosystems; for example the growth of plants that responds to the presence of 
other plants" (Piumwood: 1993: 213). Thus it seems that the emphasis is first and foremost 
on humans and their recognition of the intentionality of earth others which impose limits on 
humans, but that natural systems also respond to other centers of striving and resistance, 
which renders the manifestation of this aspect of mutuality, in the case of some natural 
s.ystems, directed elsewhere. 
4 This addresses the misunderstanding that the ecocentric critique of anthropocentrism 
expresses anti-human sentiments (Eckersley, 1992: 55-60). 
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distinguished from human greed, which is a perversion of human needs. 48 
Moreover, situated in a post-rationalist framework, nature's autonomy is 
acknowledged which in turn functions as the basis for continuity between 
humans and nature and the ethical treatment of nature. Articulated within the 
context of a post-rationalist subjectivity, here teleology, autonomy and agency 
acquire different meanings. From a feminist perspective, provision is also made 
for the concern that is expressed by critics with regard to the altruistic 
undertones of an ethic of care. The emphasis that is placed on continuity and 
distinctness is enabling to those women that are expected to give up their 
interests to tend to the needs of others. 
In the preceding section, I offered an exposition of the ethic that is endorsed by 
critical-transformative ecofeminism. What is articulated here, is not a detailed 
account of an ethic of care and respect, but rather a conceptualisation of the 
relation between self and nature that is to inform such an ethic. In the process, 
the ecological self as mutual self, in terms of which nature is perceived as 
independent center of striving and resistance, is articulated. This feminist notion 
of the ecological self is offered as providing a basis for an ecofeminist ethic of 
care and respect towards nature. In the section that follows, I will give an 
evaluation of the critical-transformative ecological feminist contributions towards 
the articulation of an ecological feminist notion of self beyond dualism and 
essentialism. 
6. An evaluation of critical-transformative ecofeminism 
Keeping in mind the problems of dualism and essentialism, the aim of this 
evaluation is to assess the contributions that critical transformative ecofeminism 
makes towards the articulation of a feminist notion of an ecological self and an 
ecological notion of a feminist self. Where relevant I will point out whether and 
to what extent this position succeeds in correcting the shortcomings identified in 
the cultural ecofeminist analysis of the domination of women and nature, and 
48 How "human greed" can be regulated without resorting to oppressive measures is a central 
concern in contemporary environmental thinking. Modern economies thrive on consumerism 
which in turn perpetuates itself by continually creating new materialist desires (as opposed to 
addressing needs) for humans to strive towards. As we all know, escalating consumerism is 
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the notions of the self that are endorsed. This is dealt with in particular in the 
first section titled "Complexifying the self". Broadly in keeping with the structure 
of this chapter, a critical appraisal of the notions of a pluralist feminine self and 
degendered self is conducted in the sections titled "A critical affirmation of 
female gender identity", and "Erasing differences". In the section that follows, 
titled "Moving beyond dualism: ethics, continuity and difference", the ecological 
self that Plumwood articulates with reference to her theory of the inherent value 
of nature, is assessed. This is followed by a section titled "The false choice 
between moral hierarchy and moral equality" in which the critique that is 
advanced against critical-transformative ecofeminism concerning its focus on 
dualism and rejection of moral extensionism is discussed. In the final part of this 
evaluation titled "Anthropocentrism and inherent value", I discuss and evaluate 
Plumwood's account of the inherent value of nature within the context of 
environmental ethics. Before proceeding with an evaluation of the contributions 
that are made by critical-transformative ecofeminism towards the articulation of 
an ecological feminist notion of the self, I would like to pause at a point of 
critique leveled at ecofeminism in general. This point of critique threatens to 
render it fundamentally flawed on a theoretical level, is discussed in the section 
titled "Universalising the woman-nature connection?" 
6.1 Universalising the women-nature connection? 
A basic point of departure of ecofeminism is that, because of the connection 
between women and nature, the domination of the one is inextricably tied up 
with that of the other. As such, to adequately address the domination and 
subjugation of nature and to conceive of an alternative ecological feminist notion 
of the self, this link has to be reckoned with. Doubt has, however, been cast on 
the validity of the argument that the domination of women and nature is 
interconnected. This argument has been criticised for being erroneous and 
universalising, since, as Segal (1994: 7) points out, women are not consistently, 
that is cross-culturally, associated with nature. This objection to the argument 
that the oppression of women can be explained in terms of her association with 
nature threatens to undermine the foundations of ecofeminism. According to 
also one of the main causes of environmental destruction and degradation. Addressing this 
very pressing issue is however the topic of a separate study. 
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Plumwood (1993: 11) however, although 11 We cannot see the alignment of 
women and nature as the entire basis and source of women's oppression" this 
connection continues to serve as an illuminating analytical tool in specific 
contexts. She (Piumwood, 1993: 11) acknowledges that the oppression or 
~~relative powerlessness" of women occurs also in cultures where women are 
not associated with nature, or in cultures that are ~~organised in terms of 
different genderised dichotomies". This does not mean that the association of 
women with nature, and men with reason or culture, cannot yield significant 
insights regarding the domination of women and nature within the context of 
Western culture. In this regard, Plum wood (1993: 11) writes: 
Nevertheless, the association of women with nature and men with 
culture and reason can still be seen as providing much of the basis of 
the cultural elaboration of women's oppression in the west, of the 
particular form it takes in the western context and that is still of 
considerable explanatory value. Once cultural universalism is rejected, 
we can draw on these features to explain much that is especially 
western in our ways of relating to each other and nature. 
In the light of the above the argument that the twin dominations of nature and 
women can be traced to classical Greek philosophy, the charge of universalism 
can be avoided by asserting that this connection is particular to Western culture. 
I agree with Plumwood that to give up the woman-nature connection because it 
is not universally true, would obscure the ways in which this association has 
contributed to the domination and subordination of women and nature in 
Western culture. Moreover, it would also prevent us from showing how the 
association of women (among others) with nature has had an impact that 
reaches far beyond the confines of Western culture. 
6.2 Complexifying the self 
I have already quite elaborately illustrated and in the process evaluated the 
significance of locating the domination and subordination of women and nature 
in dualism, and · how it distinguishes critical-transformative ecofeminism from 
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cultural ecofeminism.49 For the sake of avoiding repetition, I will keep this aspect 
of my evaluation brief. By focusing on dualism, critical-transformative 
ecofeminism avoids the reductionism cultural ecofeminism has been criticised 
for. Taking into account the wide range of different dualist pairs the manner in 
which different relations of domination overlap and reinforce one another, is 
illuminated. Such an analysis makes visible the inadequacy of reducing all forms 
of domination to one, as women's domination is viewed as one amongst many 
(that are no doubt interlinked), and the untenability of a simple distinction 
between oppressor and oppressed is made visible. As such, approaching the 
articulation of an ecological feminist notion of the self in terms of the problem of 
dualism, critical-transformative ecofeminism emphasises that a number of 
dualisms that have contributed to the domination and subjugation of a range of 
others, have to be considered and taken into account. This is therefore not to 
deny that the feminisation of nature and the naturalisation of women have 
significantly contributed to the suppression and subjugation of both. In the light 
of the different sets of dualist pairs that overlap and function in a mutually 
reinforcing manner, the focus is somewhat enlarged here and the complexities 
involved in articulating an ecological feminist notion of the self are laid bare. 
Taking into account other dualist pairs such as the human/nature and 
reason/nature, a way out of the shortcomings displayed by the cultural 
ecofeminist perspective, is suggested. Moreover as the analysis of dualism 
makes visible a network of different dualist pairs, we are made aware of an 
abundance of differences. If we recall, an affirmation of the female self is 
problematic given its essentialist character, 50 whilst the feminine self too 
remains trapped in dualism rendering both notions inadequate from an ecological 
and feminist perspective. In her analysis of dualism and the strategy she 
proposes to move beyond dualism, Plumwood, however, emphasises not only 
continuity, but also differences. Plumwood's sensitivity to differences between 
women is expressed in her engagement with female gender identity, but 
whether she succeeds in adequately engaging with differences between women, 
remains to be seen. 
49 See in this chapter the section titled Situating the woman-nature connection. 
50 With regards to the cultural ecofeminist affirmation of a female self, see Chapter 1, section 
4, titled Reconceiving the self. 
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6.3 A critical affirmation of female gender identity 
In the light of woman's traditionally essentialist identification with nature, an 
integral part of articulating an ecological feminist notion of the self is to conceive 
of a notion of a (female) feminist self. Both Plumwood and Warren's thinking has 
been received positively as succeeding in avoiding a relapse into a regressive 
essentialism (Davion, 1994; Beuge, 1994; Eckersley, 1992; Dobson, 1995). As 
we have seen an essentialist view of women entails a perception of women as 
closer to nature in that they are viewed as essentially, usually biologically, 
connected to nature. Another conception of female gender identity that is 
essentialist, albeit in universalist terms, is a notion of a feminine self that is 
complementary to a masculine self. Both these notions fail to overcome dualism 
and its correlate, essentialism. 
The concerns Plumwood expresses as reason for holding on to female gender 
identity is not novel. Moving beyond gender is perceived by many as detrimental 
to feminist politics, although, as we shall see in the following chapter, this is not 
a view universally shared by feminists. The claim that giving positive content to 
female identity is also empowering for women is also reasonable, especially in 
the light of the historical oppression, denigration and devaluation that women 
have suffered on the basis of their not-being male. 51 How this is performed, or 
the framework within which this is articulated, is however of utmost 
importance. 
Employing the strategy of continuity and difference that she proposes to address 
dualism, Plumwood shows how a dualised notion of female gender identity can 
be overcome. A critical affirmation of female gender identity renders it 
continuous, but also different, from its dualised construction as other. Moreover, 
in her engagement with what comes to the fore as a feminine self, Plumwood 
attempts to overcome the charge of universalism by endorsing a notion of a 
pluralist feminine self. Although this reveals a sensitivity towards differences 
between women, Plumwood's engagement with female gender identity remains 
inadequate That is, she does not pay sufficient attention to how variables such 
51 See Evans (1995) for taking up Plumwood's argument to hold on to women's differences, 
and advancing an opposing argument. 
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as race or ethnicity, for example, inscribes female gender identity. Critics have 
noted that the objection that black feminist writers have raised against the 
universalising tendencies in white feminist theory, can not simply be met by 
endorsing a pluralist feminine identity. The point that black feminists make is 
that race or ethnicity is inseparable from gender, and therefore female gender 
identity (Frazer and Nicholson, 1990: 29-33; Diquinzio, 1994: 1-9). This is no 
doubt a shortcoming in Plumwood's contribution towards an ecological notion of 
a female feminist self, but it is a problem that need not necessarily be 
insurmountable. Albeit unsuccessful then, Plumwood's proposal to conceive of 
female gender identity in pluralist terms, does show an acknowledgement and 
respect for differences between women. 
Although Plumwood does not succeed in formulating an alternative female 
feminist self, she does make some contribution towards it by her critical 
affirmation of female gender identity. This is achieved by illustrating how 
dualistically construed "feminine" characteristics can be transformed. For 
Plumwood, this is not to endorse the universalist perception of women as 
necessarily and particularly caring, nurturing etc. To the extent that women have 
been identified with the feminine, and to the extent that different women, given 
their social and historical positioning, may display "feminine" characteristics to a 
greater or lesser degree, these qualities, given their dualist construal denoting 
powerlessness, are up for reconstruction. 
A focus on female gender identity in terms of the "feminine" is also consistent 
with Plumwood's concerns as ecofeminist. Values and qualities such as 
nurturance, care, empathy and sympathy can be seen as relevant from an 
ecological perspective, but it is their dualistic construal as feminine which has 
rendered them problematic. The inferiority allocated to these values is a result of 
their exclusion from the superior realm of reason, which is challenged 
significantly by showing that these values move beyond the reason/emotion 
dualism. This brings us to Plumwood's introduction of the degendered model of 
the human. 
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6.4 Erasing differences 
As I have illustrated, Plumwood's degendered model of the human represents an 
attempt to conceive of a viable notion of the human self for "both sexes" 
without obliterating differences between men and women altogether. Given the 
dualist construal of the masculine and feminine models of the self, a formulation 
of a degendered model of the human self entails the rejection of both. This is 
followed by a conceptualisation of a notion of the human self that establishes 
continuity in terms of a "third set of characteristics" whilst not erasing all 
differences. 
Apart from the unfortunate choice of words in her classification of the notion of 
the human self as "degendered", which has its roots in a stream of feminist 
thinking that envisions some kind of androgynous society, a number of 
deficiencies have been identified regarding this model of the self (Braidotti et a/, 
1994: 42; Grosz, 1990: 338-339). Although Plumwood distances herself from 
androgyny she does not show how the model of the degendered self, consisting 
of the desirable qualities, would escape a characterisation as neutral. As such, 
this notion verges dangerously on - although clearly wanting to avoid -
obliterating differences. For this reason, this notion of the self evokes images of, 
if not androgyny, an artificially imposed uniformity between humans in general 
that also raises questions regarding the possibility of feminist politics, also within 
an ecofeminist context (Birkeland, 1994: 443-444). To endorse a degendered 
self, the asymmetrical power relations that exist between men and women are 
overlooked. That is, Plumwood's focus on dualism and dualist structures is an 
explicit attempt to transform power relations between self and other, which 
loses momentum if differences are inadequately engaged with. 52 Moreover, this 
also paralyses the possibility of those who have been designated to the realm of 
the other, to actively challenge oppressive practices and meanings from a 
position of difference. Plumwood's description of how such a degendered model 
of the human is to be constructed (selecting specific characteristics, 
52 As we have seen, in its quest for equality, some social/ist feminists endorses some kind of 
androgyny. However, such a notion of neutrality culminates in a reinforcement of the 
masculine because of the asymmetry that exists between the sexes. Holding on to 
differences in a modified form is a response and challenge to this asymmetry between men 
and women. 
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transforming them, and discarding others) is also reminiscent of the rationalist 
tradition she so effectively and convincingly criticises. The "installation" of such 
a model of the human self can hardly avoid coming across as a kind of social 
engineering. 
In my view, the main weakness of this concept of the human self can be 
attributed to the fact that she refrains from engaging adequately with that which 
forms the basis of continuity between humans. 53 Concentrating on a "third set of 
characteristics" is limiting. Moreover, she is unspecific regarding the content of 
the differences she envisions, thus rendering this model vague and incomplete 
(Dobson, 1995: 190-191 ). She does reiterate that differences in male and 
female ,,characters" can and should prevail, but speaking of differences between 
men and women in terms of ,,character,,, not only loses its critical edge, it also 
hardly captures the multifacetedness and richness of different selves that she 
herself clearly attributes great respect to. 
In the light of her later work (1993) and her explicit departure from the 
degendered model of the self, 54 it can with relative certainty be assumed, that 
these differences would not be differences as they are traditionally conceived. 
However, such differences could do with at least some illumination. This is 
called for especially in the light of her engagement with female gender identity in 
terms of nurturance that, as I have indicated, is significant from an ecological 
perspective. For this reason it has been remarked that the pluralist feminine self 
that Plumwood endorses seems not entirely incompatible with the notion of the 
degendered human self (Dobson, 1995: 190). In my understanding, given the 
multitude of differences that are constitutive of female feminist identity or 
subjectivity, and Plumwood,s later emphasis on difference, a fusion of the 
female self with the notion of a degendered human self that verges on neutrality, 
can be avoided. (Such a fusion would of course also be a contradiction in terms.) 
This signals a tension in Plumwood's position that is overcome at a later stage 
(1993) in her work. 
53 This shortcoming is however remedied in her later work and her discussion of Benjamin's 
mutual self as post-rationalist subjectivity. 
54 This was also stressed in personal correspondence with Plumwood (1996). 
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A clue as to how these problems that Plumwood encounters, can (perhaps) be 
overcome, lies in the classification of this model of the human self as 
"degendered". The question that I keep on asking myself is whether we need a 
degendered model of the human to conceive of an ecological self? From an 
environmental perspective, Plumwood's approach to conceive of a feminist 
notion of an ecological self is most significant, but how she goes about it in the 
case of the degendered self, is, however, unsatisfactory. 
6.5 Moving beyond dualism: ethics, continuity and difference 
This brings us to the critical-transformative ethic, which shares with cultural 
ecofeminism a critique of abstract universalist ethics, the notion of the self that 
informs it, and a positive valuation of previously marginalised moral concepts. 
Despite these convergences, that critical-transformative ecofeminism diverges 
notably from cultural ecofeminism also in the sphere of ethics, is evident. This 
position refrains from a complete abandonment of ethics, and a transformation 
of "feminine" values is also argued for. What is more significant, is that a slight 
movement away from an adherence to "feminine" values that invoke images of 
motherhood, can be detected. The reintroduction of marginalised moral concepts 
such as responsibility and respect that resist a dualist construal in terms of the 
reason/emotion dualism is also proposed, and care is detached from its incessant 
association with mothering or motherhood. Most significantly, the notion of the 
ecological self as mutual self circumvents a notion of continuity between self 
and nature that is based on identity (cultural ecofeminism) or identification (deep 
ecology). Retaining an adequate measure of distinctness avoids a relapse into 
altruism (which is not adequately addressed by cultural ecofeminism). 
Acknowledging the other as continuous but also different from the self, also 
avoids the temptation to confuse the needs of the self with those of the other, 
that we have seen, the deep ecological Self fails to guarantee. 
Plumwood's articulation of an ecological self as a mutual self is significant not 
only from an ecological, but also from a feminist perspective. As we have seen, 
Plumwood's articulation of a non-anthropocentric theory of the inherent value of 
nature is perfectly in keeping with the strategy she proposes for overcoming 
dualism. In this context the human/nature dualism is transformed by establishing 
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continuity between humans and nature without erasing differences, in particular 
the heterogeneity of nature. Articulating a non-anthropocentric basis for 
continuity, her broadened notion of intentionality forms the basis of the relation 
of mutuality between humans and nature whilst leaving space for the flourishing 
of differences. That the mutual self is articulated to express the intersubjective 
relation between humans must also not be overlooked, but I will return to this in 
due course. Within the context of articulating an ecological self, Plumwood 
succeeds in framing the mutual self in ecological terms by transposing what she 
conceives as the basis for continuity between humans and nature onto the 
mutual self. As such, in the case of the relation between humans and nature 
subjectivity as the basis for mutuality is replaced by the activity of striving and 
resistance, which is expressed differently by humans and nature, but which 
nonetheless, is at the same time shared by humans and nature. That continuity 
thus conceived is non-anthropocentric, is ascribed to the observation that this 
basis does not take what is specifically human as criterion for moral 
considerability. It is specifically designed to accommodate the flourishing of 
differences along diverse axes of differences, which in turn denotes the 
autonomy and agency of both self and other. 
Having elaborated upon the ecological significance of the mutual self, I would 
now like to turn to its significance also otherwise. If we recall, Plumwood 
discussed a degendered notion of the human so as to present us with an 
alternative notion of the self that allows for continuity between men and 
women, but which also leaves space for differences. As I understand it, what 
Plumwood was in effect aiming at here was to articulate an alternative, post-
rationalist subjectivity. Given the insurmountable problems of a degendered 
human self and Plumwood's concurrent abandonment of it, it is not 
unreasonable to hold that the mutual self replaces the degendered human self. 
What is particularly appealing about the mutual self then is unlike the 
degendered human self, that it offers a viable basis for continuity and is 
convincing in its allowance for the flourishing of differences. Whilst the basis for 
continuity between humans is a shared post-rationalist subjectivity, the 
emphasis that is simultaneously placed on difference, allows for the flourishing 
of differences. Being a post-rationalist subjectivity Plumwood's requirement that 
a movement beyond dualism through the notions of continuity and difference is 
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convincing only if a transformation of both self and other is attained, is also met. 
In this way, the dangers of both incorporation and uncritical affirmation are 
thwarted. As such then, the mutual self forms an interesting framework that has 
the potential to accommodate both an ecological self and a feminist self beyond 
dualism and essentialism. With the mutual self as backdrop, the articulation of a 
feminist notion of an ecological self is made possible. At the same time, because 
the mutual self is also an ecological self, the potential exists for the articulation 
of an ecological notion of a female feminist self. The shortcoming of critical-
transformative ecofeminism is, however, that whilst a pluralist feminine self is 
endorsed, the requirements for articulating a complexly differentiated female 
feminist self beyond dualism and essentialism are not adequately met. This is 
unfortunate, as it seems that the mutual self as post-rationalist feminist 
subjectivity that embodies differences, would most certainly not impede such an 
undertaking. 
6.6 The false choice between moral hierarchy and moral equality 
Critical-transformative ecofeminism has come under scrutiny for its purported 
rejection of moral hierarchy which is a characteristic of dualism. According to 
Andrews ( 1996: 143-144) an adherence to the "moral equality thesis" is 
presupposed in the critical-transformative critique of dualism, but it is not 
sufficiently argued for. Andrews infers the support for moral equality from the 
critique of naturism that, as we have seen, is brought in relation with sexism and 
racism. From this Andrews (1996: 144) deduces that "to hold that naturism is a 
similar injustice [to that of racism and sexism], implies a commitment to the 
moral equality thesis" (Andrews, 1996: 144). Andrews also criticises Warren 
and Plumwood's attempt to reconceive of the relation to nature in terms of 
continuity and difference. Still preoccupied with moral equality as opposed to 
moral hierarchy, Andrews claims that although it "allows" non-hierarchical moral 
perception, it does not show that this is the way we "ought" to perceive it 
(Andrews, 1996: 144). In his view, non-hierarchical moral perception is in any 
case not required. Moreover, that Plumwood and Warren's approach can also 
generate hierarchical ordering, proves for him his point that moral hierarchy is 
unavoidable and just. 
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This he (Andrews, 1996: 144) illustrates with reference to Plumwood's notions 
of continuity and difference which he reckons does not justify moral equality, as 
both continuity and difference are compatible with moral hierarchy, although 
continuity may defeat exclusion. Another point he (Andrews, 1996: 147) makes, 
is that Plumwood does not establish the equal moral importance of human and 
non-human ends, which is necessary if she places naturism alongside racism and 
sexism. In Andrews' view then, this is to imply that for Plumwood, naturism is a 
less serious injustice than sexism and racism, which is inconsistent with her 
rejection of moral hierarchy as inherent to dualism. 
Having briefly sketched Andrew's main points of critique, the soundness of the 
central assumption that inform his critique, needs to be established. That is, is 
Andrews correct in maintaining that Plumwood and Warren's rejection of moral 
hierarchy implies an adherence to moral equality? In my understanding, Warren 
and Plumwood's critique of hierarchical thinking and practices does not 
necessarily denote a support of the principle of moral equality. At the same time, 
this does not imply a concealed adherence to moral hierarchy either, as Andrews 
seems to want to suggest. Nor, and this is the contentious point Andrews is 
driving at, does it imply that moral hierarchy is unavoidable. Regarding the 
question of hierarchy, that all evaluations imply some kind of ranking, must not 
be confused with hierarchy, which is absolute and applied universally regardless 
of particular contexts. This is the hierarchy that both Plumwood and Warren 
reject. By endorsing the notions of continuity and difference, Plumwood and 
Warren introduce a more flexible strategy that, depending on the context, allows 
for an evaluation in terms of the specific continuities and differences that are 
relevant within the particular contexts at hand. 
What Plumwood and Warren seem to suggest is that everybody's interests 
deserves equal weight, which does not mean that the outcome of weighing up 
everybody's interests would necessarily result in equal treatment, an unfortunate 
but unavoidable consequence of the practical application of democracy. 
Therefore establishing continuity and difference between self and other is a 
necessary, if not entirely sufficient, requirement to enable us to consider all 
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interests equally, although this may not always result in equal treatment. 55 Moral 
hierarchy on the other hand, precludes even the possibility of weighing up all 
interests equally, as some are necessarily more morally considerable than others. 
Moreover, Andrews' view that hierarchy can not be escaped, which is proved to 
him by the fact that critical-transformative ecofeminism does not explicitly show 
how racism, sexism and naturism are equally unjust, is also in need of further 
examination. In his view, that a rejection of moral hierarchy cannot consistently 
be maintained, shows that naturism is a less serious injustice than injustices 
committed against humans, rendering moral hierarchy not only inevitable, but 
also just. 56 Again Andrews' critique rests on the assumption that a rejection of 
hierarchy implies the adherence to moral equality. One reason why Plumwood 
refrains from explicitly establishing the equal moral importance of human and 
non-human ends, is that it is only in a specific context that this would be 
necessary, and this context would be where, for example, people's interests are 
set off against those of nature. 57 However, as Norton (1991: 86-89) argues, this 
is a problem of a very theoretical kind. He points out that the choice between 
either humans or nature is, in practice, often not the only choice available. This 
renders Andrews' determination to adopt moral hierarchy not only unnecessary, 
but also an obstacle in conceiving of ways to consider the interests of humans 
and nature equally. 
Having shown that critical-transformative ecofeminism is unable to avoid 
hierarchy, Andrews (1996: 152-153) arrives at the point he has been driving at 
all along. He concludes that, despite her rejection of moral extensionism, 
Plumwood's argument for the moral considerability of earth others, itself is 
extensionist. This he ascribes to Plumwood's reference to nature as displaying 
55 As it seems to be suggested by Andrews above, it may be asked whether continuity is not 
a sufficient basis for equal moral consideration. However, this approach is specifically 
rejected because it forms part of an assimilationist strategy, which strengthens hierarchical 
relations, thus rendering the recognition of both continuity and difference necessary. 
56 For fear of misrepresenting Andrews as a neo-Darwinist, it is perhaps fitting to point out 
here that the ultimate point he is trying to make is that hierarchy need not necessarily lead to 
injustices, that hierarchy is not inherently unjust, but rather a reality we have to deal with. 
However, my response would be that if this is what he is saying, why not show a commitment 
to equality in the face of inequalities and let go of concepts that instead of facilitating 
~rogress, hold us back? 
7 Should the interests of the parties involved, be vehemently opposed, this conflict can be 
resolved democratically, in a setting where the interests of nature are also articulated. 
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mindlike qualities that renders it worthy of respect. In my view this argument is 
flawed for a number of reasons. Firstly, as I understand it, moral extensionism 
involves selecting a particular human characteristic such as consciousness and 
extending the sphere of the human (defined in these terms), to include others on 
the grounds that they exhibit these qualities. In this way, the other is no longer 
regarded morally irrelevant, but more relevant, depending on the degree of 
closeness or distance to consciousness - hence the classification "hierarchical 
extensionism". In contrast to this approach, what Plumwood explicitly does, is 
to select a criterion that is not distinctly human, but one that humans and nature 
share, to show that extensionism is neither necessary, nor inevitable. 58 
Another feature that distinguishes Plumwood' position from a moral extensionist 
one, is that in the process of establishing continuity between humans and 
nature, (which in turn also renders nature as having value in its own right), 
transformation takes place not only of nature but also the human. That is on the 
basis of the continuity that is established between humans and nature, the 
human as defined in terms of consciousness alone, too undergoes change. This 
is made explicit in particular with regard to her endorsement of the mutual self 
as a post-rationalist feminist subjectivity. Not only is it shown that humans share 
capacities with nature, the capacities humans do not share with nature are 
decentered. Moreover, the criterion of a broadened intentionality enables us to 
recognise that there are natural phenomena that far outdo what humans take so 
much pride and arrogance in. Within an extensionist framework, the self is not 
significantly challenged. For the above reasons then, the argument that 
Plumwood is a moral extensionist, is an erroneous one. 
6. 7 Anthropocentrism and inherent value 
Having argued that Plumwood's approach is not a moral extensionist one, an 
opportunity is offered to dwell on her account of the inherent value of nature. It 
can also be asked why Plumwood in her account of nature's inherent value, sees 
58 That this criterion is mindlike is indeed the case, but to conclude that this is extensionist is 
to conflate intentionality with consciousness, which is exactly what Plumwood shows the 
criterion of the intentional resists, although it does not exclude consciousness. 
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it fitting to involve the human in the manner that she does. 59 This can be 
illuminated by setting off her position against the two main approaches to 
theorising the value of nature. The first is the anthropocentric approach that 
views nature as valuable because it has value for humans. According to this 
theory, nature has instrumental value variously defined as aesthetic, 
recreational, spiritual, a stock of resources, and in terms of its medicinal value, 
and therefore we should treat nature ethically. The other is an ecocentric60 
approach which views nature as having inherent value that is objectively present 
in nature, totally independent of humans. On the grounds of nature's inherent 
value thus defined, nature should be morally considered. 61 
As Callicott (1992: 129-138) convincingly argues, to assert that nature has 
objective value in an attempt to liberate nature from its anthropocentric use 
value, is self-defeating. Objective value theory remains anthropocentric, because 
the objective value nature purportedly has, is bestowed upon it by humans. This 
is because as Callicott observes, values are necessarily human values. This 
however does not mean that we are inevitably trapped in anthropocentrism. That 
is, it is possible to conceive of the inherent value of nature in non-
anthropocentric terms and without "claiming that such value may exist 
independently of humans" (Callicott, 1992: 132).62 
Rejecting both positions for their anthropocentrism, Plumwood's account of 
nature represents one avenue that is followed in articulating such a non-
anthropocentric, theory of the inherent value of nature. That values are human 
values is in my understanding the reason why Plumwood does not and needs not 
exclude humans from her account of the inherent value of nature. That is, she 
59 If we recall, according to Plumwood, the exclusion of the inferior sphere of nature from the 
sphere of the human facilitates the instrumental treatment of nature. It is argued that if this 
relation of hyperseparation is to be addressed, nature reconceived as continuous with, but 
different from the human, could contribute significantly to transform this relation. Here 
however, I place Plumwood's account of what constitutes continuity between humans and 
nature in the context of inherent value theory so as to shed light on her particular 
engagement with establishing continuity between humans and nature. 
60 This is one of a range of different strands in ecocentrism. See Eckersley (1992: 49-71) for 
a detailed discussion of ecocentrism and its variations. 
61 A prominent exponent of this position is Rolston (1988). 
62 For an argument defending this position, see Richard and Val Routley (now Plumwood) 
(1980) and Plumwood (1981: 140-141). See Callicott (1992: 129-143) for his own version of 
such an account which is based on an interactive model: it is in our interaction with nature 
that nature's inherent value is revealed to us. 
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articulates a notion of the inherent value of nature, which is not objectively 
given, but also not wholly dependent on humans. Her particular account of the 
inherent value of nature is based upon a conception of nature as independent 
center of striving and resistance, which renders it continuous with humans. Such 
a notion of continuity enables humans to recognise nature as an other center of 
striving and resistance which demands an engagement and treatment of nature 
with due respect. 
7. Conclusion 
In the preceding chapter I have discussed the critical-transformative ecological 
feminist contributions towards the articulation of an ecological feminist notion of 
the self and the concomitant ethic beyond dualism and essentialism. The 
articulation of an alternative notion of the self and ethic is approached in the 
light of an in depth engagement with dualism as the conceptual framework that 
grounds the twin dominations of women and nature. Locating the dominations of 
women and nature in dualism, critical-transformative ecofeminism draws 
attention to the network of different dualist pairs that overlap and function in 
mutually supportive manner. A thorough engagement with dualism makes visible 
differences that were previously ignored and has significant implications for the 
articulation of an ecological feminist notion of the self beyond dualism and 
essentialism. In the light of this analysis, the critical-transformative ecofeminist 
position problematises what cultural ecofeminism treats as unproblematic. That 
is, to articulate an alternative ecological feminist notion of the self more is 
required than simply replacing a masculine notion of the self with a feminine 
notion of the self that reinforces dualism and essentialism. 
In her discussion of dualism we have seen that Plumwood stresses that the 
conceptual and material cannot be separated. This is a distinctive feature of 
critical-transformative ecofeminism and signals a shift from the predominantly 
materialist approach that is followed by cultural ecofeminism. This is also 
manifested in the (re)constructive approach that characterises the contributions 
of critical-transformative ecofeminism towards the articulation of a feminist 
notion of an ecological self and an ecological notion of a feminist self. 
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Plumwood approaches her contribution to the articulation of an ecological 
feminist notion of the self by focusing on the related human/nature, 
reason/nature and masculine/feminine dualisms. In the light of her strategy to 
move beyond dualism, she enacts a critical affirmation of female gender identity 
beyond dualism and she attempts to transform the notion of the human self. 
With regard to the latter she introduces a notion of a degendered human self 
with the objective of detaching the human self from its overtly masculine 
character so as to provide us with a backdrop against which human relations of 
domination and instrumentalisation of nature can be transformed. This 
endeavour is accomplished by illustrating how the human/nature dualism can be 
transcended through a broadened notion of intentionality. Whilst the notion of a 
degendered human self can be criticised and rejected for its inadequate 
engagement with differences, the reconceptualisation of the human-nature 
relation through a broadened notion of intentionality is positively received. 
Conceiving of continuity in these terms provides us with a non-anthropocentric 
account of the inherent value of nature, which succeeds in establishing 
connection between humans and nature without forsaking nature's differences. 
Plumwood's engagement with female gender identity is undertaken with two 
objectives in mind. The first is to untie women from their "privileged" relation of 
identification with nature that has legitimated their oppression alongside nature. 
Whilst rejecting the liberal strategy that opposes any association of women with 
nature, Plumwood also rejects the uncritical affirmation of an overidentification 
of women with nature. As we have seen, Plumwood performs a critical 
affirmation of female gender identity by untying a feminine self form its dualist, 
that is, complementary character. Holding on to women's difference whilst 
transforming it at the same time, signals also the potential ecological character 
of such a feminine self. That is, a critical affirmation of women's otherness 
opens up the way for a situatedness of women with nature. In the light of the 
second objective, which was to address universalism as a form of essentialism, 
Plumwood endorses a pluralist notion of female gender identity, hence the 
identification of this notion as a pluralist feminine self. In my view then, 
Plumwood's engagement with female gender identity marks a movement 
towards the articulation of a notion of an ecological notion of a female feminist 
self beyond dualism and essentialism, although it is a project that remains 
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unfulfilled. The reason for this is that, in the final analysis, Plumwood's notion of 
a pluralist feminine self moves beyond dualism and (biological) essentialism, thus 
addressing the shortcomings identified in the notion(s) of the female and 
feminine self as endorsed by cultural ecofeminism. However, despite her 
consistent sensitivity towards differences, she still fails to engage adequately 
with the differences between women. 
This brings us to the notion of the mutual self as a feminist notion of an 
ecological self. Emphasising continuity and difference, the mutual self is a 
refinement of deep ecology's endorsement of a notion of a relational self as 
ecological Self. If we recall, the mutual self that is also a post-rationalist feminist 
subjectivity, is articulated to address the dualist structure of the human/nature 
relation, particularly in terms of the reason/nature dualism. The mutual self as 
post-rationalist subjectivity is adapted by Plumwood to establish continuity 
between humans and nature in terms of a broadened notion of intentionality. 
Conceived of in the context of critical-transformative ecofeminist ethics then, 
the mutual self as ecological self stresses the acknowledgement of nature as 
independent center of striving and resistance. The basis that critical-
transformative ecofeminism provides for the ethical engagement with nature, 
signals a move away from a relation of women's identification with the natural 
environment, which is consistent with a shift away from an endorsement of 
"feminine" values and a restriction to an ethic or vocabulary of care. The values 
that are endorsed move beyond a restriction to mothering or motherhood, and a 
range of previously marginalised moral concepts advanced by Plumwood and 
Warren. These moral concepts are also transformed in a manner that is resistant 
to a construal along the reason/emotion dualism and in this manner, these 
concepts are detached from their association with powerlessness. 
In the final analysis, then, I would argue that the strength of the critical-
transformative ecofeminist contributions towards conceptualising an ecological 
feminist notion of the self, lies in its thorough engagement with the problem of 
dualism. The strategy Plumwood offers to move beyond dualism is to establish a 
notion of continuity between humans and nature without erasing differences. As 
such, this approach addresses radical exclusion but not at the expense of 
recognising differences, therefore resisting the strategy of incorporation. The 
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success of Plumwood's strategy to move beyond dualism lies in the fact that the 
basis that she offers for establishing continuity transforms both self and other, 
and therefore differences too, do not remain the same. Conceiving of continuity 
between humans and nature in terms of a broadened notion of intentionality 
offers a non-anthropocentric account of the inherent value of nature. By 
establishing continuity between humans and nature, the inherent value of nature 
is acknowledged, which demands a departure from the view of nature as 
instrument to the fulfillment of the endeavours and needs of man, thus calling 
for a consideration of nature as having needs and ends of its own. 
As we have also seen, Plumwood's endorsement of the notion of the mutual self 
provides us not only with a feminist notion of an ecological self that transforms 
the dualist relation between humans and nature. As a post-rationalist feminist 
subjectivity, the mutual self establishes continuity also between humans on the 
basis of subjectivity. That is, this notion of the self is offered also as alternative 
to a rationalist notion of the self that has systematically excluded women and 
others from the realm of subjecthood. The emphasis that Plumwood places on 
differences in the rearticulation of the self as mutual self, signals an 
acknowledgement of differences between humans in terms of identity and 
relative positions of power. As we have seen, Plumwood, speaking from the 
locatedness as ecofeminist, performs a critical affirmation of a notion of the 
female gender identity, which in itself is an acknowledgement of differences. As 
I have argued above, Plumwood's endorsement of a pluralist feminine self is not 
altogether satisfactory. Despite this shortcoming, the observation was made that 
the mutual self as post-rationalist feminist subjectivity invites and can 
accommodate the articulation also of a female feminist self. 
In the following chapter, I will give an exposition of the notions of the self, 
nature and politics that are articulated from a cyber-(eco)feminist perspective. 
Although cyber-(eco)feminism is not widely regarded as an ecofeminist position, 
that the notions of the self, nature and politics as conceived by cyber-
(eco)feminism, is significant from an ecological and feminist perspective, is 
evident. I therefore give an exposition of the different notions of the self, nature 
and politics offered by cyber-(eco)feminism so as to determine the contributions 
that are made towards the articulation of an ecological feminist notion of the 
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self beyond dualism and essentialism. The aim of this discussion is therefore also 
to determine which aspects of cyber-(eco)feminist thinking are consistent with 
the articulation of a feminist notion of an ecological self, and an ecological 
notion of a feminist self beyond dualism and essentialism. Moreover, in the light 
of the shortcomings identified in the critical-transformative engagement with the 
female feminist self, whether cyber-(eco)feminism can make a contribution to 
remedying this deficiency, will also be looked into. 
1 . Introduction 
Chapter 3 
Cyber-( eco )feminism 
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In the preceding chapters I have given an exposition of the contributions that 
cultural and critical-transformative ecofeminism make towards the articulation of 
an ecological feminist notion of the self beyond dualism and essentialism. I have 
shown how critical-transformative ecofeminism circumvents or improves upon 
some of the shortcomings that have been identified in the cultural ecofeminist 
strand, but also where and how the two positions overlap. In this chapter I 
explore the contributions that are made towards the articulation of a feminist 
notion of an ecological self and an ecological notion of a feminist self from a 
perspective that I have come to refer to as cyber-(eco)feminism. 
As articulated by biologist and historian of science Donna Haraway, cyber-
(eco)feminism differs markedly from cultural and critical-transformative 
ecofeminism. The notions of the self introduced by Haraway are neither 
articulated from an ecological feminist position, nor is she necessarily concerned 
with articulating an ecological feminist notion of the self as such. Moreover, 
consistent with a style that resists clear and distinct interpretations, Haraway's 
position is an unequivocally poststructuralist one. Poststructuralism is a stream 
in contemporary Western philosophical thinking that is often perceived to be 
directly opposed to and incompatible with environmental thinking. 1 Nevertheless, 
Haraway's thought and writing have direct bearing upon central questions in 
ecological and feminist thinking. The significance of Haraway's work lies not 
only in her explicit references to ecofeminism which reflects her critical solidarity 
with ecofeminism, but also in her reflection upon pertinent ecological and 
feminist questions. 
1 See Andermatt Conley (1997) for an exploration of poststructuralist thinking on the 
environment and Gare (1995) for an attempt to reconcile "postmodernism" with 
environmentalism. See also influential environmental thinker Zimmerman (1994) for a critical 
appraisal of "postmodernism" and radical ecological thinking. Zimmerman situates radical 
ecology in "postmodern" culture to show how radical ecology is compatible, but also 
irreconcilable with "postmodernism". This inquiry into Haraway's thinking, which is conducted 
from an ecological feminist perspective, is to a certain extent also a contribution to such an 
investigation into the relation between ecology, feminism and poststructuralist thinking. 
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In this chapter I focus on Haraway's deliberations upon a number of related 
issues that coincide with the activity that Haraway refers to as the "invention 
and reinvention of nature" (1991: 1 ). For Haraway, rethinking and reimagining 
nature is an act indistinguishable from rethinking the self, ethics and politics. 
Haraway's contemplation of the self, nature and politics are conceived of in "the 
belly of the monster", that is, in the context of post-industrial, late capitalist 
Western culture. As we shall see, it presents us with a very particular, that is, 
culturally specific response to the dilemmas that are thrust upon us in the late 
20th century, one which holds both potential and challenges that need to be 
taken heed of in contemporary environmental and feminist thought. 
As in the previous chapters, I will, in the section titled "Contextualisation and 
background", commence with a brief contextualisation to familiarise the reader 
with Haraway's background and the framework she writes from. Following the 
contextualisation, an exposition is given of altogether three different but related 
notions of the self that can be identified in Haraway's oeuvre. This section titled 
"Refiguring the self" is divided into two parts. In the first, titled "Monstrous 
selves", two notions of the self that are articulated by Haraway are discussed, 
namely "The figure of the cyborg" and "The lnappropriate/d Other". In the 
second part titled "The situated self", I discuss a third notion of the self that can 
be identified in Haraway's work. 2 
The notion of the cyborg signifies the transgression and destabilisation of 
boundaries previously regarded as fixed and stable. As such the cyborg, a figure 
that is half-human half-machine comes to the fore as a highly differentiated 
poststructuralist subjectivity beyond dualism and essentialism. As possible 
cyborg subjectivity, the lnappropriate/d Other marks a moment of pause, curbing 
the radical differentiation of the cyborg. The third notion of the self, the situated 
self, is articulated in an attempt to carve out an alternative notion of the feminist 
knowing subject that overcomes the sharp boundary between knowing subject 
2 During the course of this discussion, it will become clear that the boundaries between these 
different notions of the self blur to a greater or lesser degree. The emphasis does however fall 
differently in each of these notions, which warrants some degree of separation. As I hope to 
show then, the distinctions that I draw between the different selves that are discussed and 
their evaluations are performed not at the expense of a thorough engagement with and 
careful reflection on the literature at hand. 
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and the object of knowledge. In the process, the concept of nature as passive 
object is transformed into a non-anthropocentric figure of Coyote Trickster. 
Having already started discussing Haraway's perception of nature in the section 
titled "The situated self", Haraway's view on the concept of nature is further 
elaborated upon in the following section which is titled "A politics of 
articulation". In this section, consistent with the image of nature as Coyote 
Trickster, nature is simultaneously conceived of as "artifactual" and as "social". 
This multifaceted reinterpretation of nature opens up the way for Haraway to put 
forward a politics of articulation as an ethically sound alternative political 
strategy to navigate negotiations around environmental issues. A salient 
difference between cyber-(eco)feminism and cultural and critical-transformative 
ecofeminism then, is that a reconceptualisation of the self by these ecofeminist 
positions, is accompanied by the formulation of an ethic, and the self is offered 
as laying a foundation for ethical behaviour. Cyber-(eco)feminism on the other 
hand shifts the emphasis from ethics to politics (although politics and ethics here 
become less distinguishable). Haraway's politics of articulation draws upon the 
different conceptions of nature that she articulates. These conceptions in turn 
are directly linked with the notion(s) of the self that are articulated form a cyber-
(eco)feminist perspective. 
In the final section of this chapter, the different notions of the self that are 
proposed by cyber-(eco)feminism are evaluated from a feminist and ecological 
perspective. The different notions are brought in relation with one another and 
are played off against one another. Haraway's thoughts with regard to the 
concept of nature and her closely linked politics of articulation are also held up 
for closer inspection. This evaluation is of course not conducted in isolation from 
the previous two chapters, thus Haraway's work is continually assessed by 
relating it with and distinguishing it from the previously discussed two positions. 
2. Contextualisation and background 
In the introduction to her book, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention 
of Nature (1991 ), Haraway gives the reader a brief glimpse into the background 
of the author of A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-
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Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century (1985).3 This essay has become a cult 
piece of writing and articulates the main tenets of what is today commonly 
referred to as cyber- or cyborg feminism (Braidotti, 1994a: 7-13; Diergaarde, 
1994: 4; Sturgeon, 1997: 194). She writes "once upon a time the author was a 
proper, US socialist-feminist, white female, hominid biologist who became a 
historian of science to write about modern Western accounts of monkeys, apes 
and women" (Haraway, 1991: 1 ). 
Haraway has shed and reworked many of the presuppositions that these 
affinities have historically assumed and a plurality of different voices and 
concerns resonate through her current work as "cyborg feminist".4 Firmly 
situated within a poststructuralist framework, Haraway's texts are thoroughly 
fragmented and interdisciplinary: intricate allusions to discourses from 
psychoanalysis to primatology and information-technology together support and 
constitute her arguments to bring about the desired effects. lntertextual 
references abound (which requires a pre-knowledge of the reader that is at times 
simply overwhelming), which link her various essays to form a richly textured, 
albeit incomplete whole. It is here that comes to mind what is most striking of 
her style, namely a diligent resistance to and subversion of any attempt at fixed 
and final interpretations or categorisations. 
Faithful to engaging with the pressing issues her environment thrusts upon her, 
Haraway takes up the challenge of working through complex contemporary 
philosophical, epistemological, and political questions in the face of the 
deconstruction of the subject, the deligitimisation of totalising grand narratives, 
and the escalating technological advancement that characterise post-
industrial/late capitalist/postmodern Western culture. She embarks upon these 
journeys from a purposeful rejection of the dualist conceptual framework that 
has structured Western philosophical thought and culture and sets out to tell 
different stories, to envision and invent other possibilities. Like cultural 
ecofeminism and critical-transformative ecological feminism, Haraway's rejection 
of dualism is pivotal to her project. Haraway's engagement with dualism and 
3 In future references, due to the length of the title, I will refer to this essay as A Cyborg 
Manifesto. 
4 For an interesting historical account of Haraway's unfolding as cyborg feminist, see Munnik 
(1997: 70-75). 
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essentialism differs from the previous two positions in that it takes on a 
distinctly poststructuralist visage - a position which offers other (or not so other) 
perspectives and some interesting challenges to contemporary ecological and 
feminist thinking. 
3. Refiguring the self 
In the following section I would like to discuss the different conceptions of the 
self that can be distinguished in Haraway's texts. There are three such notions 
of the self that weave their way in and out of her collection of essays, namely 
the figure of the cyborg, the lnappropriate/d Other, and the situated self. Some 
features of these selves recur and repeat themselves in others, leaving traces 
that render a clear-cut differentiation somewhat artificial and forced. However, 
although I do not underestimate the significance of the overlap between these 
different notions of the self, I treat these notions separately (or relatively 
separately) due to the distinct characteristics that distinguish them and the 
effects that these differences give rise to. 5 
The section titled "Monstrous selves", is divided in two parts namely "The figure 
of the cyborg" and "The lnappropriate/d Other". I start off by discussing 
Haraway's notion of the cyborg that comes to the fore as a poststructuralist 
identity par excellence. The cyborg is a highly differentiated, playful entity that 
takes pleasure in the transgression of boundaries. It inhabits a world unmarked 
by dualist structures and embodies the destabilisation and subversion of the 
human/machine, human/animal, culture/nature and man/woman dualisms 
amongst others. In keeping with its embodiment of differences, the cyborg is 
shown to take on at least two faces, the second manifesting itself in what 
Haraway refers to as the lnappropriate/d Other. Despite the fact that for 
Haraway the notion of the lnappropriate/d Other acts as alternative cyborg 
subjectivity, I treat it not as disconnected, but as distinct from the figure of the 
cyborg. In my view the lnappropriate/d Other, marks a moment of pause where 
the radical differentiation of the cyborg is slightly curbed. This observation is 
made in the light of Haraway's discussion of the lnappropriate/d Other as moving 
5 An in depth discussion and evaluation of these differences and their effects will be 
conducted at the end of this chapter. 
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beyond the identity of other, whilst at the same time holding onto its 
situatedness as other. Following my discussion of the cyborg then, the 
lnappropriate/d Other is discussed as an alternative feminist subjectivity, one 
that does not affirm the other of the self, but the other of the other. 
In the second section titled "The situated self", the third (albeit not unrelated), 
notion of the self is discussed. This conception of the self is articulated via an 
investigation into the epistemological question of objective knowledge. Here 
Haraway presents us with an understanding of objective knowledge as situated 
knowledges. The knowing subject is situated, therefore non-neutral and 
therefore accountable for the knowledge that she produces. It is here, in her 
deconstruction of the subject/object and human/nature dualisms, that Haraway's 
creative re-imaging of nature comes to the fore, thwarting the relations of 
domination that structure and marks these dualisms. 
3.1 Monstrous selves 
i) The figure of the cyborg 
It is in A Cyborg Manifesto, (originally published in 1985), written as a vision on 
the future of socialist feminism in the 90's and the next millennium, that the 
notion of the cyborg is first articulated and given content to. Defined as "a 
cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, [the cyborg] is a 
creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction" (Haraway, 1991: 149). 
Likewise, the cyborg is an entity that is neither purely "cultural", nor purely 
"natural" (Dobbelaar and Slob, 1995: 5). 
As such then, the cyborg is the embodiment of a particular moment in the 
history of Western culture. It makes its appearance in an era that is 
characterized by escalating technological advancement, a development that 
according to Haraway has had a remarkable impact on Western culture. In her 
socio-cultural analysis, she points out that technological development has 
generated three particular boundary breakdowns that are of profound historical 
significance. These are respectively the blurring of the distinction between 
humans and machines, humans and animals and the blurring of the boundary 
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between the physical and non-physical (Haraway, 1991: 152-153).6 Concerning 
the blurring of the distinction between humans and machines, the creation of 
machine-like figures that strongly resemble humans (here popular culture figures 
such as Robocop and Terminator spring to mind), or machines that display 
human-like qualities, destabilise a wide range of previously taken for granted 
distinctions respectively associated with humans on the one hand and machines 
on the other (Diergaarde, 1994: 4). On the effects of this phenomenon, Haraway 
(1991: 152) writes: 
Late twentieth century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous 
the difference between natural and artificial, mind and body, self-
developing and externally designed and other distinctions that used to 
apply to organisms and machines. Our machines are disturbingly lively 
and we ourselves frighteningly inert. 7 
Even in our everyday surroundings, the breaching of the organism/machine 
distinction is visible all around us, which accounts for Haraway's view of the 
cyborg as both a reality and myth. Moreover she asserts that we are all cyborgs: 
the extension of ourselves to include machines is nothing extra-ordinary if we 
think about the range of "tools" that we employ in our everyday existence and 
which we can hardly imagine living without. In this regard, our daily use of and 
interaction with computers and computerised technology, comes to mind. 
Already we are not so distinct from our machines as we would like to think we 
are. 
Concurrently, the human-animal divide is challenged and questioned by those 
who, as Haraway (1991: 152) puts it, "no longer feel the need for such a 
separation" which is expressed in "many branches of feminist culture [that] 
affirm the pleasure of connection of humans and other living creatures". Baboon 
6 In this discussion an analysis of the boundary breakdown between the physical and non-
physical is omitted, as it is not directly relevant to this discussion. 
As Zimmerman (1994: 359) points out, whether machines will "eventually become self-
conscious and even autonomous" as Haraway appears to suggest, is a hotly disputed topic. 
This however, does not undermine the point that Haraway is in fact trying to make. The pace 
at which technological advancement is occurring, is in fact alarming. The reason for alarm is 
not because technology is inherently bad, but because increased automatisation threatens to 
replace human labour on a scale that has left many economically stranded already. It is in the 
light of this that her assertion that we are surprisingly passive as opposed to the "liveliness" of 
our machines that threaten to have more power over us than we have over it has to be 
understood. 
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heart transplants on babies is of course another example of the transgression of 
the human-animal distinction. This is a boundary confusion that ironically elicits 
simultaneous criticism from animal rights activists and causes upheaval in human 
purist circles (Haraway, 1991: 164-165). It is out of this milieu where dilemmas 
are created and pleasure is taken in human-animal boundary-transgressions that 
the cyborg emerges: 
The cyborg appears in myth precisely where the boundary between 
human and animal is transgressed. Far from signaling a walling off of 
people from other living beings, cyborgs signal disturbingly and 
pleasurably tight coupling. Bestiality has a new status in this cycle of 
exchange (Haraway, 1991: 152). 
That these developments mark the subversion of some of the most cherished 
distinctions and closely guarded boundaries that structured Western culture and 
thinking is evident. Haraway goes on to argue that this confusion of boundaries 
irrevocably challenges and displaces those dualisms that are fundamental to 
Western philosophical thinking and which operate in the service of Western 
imperialist culture. According to Haraway ( 1991: 177) then: 
... certain dualisms have been persistent in Western traditions; they 
have all been systemic to the logics and practices of domination of 
women, people of color, nature, workers, animals in short, 
domination of all constituted as others ... Chief among these troubling 
dualisms are self/other, mind/body, culture/nature, male/female, 
civilised/primitive, reality/appearance, whole/part, agent/resource, 
maker/made, active/passive, right/wrong, truth/illusion, God/man. 
In her description of the notion of the self that lies central to Western 
philosophical thinking, Haraway criticises the relationship between self and other 
in terms of which the other is defined in relation to self, being instrumental to 
the self in more ways than one. To distinguish the self from the other, the other 
is constructed as radically different from the self, but this difference, because it 
is a difference that is complementary to the self, is a difference that amounts to 
sameness (Haraway, 1991: 177).8 In this framework, the other is systematically 
oppressed to uphold the (illusion of) autonomy and unity that the self makes 
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claim to. This, what in effect amounts to a relationship of dependency renders 
the other an ever-present threat to the unity of the self. To contain this 
potentially volatile relationship, the other is systematically repressed and 
dominated by self: 
The self is the One who is not dominated, who knows that by the 
service of the other, the other is the one who holds the future, who 
knows that by experience of domination, which gives the lie to the 
autonomy of the self. To be One is to be autonomous, to be 
powerful, to be God, but to be one is to be an illusion, and so to be 
involved in a dialectic apocalypse with the other (Haraway, 1991: 
177). 
For Haraway, this dualistically structured relation between self and other can 
only be subverted if the seemingly innocent longing for unity, wholeness or 
harmony is firmly rejected. According to Haraway, the fulfillment of the desire 
for unity and wholeness inevitably manifests itself in oppressive and exclusivist 
politics and practices, as the promise of oneness is a promise that cannot be 
delivered. Striving towards unity is achieved "at the cost of deathly practices, 
almost a worship of death" (Haraway, 1990: 16). Zimmerman (1994: 363) is 
correct in his observation that Haraway's "crucial insight is that the longing for 
unity always produces duality"', as in this framework, the yearning for unity 
results in a system where "one is too few, but two are too many". Historically 
this has manifested itself in a systematic repression of difference and otherness 
(Haraway, 1991: 177).9 Accordingly, Haraway's deconstruction of the One and 
dualism is "in effect a call for the emergence of non-dualism" and along with it, 
the free play of differences (Zimmerman, 1994: 363). 
In the light of her deconstruction of the One, the figure of the cyborg is 
introduced as alternative to the unified self-enclosed subject in contrast to whom 
"it does not seek unitary identity and so generate antagonistic dualisms without 
end (or until the world ends)" (Haraway, 1991: 180). In the wake of a 
deconstruction of the self/other dualism differences are set fee, and the rule of 
8 This point will be further elaborated upon in the section titled "The lnappropriate/d Other". 
9 In the Twentieth Century, Fascist Nazism and Apartheid stand out in history as particularly 
dire examples of this pursuit of oneness, the horrifying manifestations of which exposed a 
fanatic quest for sameness. 
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the One is replaced by a notion of the self where "one is too few and two is only 
one possibility" (Haraway, 1991: 180).10 It is at the moment of this historical 
event that the cyborg emerges as a multiple, multifaceted and fragmented entity 
that takes delight in the transgression of boundaries, some of which, as we have 
seen, were previously held sacred. The cyborg inhabits a world beyond dualism, 
a world where there are only differences (Prins, 1992: 76). As a figure that is 
partly human, animal and machine, the cyborg also inhabits a space in-between 
culture and nature. It comes as little surprise then that the figure of the cyborg 
thoroughly undermines and destabilises the foundations upon which Western 
self-understanding is based. As Haraway (1991: 176) writes: 
Cyborg politics insist on noise and advocate pollution, rejoicing in the 
illegitimate fusions of animal and machine. These are the couplings 
which make Man and Woman so problematic, subverting the 
structure of desire, the force imagined to generate language and 
gender, and so subverting the structure and modes of reproduction of 
"Western" identity, of nature and culture, the mirror and eye, slave 
and master, body and mind. 
Given its non-dualist, highly differentiated character, it is perhaps not surprising 
that "[t]he cyborg is a creature in a post-gender world", a world where gender 
ceases to be a salient feature of identity (Haraway, 1991: 150). It also follows 
that for a cyborg that inhabits a world beyond gender, powerful stories of 
original unity and organic wholeness that not only presuppose, but also 
systematically reinforce dualism, cease to remain meaningful. Alluding to two of 
the most powerful grand narratives the twentieth century has proffered, 
Marxism and psychoanalysis, Haraway writes of the cyborg: 
... it has no truck with bisexuality, pre-oedipal symbiosis, unalienated 
labor, or other seductions to which organic wholeness through final 
appropriation of all the powers of the parts into a higher unity. In a 
sense the cyborg has no origin story . . . An origin story in the 
10 It is perhaps useful to recall here that the deconstruction of the self/other dualism reveals 
the self's dependence on the suppression of the other to uphold the illusion of his unity and 
also superiority. As soon as this relationship is unveiled, the constructedness of the 
differences that separate the self and other are revealed. At this point the boundaries that 
separate self and other become less clear and distinct. This is however not to argue that the 
differences disappear, on the contrary, the point of deconstruction is that there are always 
"Western" sense depends on the myth of original unity, fullness, bliss 
and terror, represented by the phallic mother from whom all humans 
must separate, the task of individual development and of history, the 
twin potent myths inscribed most powerfully for us in psychoanalysis 
and Marxism . . . The cyborg skips the step of original unity of 
identification with nature in the Western sense (Haraway, 1991: 150-
151 ). 
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Not suffering from the illusion of original unity, the sense of loss and dis-ease 
that these respective stories articulate and attempt to address, escape the 
cyborg completely. Instead, the cyborg feels itself at ease in a highly 
differentiated and fluctuating postmodern culture. Prins (1992: 76) articulates 
this succinctly: 
De cyborg voel zich thuis in een postmoderne wereld waarin allerlei 
grense van geen betekenis meer zijn: de grense tussen organisme en 
machine, mens en dier, fysische en niet-fysische wereld zijn voor een 
cyborg poreus geworden. Ze kent geen oorsprongsgeschiedenis - het 
verlange naar het herstel van een verloren geganen eenheid is vir haar 
daarom volkome vreemd. 11 
It is exactly in what at first glance presents itself as the attractive side of the 
cyborg, its playful subversion and transgression of rigid boundaries (read: radical 
differentiation) and its resistance to being pinned down, that the danger of the 
cyborg lurks. Haraway is thoroughly aware that ironically, it is in its appeal that 
the danger of the cyborg lies. She (1991: 161) writes: 
But in the consciousness of our failures, we risk lapsing into 
boundless difference and giving up on the confusing task of making 
partial real connection. Some differences are playful, some are poles 
of world historical systems of domination (my emphasis, FM). 
In its ceaseless transgression of boundaries, the cyborg is an entity that makes 
only differences. 
11 Approximate translation: The cyborg feels at home in a postmodem world where all sorts of 
boundaries have ceased to have meaning: for a cyborg the boundaries between organism 
and machine, human and animal, the physical and non-physical world has become porous. 
She has no origin - the longing for a restoration of a lost unity is therefore completely alien to 
her. 
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endless connections that are looked upon in a favourable light. At the same time, 
however, because it is such a free-floating sign, the figure of the cyborg 
threatens to fulfill the logical outcome of the western ideal of the completely 
independent and autonomous individual (Prins, 1992: 76). Playing on the fantasy 
of the disembodied disembedded man in total control, Haraway (1991: 151) 
observes that: 
The cyborg is also the awful apocalyptic telos of the "West's" 
escalating dominations of abstract individuation, an ultimate self 
untied at last of all dependency, a man in space. 
i 
To combat the cyborg's radical differentiation, Haraway introduces the notion of 
affinity as a means to establish connections that are enabling for political 
engagement and action. Haraway's figuration of the cyborg also as alternative 
model for political subjectivity and specifically feminist subjectivity, gives further 
substance to this endeavour. 12 
Pressed for making a commitment, Haraway (1991: 19-20) concedes that whilst 
being an inhabitant of a post-gender world, the cyborg is female, a "bad girl", 
she is a bad girl who is trying not to become "Woman". Through imagining the 
cyborg as "bad girl", Haraway distances herself explicitly from the tendency 
exhibited by some feminists to endorse a view of "woman" as the direct 
opposite of "man". In direct opposition to the cultural ecofeminist revaluation 
and celebration of the "feminine", Haraway (1989: 256) expresses her view on 
this matter as follows: 
Holism, appreciation of intuitive method, presence of "matriarchal" 
myth systems and histories of women's cultural innovation, 
cultivation of emotional and cognitive connection between humans 
and animals, absence of dualist splits in objects of knowledge, 
qualitative method subtly integrated with long term quantification, 
12 Contrary to popular interpretations of the poststructuralist declaration of the "death of the 
subject" as having given politics and political agency the final blow, Haraway departs from 
such an interpretation. Part of the objective of the Cyborg Manifesto is to come to terms with 
the demise of former grand narratives and the social environment that these changes are 
taking place in. In fact, it is most evident that Haraway is trying to redefine politics and 
imagine different routes open for the continuation of critical political engagement in a cultural 
era that is characterised by an atmosphere of apathy and disillusionment of once optimistic 
radical revolutionaries. 
extensive attention to female social organisation as the infrastructure 
grounding more visible male activities, and lack of culturally 
reinforced fear of loss of personal boundaries in loving scientific 
attention to the world are all perfectly compatible with masculinism in 
epistemology and male dominance in politics. 
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Whilst being vehemently critical of white male patriarchal culture, Haraway has 
no nostalgic yearning for a return to an untainted female culture long lost - in 
short, there is no paradise out there to rediscover and return to. The cyborg "is 
not innocent, it was not born in a garden" (Haraway, 1991: 18). 
Uncompromisingly, in response to the tendency to (uncritically) revalue feminine 
activity and "name it as the ground of life", Haraway (1991: 180) dares to 
demand: 
What about all the ignorance of women, all the exclusions and 
failures of knowledge and skill? What about men's access to knowing 
how to build things, to take them apart, to play? What about other 
embodiments? (Haraway, 1991: 181 ). 
As such then, A Cyborg Manifesto is also a compelling call upon women to 
inform themselves adequately of the effects that a rapidly changing 
contemporary culture has on their lives and to be actively involved in shaping 
their lifeworlds. Giving credit to the liberatory side of technological 
advancement, Haraway (1991: 181) writes that it "is not just that science and 
technology are possible means of great human satisfaction", at the same time 
she also warns "as well as a matrix of complex dominations". Thus, those others 
who are especially vulnerable to escalating technological advancement, 
particularly in the workplace, and whose lives will be drastically influenced, need 
to take heed. Women in particular are urged to become literate in certain skills 
that would enable them to effectively fend for themselves, as the key word 
operating in this context is "survival" (Haraway: 1990: 26). 
To become competent participants in a high-tech world, little choice is left but to 
take what was previously perceived to be the tools of oppression in our/their 
own hands. To achieve this, Haraway invites women to follow the example set 
by the cyborg and not only become literate in techno-land, but to embrace that 
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which has been the object of feminist contempt, the cold and deathly machine. 
Contrary to the feminist tendency to resist or even detest technology as part of 
the male drive for dominance and control, the cyborg does not fear machines, it 
is an integral part of her lifeworld, to the extent that she embraces it as an 
aspect of her embodiment. Haraway (1991: 180) writes: 
Intense pleasure in skill, machine skill, ceases to be a sin, but an 
aspect of embodiment. The machine is not an it to be animated, 
worshipped, and dominated. The machine is us, our processes, an 
aspect of embodiment ... Up till now (once upon a time), female 
embodiment seemed to be given, organic, necessary: and female 
embodiment seemed to mean a skill in mothering and its metaphoric 
extensions. 
Through the figure of the cyborg Haraway's disavowment of the metaphors that 
are identified with woman, such as the organic, natural, the body, and so forth is 
expressed: her project being to deconstruct it. Fittingly, Haraway (1991: 181) 
concludes that to be a cyborg: 
means both building and destroying machines, identities, 
categories, relationships, space stories. Though both are bound in a 
spiral dance, I would rather be a cyborg than a goddess. 
In the next section, I would like to explore the notion of the lnappropriate/d 
Other as another dimension of the image of the cyborg. In Haraway's writing the 
two images are intertwined. As different instances of the same (multifaceted) 
being however, the above exposition of the cyborg can be distinguished from the 
lnappropriate/d Other, in that the latter, along with figures such as "Eccentric 
subjects" and "women of colour" is specifically presented as an alternative 
notion of a female feminist self or subjectivity. 
ii) The lnappropriate/d Other 
Following Trinh T. Minh-Ha (1989), Haraway (1992b: 86) employs the notion of 
the "lnappropriate/d Other" in her undertaking of the difficult task of articulating 
a space from which it is possible to imagine the "human in a post-humanist 
landscape". What she sets out to do is to show how the lnappropriate/d Other 
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signifies an alternative notion of the human or feminist subjectivity. It is in this 
context that the lnappropriate/d Other as model for female feminist subjectivity 
emerges as Haraway depicts her by the figure of Sojourner Truth that personifies 
a specific black female feminist subject. During the course of this discussion, it 
will become clear that through the figure of Sojourner Truth, the lnappropriate/d 
Other operates not only as feminist subjectivity, but also as a specific gendered, 
racial subjectivity. As such, it is evident that for Haraway, there is a multitude of 
lnappropriate/d Others. In this discussion "women of colour" and "eccentric 
subjects" are also introduced as examples of lnappropriate/d Others. 
In her essay Ecce Homo, Ain't (Ar'n't) I a Women, and lnappropriate/d Others: 
The Human in a Posthuman Landscape (1992b), that was written in an effort to 
refigure humanity, we are introduced to Haraway's notion of the lnappropriate/d 
Other as offering an alternative notion of subjectivity. The context that the 
notion of the lnappropriate/d Other is articulated in, is one which is trying to 
come to terms with the formidable task of rearticulating a notion of the "human" 
that is other to 
the Enlightenment figures of coherent and masterful subjectivity, the 
bearers of rights, holders of property in the self, legitimate sons with 
access to language and the power to represent, subjects endowed 
with inner coherence and rational clarity, the masters of theory, the 
founders of states and fathers of families, bombs and scientific 
theories - in short, Man as we have come to know and love him in 
the death of the subject critiques (Haraway, 1992b: 87). 
Haraway's vehement rejection of the concept "Man", also referred to as the 
"unitary subject" above, by now almost speaks for itself: throughout the history 
of Western imperialist culture, it has been employed in a most vicious manner to 
privilege and legitimate the domination of a few (literally) at the expense of 
many. The "common humanity" employed in this discourse of "man", turned out 
to be common to, or the property of, only a selected group. 
In contrast to the above notion of the self then, and in keeping with 
contemporary feminist thinking in general, Haraway explores the notion of 
lnappropriate/d Other as offering an alternative notion of the human and of 
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(female) feminist subjectivity. This she discusses with reference to a particularly 
significant historical figure named Sojourner Truth. The manner in which this is 
done, as I have indicated above, fully recognises the numerous challenges 
brought about for feminist thinking by the poststructuralist critique of 
subjectivity. If we recall, the deconstruction of the subject is often interpreted as 
signaling the "death of the subject". Such talk threatens to silence women 
precisely at a time in history where women are at last in a position to speak for 
themselves. Haraway ( 1 992b: 96) expresses her disdain with these 
interpretations as follows: 
Nonfeminist poststructuralist theory in the human sciences has 
tended to identify the break-up of coherent or masterful subjectivity 
as the "death of the subject". Like others in newly unstably 
subjugated positions, many feminists resist this formulation of the 
project and question its emergence at just the moment when 
raced/sexed/colonised speakers begin "for the first time", that is, 
with an "originary" authority, to represent 
institutionalized publishing practices and other 
constituting practices (emphasis Haraway's). 
themselves in 
kinds of self-
In the same way that we have to rethink the human in a post-human world then, 
as feminists, we have to think through and articulate what it means for women 
to claim subjecthood. As such, how we articulate our selves is a matter of great 
complexity where caution needs to be taken. Haraway repeatedly points out that 
reinforcing oppressive essentialist identities that have caused great suffering, is 
self-undermining in more ways than one: 
Consciousness of exclusion through naming is acute ... With the hard 
won recognition of their social and historical constitution, gender, 
race and class cannot provide the basis for belief in essential unity ... 
Gender, race and class is an achievement forced on us by the terrible 
historical experience of the contradictory social realties of patriarchy, 
colonialism and capitalism (Haraway, 1991: 155). 
Uncritically affirming otherness is not only undesirable because it reinforces 
oppressive identities, it is also highly problematical because it too, can function 
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in an oppressive or exclusivist manner. 13 This brings us to the challenge faced by 
feminist theorists - how to conceive female subjectivity at a time when the 
concept "woman" itself is a site of contestation. The deconstruction of the 
notion of "woman" by feminists of color has severely problematised the appeal 
to shared identity as ground for political unity. An inquiry into who this "us" is, 
needs to be rigorously performed: 
And who counts as "us" in my own rhetorical? Which identities are 
available to ground such a potent political myth called "us", and what 
could motivate enlistment in this collectivity? Painful fragmentation 
among feminists (not to mention among women) along every possible 
fault line has made the concept "woman" elusive, an excuse for the 
matrix of women's dominations of each other (Haraway, 1991: 155). 
Feminism itself is therefore neither pure nor innocent. When subjected to 
scrutiny, even here an avoidance of the oppression and domination of some by 
others is not guaranteed. However, this revelation of the non-innocence of 
feminism, brings with it new possibilities that are long overdue. In this regard, 
Haraway (1991: 157) writes: 
I do not know of another time in history when there was greater need 
for political unity to confront effectively the dominations of "race", 
"gender", "sexuality" and "class". I also do not know of any other 
time when the kind of unity we might help build could have been 
possible. None of "us" have any longer the symbolic or material 
capability of dictating the shape of reality to any of "them". Or at 
least "we" cannot claim innocence from practicing such dominations. 
White women, including socialist feminists, discovered (that is, were 
forced kicking and screaming to notice) the non-innocence of the 
category "woman". 
Stressing the untenability of fixing the meaning of woman, Haraway (1991: 155) 
proceeds to assert that "there is nothing about being "female" that naturally 
13 Here the problems surrounding the cultural ecofeminist affirmation of female identity and 
female gender identity come to mind. If we recall, the criticism that these notions of the self 
have received, pertain their essentialist characters. The untenability of an affirmation of a 
(biologically grounded) concept of the female self is evident, whilst the feminine self too has 
been revealed to be essentialist. Universalising gender identity, the differences that exist 
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binds women" and deconstructing the term further, she writes "there is not even 
such a state as 'being' female, itself a highly complex category constructed in 
contested sexual discourses and other social practices". In the wake of the 
above critique then, shared identity can no longer serve as ground for political 
unity. Through trial and error feminists too have learned that to claim unity 
through identity is an exclusivist strategy. Differences between women cannot 
be accommodated and is thus ignored/negated and excluded. Instead of 
grounding politics in identity, or sameness, Haraway then ventures forth and 
offers us a different grounding for politics and this is "affinity: related not by 
blood, but by choice"14 (Haraway, 1991: 155). 
As Haraway (1991: 155) has asserted, this is not to renounce the endeavour to 
articulate an alternative notion of a female feminist self. On the contrary, this is 
a challenge undertaken by Haraway herself, but at the same time she wants to 
emphasise the impossibility of such an undertaking. To show awareness of what 
we are doing and how we go about it, is therefore of utmost importance. It is 
here that the notion of the lnappropriate/d Other as alternative female feminist 
self or subject is significant. The lnappropriate/d Other "refers to the historical 
positioning of those who cannot adopt the mask of either self or other offered by 
previously dominant Western narratives of identity and politics" (Haraway 1990: 
23). 15 The appeal of the lnappropriate/d Other as model for feminist subjectivity 
is twofold. It neither buys into the notion of the self as traditionally understood, 
nor does it affirm otherness defined as oppositional to the self thus not simply 
the other of the self: "multiple, without clear boundary, frayed insubstantial" 
(Haraway, 1991: 177). 
The lnappropriate/d Other is however not without history - it enunciates from the 
locatedness as other. No longer serving as mirror to the self, and no longer 
proper to the self, owned by the self, the other transcends its status as property 
of the self, thus rendering it inappropriated. Articulating a subversive and 
between women are negated or ignored. 
14 Haraway's notion of political unity through affinity as opposed to identity will be elaborated 
upon in more detail in the section titled "The situated self'. 
1 We are reminded here that the lnappropriate/d Other as coinciding with neither self nor 
other, is also an alternative notion of the human, as is suggested by her assertion that 
"feminist humanity must have another shape, other gestures, but I believe we must have 
feminist figures of humanity. They cannot be man or woman" (Haraway, 1992b: 86). 
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excessive identity that disrupts its designation to the realm of otherness, by 
"seizing the tools to mark the world that marked them as other", the other 
becomes inappropriate (Haraway, 1991: 175). The subversive character of the 
lnappropriate/d Other also effects a destabilisation of the master subject in that 
it ''disrupt[s] the humanisms of many western traditions" thus posing a challenge 
the self to transform in turn. 
To elucidate the notion of the lnappropriate/d Other, Haraway ( 1992) introduces 
the former slave woman Sojourner Truth, who was a speaker for feminism and 
abolitionism and famous for her 1 851 speech in Akron, Ohio. In preparation of 
her discussion of Sojourner Truth as historical figure, but also metaphorical 
figure of poststructuralist woman, Haraway (1992b: 91 ), raises the following 
questions: 
What kind of sign is Sojourner Truth - forcibly transported, without a 
home, without proper name, unincorporated into the discourse of 
(white) womanhood, raped by her owner, forcibly mated with another 
slave, robbed of her children, and doubted even in the anatomy of her 
body? 
The name "Sojourner Truth" signifies "someone who could never be at home, for 
whom truth was displacement from home" (Haraway, 1992b: 92). These 
qualities of not being static or fixed, but always becoming are distinct to the 
lnappropriate/d Other. The reason why Sojourner Truth is such a compelling 
figure is because she embodies the recognition that "the essential Truth would 
never settle down; that was her specificity. S/he was not everyman; s/he was 
inappropriate/d" (Haraway, 1992b: 92-93). 
The lnappropriate/d Other is further illuminated by the closing words of the 
famous speech that Truth delivers at a woman's rights convention in Ohio in 
1851. It ends with the words "ain't I a woman?" a phrase which "bristles with 
irony" as "the identity of woman is both claimed and deconstructed 
simultaneously" (Haraway, 1992b: 96). This utterance affirms the identity of 
woman/other whilst subverting it at the same time, throwing it open to new and 
different meanings. Also, confronting her public in her capacity as black woman, 
toughened by the work she had to do as slave, she challenges the dominant 
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associations of womanhood with whiteness, fragility and innocence - an image 
that evokes male protection (Prins, 1994: 73). 
What's more is at a later stage it was made known that this phrase was 
incorrectly transcribed. Consistent with the multiple meanings that her name 
signifies, Sojourner Truth's words "aren't I a woman?" makes us "rethink her 
story", and as Haraway puts it, "the difference matters", and in more ways than 
one (Haraway, 1992b: 97). Not only does it throw a different light on the 
specific identity of Sojourner Truth, but also the meaning of the lnappropriateld 
Other as model for female subjectivity itself is deepened. The resistance to 
fixation and the impossibility of fixed and final definitions is reinforced by this 
shift from the singular "ain't" to the plural "ar'n't". This signals the complexly 
differentiated character of the lnappropriateld Other, emphasising the multiplicity 
of differences between and also within women. The figure of Sojourner Truth as 
the lnappropriateld Other, embodies what Teresa de Lauretis (1990) has named 
the "eccentric subject": a notion of the female subject that moves beyond her 
dualist constructed identity by affirming otherness whilst at the same time being 
in critical excess of this otherness. This recognition of difference opens up the 
way for the recognition and accommodation of a broader range of differences. 
She (De Lauretis, 1990: 116) writes: 
That, I will argue, is precisely where the particular discursive and 
epistemological character of feminist theory resides: its being at once 
inside its own social and discursive determinations, and yet also 
outside and excessive of them. This recognition marks a further 
moment in feminist theory, its current stage of reconceptualisation 
and elaborations of new terms; a reconceptualisation of the subject 
as shifting and multiply organized across variable axes of difference; a 
rethinking of the relations between forms of oppression and modes of 
resistance and agency . . . an emerging redefinition of marginality as 
location of identity as disidentification (my emphasis, FM). 
Another instance of an lnappropriateld Other identity, is Chela Sandoval's ( 1984) 
notion of "women of colour". Haraway describes this as "a hopeful model of 
political identity called "oppositional consciousness", born of the skills of reading 
webs of power by those who refused stable membership in the social categories 
of race, sex and class" (Haraway, 1991: 155). Women of colour is 
. . . a name contested at its origins by those whom it would 
incorporate, as well as historical consciousness marking systematic 
breakdown of all the signs of Man in "Western" traditions, constructs 
a kind of postmodernist identity out of otherness, difference and 
specificity (Haraway, 1991: 155). 
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The use of the plural "women" is a first indication that this conception of the 
female feminist subject is not universal, fixed and stable, but one that allows for, 
and accommodates differences between women and within women themselves. 
Moreover, it is pointed out that there lacks "any essential criterion" for 
identifying who is a woman of color. Membership to a collectivity such as 
"women of colour" is "conscious appropriation of negation" (Haraway, 
1991:156). Multiple, heterogeneous and highly differentiated, Haraway (1991: 
197) writes that "women of colour" as instance of the lnappropriate/d Other, 
denotes a "potent subjectivity synthesized from fusions of outsider identities" 
(Haraway, 1991: 174). 
At this point, the reader might be asking him or herself of what significance the 
preceding discussion of Haraway's endorsement of the lnappropriate/d Other as 
alternative (female) feminist subject is to the rethinking of an ecological feminist 
notion of the self. In the next section, titled "The situated self", I hope to bring 
to light the interconnectedness between the different notions of the self that 
populate Haraway's texts as well as their relevance to ecological feminist 
thinking. 
3.2 The situated self 
The notion of the situated self comes to the fore in the context of Haraway's 
reflection upon and engagement with the epistemological question of objective 
knowledge. In this discussion of Haraway's understanding of objectivity, the 
situated self is proposed as alternative to the apparently neutral "knowing 
subject" that features in rationalist epistemological thinking. A rearticulation of 
"objectivity" transforms not only the subject of knowledge, but also the object 
of knowledge: nature is redefined. By way of giving an exposition of her 
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understanding of objectivity, Haraway rewrites the knowing subject as situated, 
and she reconceptualises nature as Coyote Trickster. The ecological feminist 
significance of these notions of the self and nature will become evident during 
the course of this discussion. Brought in relation with the notions of the cyborg 
and lnappropriate/d Other, its relevance to an inquiry into a rearticulation of an 
ecological feminist notion of self is illuminated. 
In her essay on objective knowledge, Haraway (1991: 184-191) shows how, for 
different but related reasons, given that they are mirror images of each other, 
both empiricism and constructivism are inadequate epistemologies. Empiricism's 
pretense to universally valid knowledge is criticised for being totalitarian whilst 
radical constructivism is shown to effect a lapse into relativism. According to 
Haraway (1991: 189), universalism is unacceptable because it entails a "god 
trick" that insists on "seeing everything from nowhere", or as Prins (1994:58) 
translates it "being everywhere whilst claiming to be nowhere". Concurrently its 
opposite, relativism, is also inadequate given that it represents "a way of being 
nowhere while claiming to be everywhere equally" (Haraway, 1991: 191 ). 
Whilst rejecting empiricism's pretense to "objectivity" in its universalist scientific 
knowledge claims, Haraway refuses to buy into the cynicism of radical 
constructivism. Since the assumption that we have im-mediate access to the 
world around us has been exposed to be an illusion, the claim that knowledge is 
discovered loses its credibility. Rather, argues the radical constructivist, 
knowledge is produced, thus rendering all knowledge claims equally valid, and 
what eventually passes off as knowledge is simply a matter of power. 16 
In acknowledgement of the constructivist insight that we do indeed not have im-
mediate access to the world, Haraway points out the "rich and historically 
specific mediations through which we and everybody else must know the 
world". Resisting a full blown constructivism she argues for a position that 
allows us "to think that our appeals to real worlds are more than a desperate 
16 Haraway would of course be the last person to deny the significant role that power plays in 
the production and establishment of knowledge, but as we will see, Haraway (1991: 185) 
rejects the assumption that we cannot make claims about "the real world". Moreover, in this 
context, Haraway's (1990, 1991, 1992a) constant reference to and emphasis on democratic 
structures and institutions are of particular relevance. 
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lurch away from cynicism and an act of faith like any other cult' s". 17 As such 
then, Haraway (1991: 185) wants to hold on to both ends of the pole: radical 
constructivism and critical empiricism. That is, she attempts to carve out a 
space which permits us to still come up with what Haraway refers to as "faithful 
accounts of the world". According to Haraway however, these accounts -
because we do not have un-mediated access to the world - can only be objective 
if we acknowledge the specific and embodied character, that is situatedness of 
knowledge claims (Haraway, 1991: 188). 
To illustrate what she means by such a notion of objectivity, Haraway 
announces that the time has come for a switch of metaphors. In defiance of the 
predatory masculinist gaze that "scientific objectivity" denotes, Haraway sets 
out to reappropriate "vision" and to disengage it from its association with the 
detached, disembodied, penetrating scientific gaze to a concept that serves as 
metaphor for the non-neutrality of objective knowledge. She (Haraway, 1991: 
188) writes: 
I would like to insist on the embodied nature of all vision, and so 
reclaim the sensory system that has been used to signify a leap out 
of the marked body and into the conquering gaze from nowhere. This 
is the gaze that mythically inscribes all the marked bodies, that makes 
the unmarked category claim the power to see and not be seen, to 
represent while escaping representation. This gaze signifies the 
unmarked positions of Man and White, one of the many nasty tones 
of the word objectivity to feminist ears in scientific and technological, 
late industrial, militarized, racist and male dominant societies 
(emphasis Haraway's). 
A dualistically construed notion of vision is thus starkly set off against how 
Haraway wants to reinterpret and employ the term. The gaze signifies the power 
to look, pin down and control and has historically had (and still has) the 
seduction of total mastery, for being untouchable, indebted or answerable to no 
17 Aligning herself "with those of us who would still like to talk about reality with more 
confidence than we allow the Christian Right's discussion of the Second Coming" Haraway 
reminds the reader of the potentially negative consequences of a radical constructivism taken 
to its extreme: that is a position that breaks completely with the notion "reality" (Haraway, 
1991 :185). 
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one. 18 In response to this fantasy of total control and by invoking her rejection of 
universalism, Haraway hints at the physical/material/social disasters that the 
dream of the disembodied gaze realises: 
But of course that view of infinite vision is an illusion, a god-trick. I 
would like to suggest how our insisting metaphorically on the 
particularity and embodiment of all vision (though not necessarily 
organical embodiment and including technological mediation), and not 
giving in to the tempting myths of vision as a route to disembodiment 
and second-birthing, allows us to construct a usable, but not an 
innocent doctrine of objectivity ... So not so perversely, objectivity 
turns out to be about particular and specific embodiment, and 
definitely not about the false vision promising transcendence of all 
limits and responsibility (Haraway, 1991: 189, 190). 
To acknowledge the embodiedness of vision denotes for Haraway the 
impossibility of taking in a neutral stance. 19 This however, is not to endorse 
relativism. The key word here is "responsibility": it is only in our willingness to 
be held accountable "for what we learn how to see", that we can claim for 
knowledge to be objective (Haraway, 1991: 190). It follows then that "only 
partial perspective promises objective vision" because an acknowledgement of 
one's locatedness is to acknowledge that that one's view is partial, in both 
senses of the word: necessarily incomplete and biased (Prins, 1994: 59). It is 
this concession that "initiate[s], rather than closes off the problem of 
responsibility" (Haraway, 1991: 190). 20 
In their failure to meet this requirement, the inadequacy of universalism and 
18 Here Haraway's critique of the scientific gaze as masculine and knowledge employed to 
establish power over, control and mastery, links up with the cultural and critical-transformative 
ecofeminist critiques of Western science and Cartesian-Newtonian thinking as sanctioning the 
domination and control of nature and women. 
19111umination of the meaning of the term embodiedness is called for here. Embodied 
subjectivity makes visible the "biocultural" and "empirical" aspects of subjectivity, which brings 
to light the material and symbolic situatedness of the self. Embodiedness therefore 
emphasises the corporeality of subjectivity, which in turn reminds of our mortality and our 
dependence on nature for survival. 
20 Here it can be noted that Haraway (1991: 192) qualifies this statement further and asserts 
that not "any partial perspective will do", but that "acknowledged and self-critical partiality" 
must be accompanied by a commitment to construct knowledge that generates "worlds less 
organized by axes of domination". For Haraway, the production of knowledge therefore has a 
particular ethical and political dimension. 
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relativism is revealed: "both deny the stakes in location, embodiment and partial 
perspective, both make it impossible to see well" (Haraway, 1991: 191 ). Given 
its pretensions to neutrality, universalism's totalising, but impoverished "single 
vision" whose power "depends on systematic narrowing and obscuring", refuses 
and makes impossible being held accountable from the outset. Relativism, too, in 
its "being nowhere while claiming to be everywhere equally" resists critical 
engagement. Haraway remarks that "[t]he 'equality' of positioning is a denial of 
responsibility and critical inquiry" (Haraway, 1991: 191); 
In her call for situated, embodied knowledges as opposed to "various forms of 
unlocatable, and so irresponsible knowledge claims", Haraway (1991: 191) 
distinguishes her notion of situatedness from an interpretation of situatedness as 
coinciding with the identity politics endorsed by Harding (1987). Haraway's 
critique of Harding's position is double edged. According to Haraway, although 
the perspectives of the subjugated are appealing because they promise a more 
adequate, sustained, objective and transforming account of the world, great care 
must be taken not to romanticise the view of the other. The positionings of the 
subjugated are not "exempt form critical re-examination, decoding, 
deconstruction" and she points out, "how to see from below" requires certain 
skills which make the critical difference (Haraway, 1991: 192). She writes: 
A commitment to mobile positioning and to passionate detachment is 
dependent on the impossibility of innocent "identity" politics and 
epistemologies as strategies for seeing from the standpoints of the 
subjugated in order to see well. One cannot "be" either a cell or a 
molecule - or a woman, colonized person, laborer, and so on - if one 
intends to see and to see from these positions critically. "Being" is 
much more problematic and contingent ... These points also apply to 
testimony of the position of oneself. We are not immediately present 
to ourselves. Self-identity is a bad visual system. Fusion is a bad 
strategy of positioning (Haraway, 1991: 192). 
Not only is the assumption that the view from below is necessarily better 
departed from, the existence of such a position is also challenged. Otherness 
too, is shot through with difference. This brings us to another reason why 
situatedness for Haraway does not denote identity politics. In the same way that 
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the illusion of self-identity is oppressive in that it obliterates difference by 
appropriating and ordering all difference, claiming to see from the perspective of 
the other can have the same effect. ~~Identifying" with the other, holds the 
danger of appropriating the view of the less powerful and thus subsuming the 
view of the other. 21 In the above citation, Haraway is playing on the impossibility 
of the existence of any pure or singular identity. In the light of this recognition of 
the heterogeneity of the other Haraway shows that the continued belief in the 
possibility of taking on the identity of the other, is best departed from, given that 
this results in a strategy of fusion that is part and parcel of a system of thinking 
that is reductionist and exclusivist. 
Moreover, as noted, situatedness understood in terms of identity politics is 
rejected because it reinforces existing differences between groups of identities 
(Prins, 1994: 65). Haraway proceeds to question and challenge the existence of 
any such pure identities. The situatedness of the self that Haraway has in mind 
is not readily definable, it is a complex, heterogeneous self that is not simply 
other. Subverting and deconstructing any notion of the fixed and pure other, 
Haraway repeats her distrust and departure of the situated self conceived of in 
oppositional terms. She (Haraway, 1991: 193) writes: 
There is no way to 11 be" simultaneously in all or wholly in any of the 
privileged (subjugated) positions structured by gender, race, nation 
and class. And that is a short list of critical positions. The search for 
such a "full" and total position is the search for the fetishized perfect 
subject of oppositional history, sometimes appearing in feminist 
theory as the essentialized Third World Woman. Subjugation is no 
ground for ontology; it might be a visual clue. 22 
The situated self is thus a self that is heterogeneous and incapable of being 
squashed into isomorphic slots or cumulative lists. The situated self is one that 
moves beyond oppositional identities, and instead of taking in a position of self-
21 Here the "other'" refers to and invokes the other of the Western feminist, the Third World 
woman. Haraway uses the concept of the "other" also to designate both women's otherness 
and the difference and otherness amongst women themselves. 
22What this quote seems to suggest is, that although Haraway wants to distinguish her 
position from an "identity politics" one, a complete break is not made. As Prins (1994: 66) has 
noted, Haraway continues to endorse an identity politics to the extent that this has a 
transformative effect on existing identities. That is that identities are destabilised and recoded 
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identity, it is marked by a critical positioning (Haraway, 1991: 193). What 
Haraway wants to achieve here is to articulate a notion of the knowing subject 
that departs from the illusion of self-identity by throwing open identities to affirm 
critical difference, multiplicity and fragmentation: 
The knowing self is partial in all its guises, never finished, perfect, 
whole, simply there and original; it is always stitched together 
imperfectly, and therefore able to join with another, to see together 
without claiming to be another. Here is the promise of objectivity: a 
scientific knower seeks the subject position not of identity but of 
objectivity; that is, partial connection (Haraway 1991: 193, emphasis 
Haraway's). 
It is in the acknowledgement that the knowing self is not one, identical to itself, 
that connection with the other is made possible. Approaching the other out of 
this location of difference, the illusion of identification that obliterates the other 
makes way for a notion of connection that is best described as "passionate 
detachment": joining with the other without obliterating the difference of the 
other (Haraway, 1991: 1 ). 
This brings us to Haraway's rearticulation of the object of knowledge, nature, 
traditionally conceived of as brute matter, either appropriated as resource "for 
the instrumentalist projects of destructive Western societies" or serving as 
metaphor in discourses that express the interests of the dominating class 
(Haraway, 1991: 197). In contrast to this conception of "nature", Haraway 
insists that nature, on both material and conceptual levels, ceases to fulfill the 
role of resource, screen or ground. Instead, Haraway envisions nature as active 
actor that subverts and destabilises the human/nature and subject/object 
dualisms in particular (Haraway, 1990, 1-5; 1991: 197-205). This destabilisation 
of boundaries and affirmation of the other as independent agent challenges the 
self-understanding of the master and therefore also what counts as self-
realisation: 
Acknowledging the agency of the world in knowledge makes room 
for some unsettling possibilities, including a sense of the world's 
in the interaction with others. 
independent sense of humour. Such a sense of humor is not 
comfortable for humanists and others committed to the world as 
resource (Haraway, 1991: 199). 
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Departing from the tendency of some cultural ecofeminists to visualise nature as 
"primal mother", Haraway (1991: 176) suggests the Coyote or Trickster as 
image to refigure nature as witty agentY The Coyote is an animal that can not 
be pinned down and controlled, it is evasive and resilient and survives because it 
can retreat into geographical areas that are completely inaccessible to humans. 
For this reason it is a trickster, forever playing pranks on humans who attempt to 
pin down and control it: 
The Coyote or Trickster, embodied in American Southwest Indian 
accounts, suggest our situation when we give up mastery but keep 
searching for fidelity, knowing all the while we will be hoodwinked. 
Feminist objectivity makes room for surprises and ironies at the heart 
of knowledge production; we are not in charge of the world. We just 
live here and strike up non-innocent conversations . . . (Haraway, 
1991: 199).24 
Locating agency on the side of nature has far reaching implications. Liberated 
from the status of mere matter to material-semiotic actor that generates 
meaning/5 the subject/object dualism is effectively subverted. Conceiving of 
nature as agent or actor, some notion of continuity between humans and nature 
is established that subverts the human/nature nature dualism. 26 Conceiving of 
nature as agent can contribute to transforming the domination and 
instrumentalisation that characterises human treatment of the natural 
environment. However, it remains to be seen whether locating agency on the 
23 The Coyote Trickster is a mythical character in American Indian folklore. It is a character 
that can change from human to animal to spirit, comfortably moving between the boundaries 
of the human, animal and spiritual worlds. 
24 Haraway's use of the Coyote Trickster with reference to both "nature" and "the world" can 
be confusing. In my understanding this is to emphasise that objects of knowledge are actors, 
and that these actors are both human and non-human. Taking this into account makes this 
interchangeable use of the figure of the Coyote Trickster becomes less jarring. Given the 
focus of my project however, I focus on the Coyote Trickster as signifying the natural 
environment. At the same time using these terms in such a broad sense is somewhat 
disconcerting, as everything in ''the world" seems to enjoy the same moral status, both the 
rainforest and the bulldozer. 
25 In the next section titled A politics of articulation, this point will be further elaborated upon. 
26 This understanding is shared by Alaimo (1994: 144-146, 150). 
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side of nature in the manner that Haraway does, is in fact sufficient to ensure 
the ethical treatment of the natural environment. 27 
4. A politics of articulation 
In the preceding section titled "Refiguring the self", I have discussed the 
different notions of the self that can be identified in Haraway's work, namely the 
cyborg, the lnappropriate/d Other and the situated self. That such a rearticulation 
of the self necessarily has implications for how nature is conceived is evident, 
especially in the case of the situated self, which is accompanied by a 
reconceptualisation of nature as Coyote or Trickster. 
Having entered the domain of ecological thinking, Haraway proceeds to elaborate 
upon her understanding of nature in a discussion of what she refers to as a 
politics of articulation. Haraway's politics of articulation is consistent with two 
different but related notions of nature, the one being a notion of nature as 
artifactual, and the other a conception of nature as social nature. The difference 
and connections between these two notion are discussed in detail in the sections 
below, titled "Nature as artifact", and "Politics and social nature". Rather than 
offering her audience an ethic that can serve as guideline in our treatment of the 
natural environment, Haraway formulates a politics of articulation instead. In the 
following section then, I give an exposition of Haraway's politics of articulation, 
central to which lies a particular notion of nature. 
4. 1 Nature as artifact 
In the opening paragraphs of her discussion of the concept of nature, Haraway, 
following Spivak, asserts that nature is "that which we cannot not desire" 
(Haraway, 1992a: 296). Despite our awareness of nature's construction as other 
and its deployment in the histories of sexism, racism, colonialism and class 
dominations, "we nonetheless find in this problematic, ethno-specific, long-lived 
and mobile concept something we cannot do without, but can never have" 
(Haraway, 1992a: 296, emphasis mine, FM). This, what appears to be a 
27 This matter will receive further attention in the last section of this chapter that consists of an 
evaluation of Haraway's notions of the self, nature and politics. 
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paradoxical statement, gives us a glimpse of Haraway's understanding of nature. 
Contrary to the manner in which nature has traditionally been conceived, 
Haraway holds that nature cannot be represented, pinned down, its essence 
captured. Nonetheless, it is a "topic of public discourse" that imparts an 
authority "on which much turns, even the earth" (Haraway, 1992a: 296). Here 
Haraway is explicitly alluding to the extent to which our understanding of nature 
affects our treatment of nature (and others), and also our understanding of 
selves. Notwithstanding the impossibility of fixed and final meanings then, how 
we conceive of nature has far reaching implications that are determining for the 
continued existence of our natural environment that sustains us. 
This prompts Haraway to argue that the time has come to envision and articulate 
a different relationship with nature than the one that has thus far been our 
cultural heritage. Marked by "reification, possession, appropriation and 
nostalgia" (Haraway, 1990: 65), this is relationship is coterminous with the 
Western endeavour to essentialise nature, "to stabilize, and materialize nature, to 
police its/her boundaries" (Haraway, 1992a: 296). In the light of escalating 
environmental degradation and destruction and the deconstruction of dualism 
and fixed essences, this relation is indeed in critical need of transformation and 
change. 
For Haraway the widespread, albeit divergent conceptions of nature that 
circulate in Western culture are all different expressions of the relationship with 
nature that is described above. The prevailing images and references to nature 
that abound, are all drenched in an understanding of nature that bears witness to 
an essentialist and dualistically construed conceptualisation of nature. Scathingly 
critical of these images of nature, Haraway ventures forth to reveal the 
underlying mechanisms of these seemingly innocent projections of nature. 
Commencing with a reminder that the images of nature that circulate in Western 
culture coincides with a brutal colonial history, she writes: 
Efforts to travel into nature become tourist excursions that remind the 
voyager of the price of such displacements - one pays to see 
fun house reflections of oneself. Efforts to preserve nature in parks 
remain fatally troubled by the ineradicable mark of the founding 
expulsion of those who used to live there not as innocents in a 
garden, but as people for whom the categories nature and culture 
were not the salient ones (Haraway, 1992a: 296). 
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By revealing that nature as culture and the human's other is an artificial 
construction - a projected image of the self which necessarily requires an act of 
repression - the concept of nature is deconstructed. Haraway also illustrates 
how a conception of nature as opposite to culture and humans - as entity out 
there - lays the ground for losing sight of physical nature altogether. In apparent 
recognition of the inherent value of nature, grand attempts are being made to 
"save nature" and treasure nature's "diversity". The irony of seemingly 
commendable actions such as these are fully revealed when they are placed next 
to and contrasted with the continued systematic destruction of physical nature. 
Signifiying a complete disconnectedness form nature, the misguidedness of 
projects of this kind becomes intolerable. The nature that is referred to here is 
the nature that we (and especially those who neither have access to large bank 
accounts, nor any use for nature stored away) are dependent upon for survival, 
and whose destruction is facilitated by institutions that profess to assist 
progress and development. Haraway (1992a: 296) writes: 
Expensive projects to collect nature's diversity and bank it seems to 
produce debased coin, impoverished seeds, and dusty relics. As the 
banks hypertrophy, the nature that feeds the storehouses 
"disappears". The World Bank's record on environmental destruction 
is exemplary in this regard. Finally the projects for representing and 
enforcing human "nature" are famous for their imperializing essences, 
most recently reincarnated in the Human Genome Project. 
The latter signals a final instance of the appropriative impulse that accompanies 
an essentialist notion of nature. Constructed as essence to be discovered and 
captured, nature is reduced to the status of object. In this way nature remains 
no more than an instrument in the realisation of man's self-obsessed desire to 
have nature under total control, or differently formulated - to have complete 
control over "human nature". In conclusion, Haraway (1992a: 296) criticises the 
different roles that nature has historically fulfilled as other, and declares them 
obsolete: 
So, nature is not a physical place to which one can go, nor a treasure 
to fence in or bank, nor as essence to be saved or violated. Nature is 
not hidden and so does not need to be unveiled. Nature is not a text 
to be read in the codes of mathematics and biomedicine. It is not the 
'other' who offers origin, replenishment, and service. Neither mother, 
nurse nor slave, nature is not matrix, resource or tool for the 
reproduction of man. 
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Rejecting, and wanting to move away from and beyond these very problematic 
images of "pure other" which operate to the (short-term) advantage of nobody 
but the master, Haraway proposes a different conceptualisation of nature as 
artifact. Quick to distinguish her position from a very crude form of postmodern 
artifactualism, Haraway distances herself from a form of hyper-productionism, 
according to which nature is viewed as fully malleable. Hyper-productionism is 
the logical consequence of a transcendental realism, according to which nature 
is pure other that can be discovered and known. The drama that is enacted upon 
this stage however, is one where there is only one actor and that is the self who 
projects a reflection (an oppositional at that) of himself upon what he sees as 
screen that is being deciphered. At the point where nature's agency is denied to 
the extent that it becomes the blank slate that only receives inscriptions, we are 
confronted with hyper-productionism, which renders physical nature obsolete. 28 
This state of affairs signifies the culminating point of Western 
anthropocentrism. 29 In a hyper-productionist world the illusion is suffered from 
that, having now lost even its use value, nature is totally dispensable as it can 
be replicated at will. In defense of her specific understanding of artifactualism 
and how it contrasts with hyper-productionism, and illuminating what two 
seemingly opposing positions such as hyper-productionism and transcendental 
naturalism have in common, Haraway ( 1992a: 297) writes: 
This is a very different vision from the postmodernist observation that 
all the world is denatured and reproduced in images or replicated in 
28 In thls discussion it is succinctly demonstrated how the material welfare of nature is 
crucially tied up with our understanding of the concept of nature. 
29 Taking this critique of anthropocentrism further, Haraway identifies and elaborates upon the 
relation between hyper-productionism and humanism. She (1992a: 297) writes: 
"[p]roductionism and its corollary, humanism, come down to the story line that man makes 
everything, including himself, out of the world that can only be resource and potency to his 
project and active agency". 
copies. That specific kind of violent reductive artifactualism, in the 
form of hyper-productionism, actually practiced widely throughout the 
planet becomes contestable in theory and other kinds of praxis, 
without recourse to a resurgent transcendental naturalism. Hyper-
productionism refuses the witty agency of all the actors but One; that 
is a dangerous strategy - for everybody. But transcendental 
naturalism also refuses a world full of cacophonous agencies and 
settles for mirror image sameness that only pretends to difference 
(emphasis Haraway's). 
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Having stated the reasons for rejecting a conceptualisation of nature in either 
transcendental realist or hyper-productionist terms, Haraway's notion of 
artifactuality calls for further illumination. Not shying away from constructivism 
altogether, Haraway (1992a: 297) writes that 
for us, nature is made, as both fiction and fact. If organisms are 
natural objects, it is crucial to remember that organisms are not born; 
they are made in world-changing techno-scientific practices by 
particular collective actors in particular times and places. 
Artifactualism alludes to the discursive character of nature which instead of 
being "discovered", comes into being at specific times in specific contexts. This 
however is not the last word: that Haraway's position is to be distinguished from 
an anthropocentric one, and taken to its extreme, a productionist one - is also 
crucial. The distinctive feature that marks the artifactuality of nature, is who the 
participants in this endeavour of constructing nature are. Haraway overcomes 
anthropocentrism by refiguring the parties involved in the construction of nature. 
This is achieved in a movement beyond the dualist constructions of culture and 
nature, and humans and nature that gives new meaning to who and what we 
perceive as actors. She (Haraway, 1992a: 297) writes: 
The actors are not all "us". If the world exists for us as nature, this 
designates a kind of relationship, an achievement among many 
actors, not all of them human, not all of them organic, not all of them 
technological. In its scientific embodiments as well as other forms 
nature is made, but not entirely by humans; it is a co-construction 
amongst humans and non-humans. 
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Tearing through the human/nature dualism, nature's status as object is 
surmounted and refigured as active agent. Here the image of nature as "Coyote 
Trickster" ( 1991) as "material-semiotic actor" whereby nature is imaged as 
actively generating meaning, is recalled (Haraway, 1991, 1992a: 298). Doing 
away with the assumption that nature is an entity that exists separately from 
humans, Haraway states that nature's boundaries are established in the 
interaction between humans and non-humans, she writes: 
Objects, like bodies, do not pre-exist as such. Similarly, nature cannot 
pre-exist as such ... Nature is a commonplace, a powerful discursive 
construction, effected in the interactions among material-semiotic 
actors, human and not (Haraway, 1992a: 298). 
Faithful to her commitment of acknowledging and engaging with nature on 
conceptual and material levels and showing how they are bound up with each 
other, Haraway shifts her focus to another aspect of nature as part of our 
everyday environment. In her discussion of social nature Haraway brings 
together the social with the natural. In what follows I discuss Haraway's notion 
of social nature and its political implication referred to as a politics of 
articulation. 
4.2 Politics and social nature 
Displaying similar features, the concepts of nature as "social" and "artifactual" 
meet and reinforce each other in Haraway's politics of articulation. Similar to the 
view of nature as artifact, the conceptualisation of nature as social nature 
diverges from a conception of nature "out there" and in need of re-presentation. 
As such, the concept of social nature links up with the artifactuality of nature in 
which the rigid separations that mark the human/nature and culture/nature 
dualisms are transcended. As part of the movement away from an essentialist 
and dualist representability of nature, the notion of social nature promotes a 
politics of articulation as opposed to a politics of representation. 
Introducing us to a particular approach to environmental politics, Haraway 
argues that the difference between conceiving of nature as social nature and 
conceiving nature as entity out there waiting to be discovered and represented, 
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is justice. To illustrate her point, Haraway contrasts a politics of "saving nature" 
with a politics of "social nature". The former is riddled with images of nature as 
empty space, pure, "uncontaminated" by humans, national parks and walled off 
reserves being exemplary in this regard. Picking up on an earlier reference to the 
injustices that accompanied the construction of these images of nature, she cites 
the Amazonian rain forests as example of such a construction. Only after the 
greater proportion of what had originally amounted to six to twelve million 
indigenous people had been "sickened, enslaved, killed, and otherwise displaced 
from along the rivers, could Europeans represent Amazonia as "empty" of 
culture, as "nature", or, in later terms, as a purely "biological" entity (Haraway, 
1992a: 309). 
In opposition to the above conception of nature which effects a politics of 
"saving nature", Haraway endorses the concept of social nature as designating 
an altogether "different organization of land and people" (Haraway, 1992a: 
309). "Social nature" alludes to a concept of nature where nature is not 
conceived in isolation from culture or humans, but as habitat, which throws a 
different light on how addressing environmental issues should be approached. 
Such a notion of nature paves the way for a politics not of representation where 
nature is spoken for, but of articulation, where all interest groups are given a 
voice. The point Haraway wants to make is that in the same way that social 
nature is a more just image of nature, a politics of articulation is a more just way 
of practicing politics, and the suggestion is made that this will generate just 
decisions and consequences. 
The operations and effects of a politics of representation in opposition to a 
politics of articulation are illustrated as follows. Integral to the discourse of 
"saving nature", are images and agents that are employed "to represent, to 
reflect, to echo, to act as ventriloquist for the 'other'" (Haraway, 1992a: 309). 
A politics of representation employs a dualistically conceived notion of nature as 
devoid of agency, which evokes echoes of Marx that "they cannot represent 
themselves, that they must be represented". Such a politics of representation is 
however more likely to erase the other and obliterate the interests of others 
(Haraway, 1992a: 308). Losing sight of the fact that "nature" exists not in a 
vacuum, but as part of a specific context, those who are in closest proximity to 
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nature are depicted as posing the greatest threat to "nature". In Haraway's 
discussion, the jaguar and fetus are employed as examples of nature. She 
(Haraway, 1992a: 311) writes: 
The effectiveness of such representation depends on distancing 
operations. The represented must be disengaged from surrounding 
and constituting discursive and non-discursive nexuses and relocated 
in the authorial domain of the representative. Indeed the effect of this 
magical operation is to disempower precisely those - in our case, the 
pregnant woman and the peoples of the forest - who are close to the 
now represented "natural" object. Both the jaguar and the fetus are 
reconstituted as objects of a particular kind - as the ground or the 
representational practice that forever authorizes the ventriloquist 
The represented is reduced to the permanent status of recipient of 
action, never to be co-actor in an articulated practice among unlike, 
but joined social partners (my emphasis, FM). 
In its failure to acknowledge the social aspect (and by implication, artifactuality) 
of nature, a politics of representation has a silencing effect in its acts of 
objectification. Here it is necessary to emphasise that the claim to articulate 
derives not from "being" nature, nor having the power to speak for nature but to 
articulate from a position of relationality. 30 Haraway conveys this point 
succinctly when she discusses how a defense of nature grounded in social 
nature differs from a defense grounded in a dualistically conceived notion of 
nature. Here, she is referring to the different groups of peoples of the Amazonian 
forests whose fight to protect nature is a significant example of a politics of 
articulation as opposed to representation: 
Their position as defenders derive not from a concept of "nature 
under threat", but rather form a relationship with [the forest as the 
protective covering in their own elemental struggle to survive]. In 
other words, their authority derives not from the power to represent 
from a distance, nor from an ontological natural status, but from a 
30 That Haraway's (1992a: 31) notion of relationality is not a limited or limiting one, is 
conveyed by her assertion that "assuredly North Americans, Europeans and the Japanese 
among others, cannot watch from afar as if we were not actors, willing or not, in the life and 
death struggles of the Amazon". At the same time, I am not hesitant to stress that this is a 
constitutive social relationality in which the forest is an integral 
partner, part of natural/social embodiment. In their claims for 
authority over the fate of the forest the resident peoples are 
articulating a social collective entity among humans, other organisms, 
and other kinds of non-human actors (Haraway, 1992a: 31 0). 
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From the above it is clear that social nature is intertwined with and gives 
expression to artifactual nature. She ( 1992a: 31 0) elaborates further: 
Social nature is the nexus I have called artifactual nature. The human 
"defenders of the forest" do not and have not lived in a garden; it is 
from a knot in the always historical and heterogeneous nexus of 
social nature that they articulate their claims. Or perhaps it is within 
such a nexus that I and people like me narrate a possible politics of 
articulation rather than representation. 
Here Haraway's story comes full circle, which brings us to what in my mind is 
suggestive of the ethic (albeit a very slim one indeed), that runs through 
Haraway's figuration of nature. If we recall her initial citation of Spivak's phrase 
that nature is "that which we cannot not desire", this is illuminated somewhat. 
We cannot represent nature, because representation depends on possession of a 
"passive resource, a silent object, a stripped actant" (Haraway, 1992a: 313). It 
is therefore suggested that for Haraway, to engage ethically with nature an 
acknowledgement of nature beyond these terms is required. By figuring nature 
as artifactual, social nature, nature is released from its status as object, thus 
challenging our illusion of having the power over nature, and ability or authority 
to represent nature. Her promotion of artifactual nature signals a rejection of the 
pretense that we can know nature in the sense of discovering the objective facts 
about nature, the essence of nature. This is not to suggest that we can not learn 
about nature, but this knowledge of artifactual social nature is a co-construction 
effected by human and non-human actors. In the awareness that we are dealing 
with the Coyote Trickster, our knowledge and authority is therefore always 
relativised somewhat, in that it is never fixed nor final, but always provisional. In 
conclusion then, Haraway ( 1992a: 312) suggests that to address the destruction 
of the natural environment, we must not move "back to nature" as in empty 
relationality that is not untouched by differences. 
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wilderness, which implies an adherence to "philosophical realism", rather, she 
maintains, "where we must move is not 'back' to nature but elsewhere, through 
and within artifactual social nature". In this way, the dualist conception of 
nature is destabilised, and through such a non-dualist conception of nature, a 
more inclusive environmental politics, consisting out of a range of (complexly 
differentiated) voices is facilitated. 
Having discussed Haraway's politics of articulation which is informed and 
strengthened by her conceptions of nature as Coyote Trickster, artifactual and 
social, I would now like to close this chapter with an evaluation of her 
contributions to a reconceptualisation of the self and nature, along with her 
politics of articulation. 
5. An evaluation of cyber-(eco)feminism 
In the following section I will conduct an evaluation of Haraway's contributions 
towards a reconceptualisation of the self, nature and politics. Notwithstanding 
the fact that Haraway does not articulate a specifically ecological feminist notion 
of the self, that the notions of the self that do feature in her work are of 
ecological and feminist significance, is evident. In this evaluation, I hope to shed 
further light on its relevance by comparing the insights articulated from a cyber-
(eco)feminist perspective with the contributions that are articulated by cultural 
and critical-transformative ecological feminism. In the section titled "An 
assessment of the cyborg" evaluate the figure of the cyborg as it has been 
received by ecological and (eco)feminist thinkers. This is followed by an 
evaluation of the lnappropriate/d Other and the situated self in the section titled 
"An assessment of the lnappropriate/d Other and situated self". What comes to 
the fore here is that these notions of the self can be shown to share significant 
features that act as remedy to some of the shortcomings that the figure of the 
cyborg display. Here other possibilities are opened up regarding aspects of the 
self that the figure of the cyborg fails to contain in a satisfactory manner. If we 
recall, it is also in her discussion of the situated self that we are introduced to a 
significant dimension of Haraway's conception of nature which is evaluated in 
the section titled "Nature as Coyote Trickster". Following this, Haraway's 
politics of articulation, with reference to her concepts of social and artifactual 
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nature is assessed in the section titled "Social nature and a politics of 
articulation". 
5. 1 An assessment of the cyborg 
i) The figure of the cyborg 
The amount of enthusiasm with which the cyborg has been received in some 
feminist circles (Braidotti, 1994a, 1994b; Balsamo, 1996) seems to have been 
tempered somewhat by the caution with which ecological and feminist 
philosophers have greeted the figure of the cyborg. The hesitancy that has been 
expressed pertains to the manner in which the non-dualist character of the figure 
of the cyborg manifests itself. This is apparent in the purported post gender 
character of the cyborg and the world it inhabits. One response is formulated by 
Halsema and Van Lenning (1995: 449) who question the possibility of the 
continued existence of the feminist project if a post gender world is what is 
strived towards, which leads them to question the feminist character of the 
cyborg. 
That Haraway's figuration of the cyborg is prescriptive, but also very much 
descriptive, is also the case. This is emphasised by her repeated assertions that 
the cyborg already exists, that we are all cyborgs (Haraway, 1991 a: 179) and 
that we have no choice but to be cyborgs (Haraway, 1991 b: 68). More so than 
striving towards a world beyond gender, this assertion too gives reason for 
caution. Haraway seems to suggest that we already inhabit a world beyond 
gender, a world beyond dualism.31 This might be so to a certain extent but that 
we continue to live in a society where sex/gender continues to function as 
ordering principle, can hardly be contested. Halsema and Van Lenning (1995: 
453) who assert that for the time being daily reality remains firmly grounded in 
old patterns affirm this. Haraway thus seems to be slightly hasty in her claim 
31 That non-dualism itself offers no guarantee regarding the transformation of traditional 
gender patterns is also pointed out by De Castro (1994: 34-45) who conducts an investigation 
of the use of the Internet. It is in this environment, which is held to be an exemplary space for 
the destabilisation of previously salient dualisms that traditional patterns persist. In this regard 
Halsema and Van Lenning (1995: 450) remark that even in virtual reality, traditional gender 
patterns prevail. 
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that we already live in a world that is beyond dualism and beyond gender. 32 
It has also been remarked that maintaining that we live in a post gender world is 
damaging to feminism and feminist politics as this functions to undermine the 
ability to speak about women (Aicoff, 1988). That this is indeed the case is true. 
This concern is however slightly ameliorated if Haraway's use of the term post 
gender is interpreted not as denying the significance of gender, but as an 
attempt to bring to light the complexities involved when we speak of gender; 
that is that gender is not the only axis of difference that structure identity and 
power relations. Gender is of course only one of a range of differences that we 
need to take heed of when we speak of women (Scott, 1985: 1 075; 1989: 
216), but at the same time it is one that cannot be ignored. In further elaboration 
on this point, Prins observes that Haraway's movement beyond gender is not to 
deny women's agency. She writes: 
Het verlies van een duidelijke sekse-identiteit staat niet gelijk aan het 
verlies van vrouwelijk actorskap. Volgens Haraway is het heel goed 
mogelijk die idee van vaste sekse-identiteiten los te Iaten zonder 
daarmee vrouwen het vermogen te handelen te ontnemen (Prins, 
1994: 65).33 
Thus, a departure from a fixed gender identity is not necessarily undermining to 
feminist politics, and, as we will see at a later stage, it can also be shown to 
enable a more inclusive form of feminist politics. More on this later. 
The cyborg's movement beyond dualism that is manifested in a post gender 
character has received criticism also from an ecological feminist perspective. In 
this regard, Alaimo writes that "ecofeminists reaffirm [the link between women 
and nature] in order to fight for both women and nature" (Alaimo, 1994: 141 ). 
According to Alaimo (1994: 140-150), to embrace the figure of the cyborg 
32 If what Haraway is trying to communicate is that we must strive towards a world where 
gender is no longer a salient ordering principle, how we should envision such a world should 
be elaborated upon in more detail. In the absence of such an explication, it might be asked 
whether Haraway is perhaps not a little hasty here, if she is not skipping a transformative 
moment in her quest to move beyond dualism. As I hope to show, the endorsement of the 
lnappropriate/d Other and situated self does, however, signal such a moment of pause. 
33 Approximate translation: giving up a clear gender identity is not to give up women's agency. 
According to Haraway it is very much possible to let go of fixed gender identities without 
impeding women's agency. 
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would mean that "women give up their privileged ecofeminist position as 
comrades with nature". In Alaimo's view, this is to "abandon a female 
connection with nature" which is irresponsible, as such a leap "to a "post 
gender" environmentalism ignores the interdependent constructions of women 
and nature" (Alaimo, 1994: 149). Illustrating the insufficiency of such a 
disregard of gender, she quotes social ecologist Murray Bookchin (1971: 17), 
saying that "both men and nature have always been common victims of 
hierarchical society". In response, Alaimo points out that an anti hierarchy stance 
thus formulated, is unsatisfactory as "some 'men' have been more consistently 
dominated than others" (Alaimo, 1994: 149). 
I agree with Alaimo that denying a link between the oppression of women and 
nature is indeed irresponsible. I do however hesitate to accept her argument as a 
whole. This pertains to the ambiguity of her statement that women occupy a 
relation of "privileged comradeship" with nature. In this regard I find myself 
asking whether this "comradeship" with nature is indeed a "privilege" that 
should receive uncritical support. Should we not ask how this privilege came 
about? Why are we affirming such a privileged relation, and what are the effects 
of doing so? Is it in either women or nature's interest to perpetuate such a 
privileged relation and to limit the connection with nature to women? What she 
understands to be the connection between women and nature might shed some 
light on this ambiguity. As we have seen a reaffirmation (accompanied by a 
celebration) of the connection between women and nature is potentially self-
undermining for ecofeminists. 
Some ecofeminists do however illuminate this link between women and nature 
as part of a more critical exercise where it is argued that the oppression of the 
one cannot be addressed without addressing the oppression of the other, and 
that both concepts need to be thoroughly transformed. That Alaimo's position is 
compatible with the latter approach, is suggested by her rejection of 
stereotypical conceptions of women and nature that serve to perpetuate the 
domination of the other (Alaimo, 134-138, 149). She also refers to women and 
nature as constructions that need to be rearticulated so that they can continue 
to be "comrades in a struggle that would benefit them both" (Alaimo, 1994: 
149). Having reached some clarity on what Alaimo perceives to be a connection 
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between women and nature, I still have difficulty with her assertion that women 
have a privileged connection with nature. Alaimo seems to suggest that 
endorsing the notion of the cyborg is to give up women's privileged comradeship 
with nature along with the claim that there is a connection between the 
oppression of women and nature. In my view, however, it does not follow that 
because there is a link between the oppression of women and nature, women 
have a relation of privileged comradeship with nature. The soundness of this 
critique as a whole is thrown into doubt. 34 
If endorsing a figure such as the cyborg prevents us from arguing that there is a 
link between the oppression of both women and nature, Alaimo's criticism is in 
my view perfectly legitimate. Whether we should reject the cyborg because it 
makes women's comradeship with nature less self-evident, is another question 
altogether. That is, such a gesture seems to insist on the perpetuation of the 
privileged connection between women and nature, a connection that is dubious 
from the start. Moreover, it can be argued that this would have the effect of 
restricting "true" comradeship with nature to women, a limitation that not only 
grants women a privilege that is suspect, but one that is also counterproductive 
in a political sense, in that this tends to place an uneven burden of responsibility 
on women. It serves to undermine broader involvement in addressing 
environmental affairs and issues and hinders a thorough transformation also of 
the (in masculine terms conceived) self. 
ii} The technophilia of the cyborg 
Despite the amount of space granted to the above evaluation, the post gender 
character of the cyborg can almost be said to be the least problematic aspect of 
the cyborg. Criticism of the figure of the cyborg is not limited to this 
characteristic and takes on a much more serious tone regarding some of its other 
features. Contrary to the general trend in feminist thinking, we have seen that 
34 This questioning of the notion of a "privileged" comradeship is not to deny the necessity to 
think through women's relation with nature, but thus formulated, Alaimo initially seems to be 
hovering onto endorsing an essentialist connection between women and nature, based on 
shared identity. Given the historical and conceptual link between women and nature, I would 
replace the claim of a "privileged" relation with nature, to a "different" relation to nature, a 
difference that warrants both recognition and some degree of compensation. However, this 
relation with nature should not be limited to women either, but all those who have been cast in 
the realm of the other. 
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through the figure of the cyborg, Haraway embraces technology rather than 
wishing away its existence and rejecting it as a whole. This refusal to simply 
demonise technology is of course refreshing. However, whether Haraway can 
allay the fears of those who are severely skeptical of technology, and whether 
she provides adequate measures to exercise effective control of escalating 
technological advancement, remains to be seen. 
From an ecological feminist perspective, concern is expressed with regard to 
what can be described as the overtly "technophilic" character of the cyborg. 
More specifically, it is Haraway's suggestion that a blurring of the human-
machine boundary can contribute to a more responsible engagement with our 
machines that is regarded with suspicion. If we recall, she ( 1991 : 1 80) writes 
that "we can be responsible for our machines; they do not dominate or threaten 
us. We are responsible for boundaries; we are they". In reaction to this, Alaimo 
( 1994: 14 7) points out that "thinking of machines as part of ourselves doesn't 
necessarily mean that the machine won't be worshipped or feared". In Alaimo's 
view, this argument ignores our current cultural context where the blurring of 
the human-machine boundary is already a reality and not a very appealing one at 
that. Alaimo (1994: 147-148) writes: 
If Haraway's argument for machine/body blurring is to make our 
machines less threatening, more controllable, less Other, a 
phallocentric discourse has already accomplished these goals with a 
destructive twist . . . In this culture the predominant ideology 
connected to the blurring of machines and humans is one of 
masculinist force and domination, an erotics of power particularly 
terrifying in a nuclear age. 
What Haraway does not address in a satisfactory manner then, is the fact that 
we live in a culture where a blurring of the human/machine boundary is already a 
reality (one which she is clearly very much aware of). The form that this blurring 
takes on is reflective of disconnectedness, an obsessive love for technology, and 
the power that it yields over others.35 The technophilia that marks contemporary 
35 Zimmennan's (1994: 370-372) discussion of Haraway's encouragement of women and men 
to engage with technology, also touches upon this point. With reference to extreme fonns that 
the fascination with virtual reality threatens to take on, he (1994: 372) writes: "this fantasy is 
the latest version of the death denying masculinist ego's denial of mortality, limitation, and 
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Western culture is an extension of a culture characterised by domination of 
others and a relationship with technology that has allowed extensive damage of 
the natural environment, and continues to pose great threats and risks to our 
natural environment. In Alaimo's opinion, these are obstacles that the cyborg 
does not seem to be able to avoid or overcome. It fails to convince that the 
pleasures of boundary confusion are of a sort that can disengage technophilia 
from a phallocentric politics of domination, and that a feminist technophilic 
position such as the one endorsed by Haraway, does not merely bolster the 
dominant technoglorification that functions to the detriment of women and 
nature (Alaimo, 1994: 148). As we have seen however, Haraway does not 
pretend to give any guarantees, she seems only too aware of the dangers that 
lurk in the figure of the cyborg being the "illegitimate offspring of militarism and 
patriarchal capitalism", but she expresses her hope that the cyborg "like other 
illegitimate offspring" will be "exceedingly unfaithful to its origins". 
It appears that Haraway is calling upon feminists to overcome their aversion to 
technology and engage with it in a responsible manner. In my understanding she 
seems to want to communicate that given the power that technology can 
potentially have over our lives, we simply have to face up to the impact of 
technological advancement and take responsibility for our machines in order to 
prevent them from dominating us. This is the only hope that exists for thwarting 
the relations of domination that are facilitated by technological advancement on 
the one hand, and for challenging the dominant cultural role and meaning of 
technology as an extension of the alienated disembodied mind. The question that 
follows is whether or how the cyborg can be shown to be different? Is there 
anything about the cyborg that would prevent it from simply following the 
patterns already firmly entrenched in Western culture? The moment has 
therefore arrived for us to determine whether the figure of the cyborg is 
competent to actively challenge and subvert the destructive manifestations of 
technological progress. Keeping in mind these questions, I would now like to 
move on to another aspect of the cyborg that has caused discomfort. Linked to 
the issues pointed out above, an examination of this problematic can shed light 
on our final valuation of the figure of the cyborg. 
corporeality". 
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iii) Radical differentiation 
In the discussion of the figure of the cyborg, it was observed that the highly 
differentiated cyborg threatens to realise a vision of the wholly autonomous, 
independent (read: disconnected) individual, a figure which is looked upon with 
little short of horror. Aware of the dangerous ground she occupies, Haraway 
introduces the notion of "affinity" as a mechanism to curb the cyborg's radical 
differentiation into infinity. This signals an attempt to make political engagement 
central to the life of the cyborg along with a "no-nonsense commitment" to 
political transformation. Affirming her departure from identity politics, she ( 1 991: 
155) writes: "Affinity: related not by blood, but by choice, the appeal of one 
chemical nuclear group for another, avidity". Translated into Dutch it reads 
"Affiniteit: met elkaar verbonden niet door het bloed, maar deur keuze, de 
aantrekkingskracht van een nucleaire groep door een andere, begeerte" (Prins, 
1994: 81-82). It is a notion of affinity formulated in these terms that cast doubt 
on the significance of the cyborg's yearning to connect. The cyborg is said to 
strive towards connection and connect it does, to the extent that some 
commentators have asked whether the cyborg "knows how to say no" (Crosby, 
1989: 208), which brings us to the question "what serves as motivation for the 
cyborg's connections?" In this regard, Prins writes: 
Een cyborg kiest haar partners op grond van aantrekkingskracht -
maar hoe goed is haar oordeelsvermogen eigentlik? En mocht dat 
oordeelsvermogen betrouwbaar zijn, is aantrekkingskracht eigentlik 
wei voldoende basis voor het aangaan van een politieke binding? 
Moet er ook niet nog zoiets "ouderwets" zijn soos een goed doel 
waarvoor je de gesamentlike verbinding aangaat. De cyborg verhoudt 
zich tot de "ander" aileen op grond van aantrekkingskracht en 
begeerte.36 
This flaw in the figure of the cyborg is not inconsistent with the depiction of the 
cyborg as rootless, playful entity that is bound by nothing, having no 
36 Approximate translation: A cyborg chooses her partners on the basis of attraction - but how 
good is her judgment really? And may that judgment be reliable, is attraction a sufficient basis 
for forming political alliances? Should there not be something as "old fashioned" such as a 
good cause that we forge joint alliances for? The cyborg connects with the "other" only on the 
grounds of attraction and desire. 
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subconscious and no awareness that something may be amiss. Being fearless, 
the cyborg affirms all contradictions and ambivalences that come her way. This 
lack of vulnerability (which can also be read as a lack of connectedness in any 
significant sense), is what makes it impossible for the cyborg to feel with the 
other, she apparently has no experience of pain, a basic awareness that makes 
us strive for a better world.37 In conclusion Prins (1992: 82) writes: 
AI bewonder ik de cyborg om haar creativiteit, de manier waarop ze 
zogenaamde natuurlijke grenzen ontkent, en wars is van elke 
zuiwerheidsideologie, en ben ik jaloers op haar speelsheid en 
onkonvensionalitiet - de vonk slaat niet over. 38 
That the cyborg forges connections purely on the basis of attraction seems to 
locate the cyborg uncomfortably close to an intensified version of the self-
interested, autonomous independent self, eliciting much concern (Doanne, 1989: 
211 ). Seen in this light, severe doubt is indeed cast on the likelihood that the 
cyborg is competent to make no-nonsense commitments to social issues and 
political transformation. 
In the final analysis then, the figure of the cyborg can be shown to lack the 
features that are required to render it a viable or desirable alternative notion of 
the self. One of the main weaknesses of the cyborg lies in its inability to 
critically reflect on the ethical status and implications of its desires which I hope 
to have shown, is consistent with the particular form that its radically 
differentiated character takes on. 39 It is in the light of these observations that I 
would now like to turn to an evaluation of the lnappropriate/d Other and the 
situated self as alternative conceptions of a more specific (female) feminist self 
beyond dualism and essentialism. 
37 See Doanne's (1989) article, Cyborgs, Origins, and Subjectivity, for putting forth a similar 
argument. 
38 Approximate translation: Although I admire the cyborg for her creativity, the manner in 
which she disavows so-called natural boundaries, and is loathe of every ideology of pureness, 
and although I am jealous of her playfulness and unconventionality- she fails to convince. 
39 For example, how likely is it that a young mobile and technophilic urban individualist will 
critically reflect on the environmental impact of the high tech consumer goods s/he so often 
desires? Will s/he refrain from buying a product s/he can afford on the basis that the core 
components was produced in a low-income country where workers are not allowed to 
unionize and have to work 15 hours a day? 
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Before I proceed to discuss the lnappropriate/d Other as alternative conception 
of the (female) feminist self, I would like to make a remark on this endeavour. As 
this discussion is framed within the context of ecofeminist thinking and a central 
point of departure in ecofeminist thinking is the argument that there exists a 
historical and conceptual link between the domination and subordination of 
women and nature. To conceive of an ecological feminist notion of the self is 
therefore incomplete if attention is not paid to how the notion of a feminist self 
can be reconceptualised beyond dualism and essentialism. In the light of the 
contributions that are made towards the articulation of a female feminist self in 
the previous chapters, all of which have displayed shortcomings to a greater or 
lesser degree, we are compelled to look further into other possibilities. As I have 
argued and demonstrated elsewhere, such an (ecological) notion of a feminist 
self is also a significant moment in the layers that constitute the ecological 
feminist notion the self. 
5.2 An assessment of the lnappropriate/d Other and the situated self 
In the discussion of the figure of the cyborg, Haraway's aspiration to move 
beyond gender was observed. At the same time she also supports the 
articulation of a notion of a female feminist self beyond dualism and 
essentialism.40 The ambiguity that this creates is the result of her commitment to 
destabilising and subverting dualism and essentialism through an endorsement of 
the free play of differences on the one hand, and on the other an awareness of 
the historical significance of articulating differences. 
It is quite evident that Haraway rejects a notion of the female self that is 
articulated in biological essentialist terms, and that she views a notion of the 
feminine self articulated in terms of relationality as complementary to the 
masculine self and therefore perfectly consistent with patriarchal social 
structures. Similar to Plumwood, who we have seen endorses a pluralist 
feminine self, Haraway opposes discarding a notion of a female feminist self,41 
and argues that the articulation of such a notion should be conducted in a 
40 This is stated explicitly in her essay titled Ecce Homo, Ain't (Ar'n't) I a Woman and 
lnappropriateld Others: the Human in a Posthuman Landscape' (1992b: 96). 
41 In this chapter, a shift can be detected from the "female self' or "feminine self' to a "(female) 
feminist subjectivity" which is discussed as Haraway's contribution to the articulation of an 
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critically affirmative mode.42 The notion of the lnappropriate/d Other expresses 
such a critical affirmative moment, although Haraway takes this project one step 
further. As we have seen, a salient feature of the lnappropriate/d Other is the 
emphasis on differences. Feminist subjectivity is introduced as organised along 
diverse axes of differences, thus allowing space for the acknowledgement of 
complexly differentiated subjectivities that are socially and discursively 
constructed. The heterogeneity of the lnappropriate/d Other as alternative notion 
of female subjectivity therefore corrects the shortcoming displayed in 
Plumwood's endorsement of a pluralist feminine self that exhibits a sensitivity to 
differences, although an adequate engagement with differences between women 
is wanting. 
The accommodation and affirmation of radical differentiation is a salient feature 
also of the situated self - not only is respect for differences central to the 
articulation of the situated self, but the situated self itself is radically 
differentiated. Haraway's consistent emphasis on differences has led me to ask 
yet again whether holding this view does not function to the detriment of 
feminist politics. As we have seen however, Haraway's notion of affinity acts to 
curb radical differentiation which in turn is enabling for political engagement. 
However it can still be asked what grounds affinity, or, how is affinity 
established if there seems to be so little, in fact, if we are to take Haraway 
seriously, apparently nothing that connects women. Formulated differently, what 
would motivate the enactment of affinity in the face of radical differentiation? 
For Haraway to take in this position, is to place herself in direct opposition to the 
ecofeminist valuation of some form of connectedness or continuity as conducive 
to ethical behaviour and similarly, political engagement. This is where Haraway's 
position becomes interesting, because in her view, political engagement (and I 
presume ethical behaviour), on the grounds of affinity is perfectly possible 
despite radical differences. As I interpret it then, affinity can be established not 
on shared identity, but rather a commitment to specific political issues shared by 
different women. 43 
~ecological) notion of a feminist self. 
2 Coincidentally Haraway (1992b: 96) uses the exact words in her discussion of emerging 
feminist theories of "gendered racial subjectivities". 
43 Moreover, to envision the basis for political engagement in these terms, is in effect an 
invitation to all of those individuals who are committed to particular causes, thus enabling the 
formation of political alliances that resists any exclusivist tendencies. 
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This brings us full circle. In the light of the above, is it not, at closer examination 
of the lnappropriate/d Other, possible to assert that some degree of connection 
can be asserted on the grounds of otherness. Unlike the dualistically and 
essentialistically construed notion of the other, this otherness is an expression of 
lnappropriate/d Otherness: the realm of the other is not fixed and accommodates 
a whole range of complexly differentiated positions. lnappropriate/d Otherness 
marks a resistance to and transformation of the dualistically conceived other, 
which is suggestive of a critical positioning that presumably all those who fall 
into the domain of lnappropriate/d Other share. In the light of the above, is it not 
reasonable to ask whether it is not such a critical positioning that connects 
different women? This is consistent with Hampshire's (1995: 95, 99) suggestion 
that "dissonance" as an attribute of lnappropriate/d Others and the "complex 
positions" of situated selves, is what connects women (and others). 
Having argued that some kind of connectedness, (albeit no longer dualistically 
conceived of in terms of an essentialist "identity"), can be discerned in the 
notions of the lnappropriate/d Other and situated self, it may be asked if 
otherness thus conceived does not provide a possible basis for expressing 
solidarity also with nature. However, a nagging question continues to trouble 
me. Locating connectedness in the realm of the lnappropriate/d Other and 
situated self, is fine and well and can be argued to facilitate organizing political 
action and ethical conduct. However, where does this leave us with regard to 
those individuals who do not share progressive political convictions? What can 
we appeal to when we are faced with the master who refuses to acknowledge 
the other? Is the above formulated notion of the self not comparable to 
"preaching to the converted"? Is it sufficient to locate connectedness amongst 
those who understand themselves as in solidarity with the other? On what basis 
can we convince the master of his responsibility to ethically treat and engage 
with the other, in particular, the natural environment? Before returning to this 
obstacle, I would like pay attention to Haraway's rearticulation of the concept of 
"nature". 
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5.3 Nature as Coyote Trickster 
It is quite evident that, by conceiving of nature as "Coyote Trickster" Haraway 
distinguishes her position from some (cultural) ecofeminists' tendency to 
uncritically celebrate and endorse a notion of nature as goddess, or nurturing 
mother. Although the appeal to these images marks an attempt to transform 
nature from passive resource into an active agent, they continue to be highly 
problematic. Not only is such figuring consistent with the conception of nature 
as "threatening and withholding mother" (which, as we have seen, plays in the 
hands of those who see "taming and controlling" nature as the suitable 
treatment of nature) it also reinforces stereotypical images of nature which 
renders it still trapped in dualism (Zimmerman, 1994: 364). By not formulating 
nature in "overtly gendered" terms, Haraway steers clear from potentially 
debilitating images (Alaimo: 1994: 145). Moreover, her visualisation of nature as 
Coyote Trickster is decidedly nonanthropocentric. Casting nature as active agent 
succeeds in moving beyond dualism in that whilst no longer "an ahistorical 
passive resource for human domination", the image of the Coyote remains within 
the realm of nature, thus resisting assimilation and denial of difference. Nature 
as active agent thus resists not only "glorified mystification" but also 
destabilises the active/passive, human/nature, knower/known, user/used 
dualisms upon which an epistemology and politics of nature is based (Alaimo, 
1994: 145). For these reasons, it is not surprising that Haraway's figure of 
nature as Coyote Trickster has been received with approval by ecological 
(Zimmerman, 1994) and ecofeminist thinkers (Warren 1987; Hampshire, 1995; 
Alaimo, 1994) alike. 
Haraway's conception of nature described above indeed serves to establish 
continuity between humans and nature in a different, albeit analogous manner to 
that of Plumwood's notion of continuity between humans and nature. If we 
recall, Plumwood transforms the dualistic relation between humans and nature 
by establishing continuity between humans and nature on the ground of agency, 
whilst at the same time emphasising the acknowledgement of differences.44 
44 Establishing continuity in this way improves upon the transgression of boundaries 
characteristic of the cyborg, that is, continuity between humans and nature formulated in 
terms of agency suggests an acknowledgement and respect for nature's difference. The 
universe of the cyborg is of course also marked by differences, but as we have seen such an 
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Interestingly, Haraway (1992c: 90) expresses an explicit appreciation for 
"continuity, connection and conversation" as conducive to ethical conduct in our 
relation with "other worlds", also with the natural environment. This she 
qualifies by stating "without the frame that leads to essentialism" (Haraway, 
1992c: 90). Illuminating her point she (1992c: 90) writes: "[e]ssentialism 
depends on reductive identification, rather than ethical relation, with other 
worlds, including with ourselves. It is the paradox of continuity and alien 
relationality that sustains the tension ... " (my emphasis, FM). It is in the light of 
this assertion that we may ask whether this does not imply an ecological 
dimension to her notions of the situated self and by implication also the 
lnappropriate/d Other?45 From an ecological perspective then, the lnappropriate/d 
Other and situated self in particular are cast in a favourable light. As alternative 
notions of feminist subjectivity that are continuous with nature as active 
material-semiotic agent, these two notions meet the requirement of formulating 
an ecological notion of a feminist self. It still remains to be seen, however, 
whether such a reconceptualisation satisfies the requirements needed for an 
adequately formulated ethical relation between self and nature. 
5.4 Social nature and a politics of articulation 
In the preceding section I pointed out that Haraway's rearticulation of nature as 
active agent establishes continuity between humans and nature which is 
conducive to ethical behaviour. This in turn can be brought in relation with 
Plumwood's endeavour to establish continuity between humans and nature. In 
what follows, I would like assess Haraway's notions of social nature, artifactual 
nature and her politics of articulation. Marking her commitment to non-dualism 
on the one hand and concurrently a commitment to an inclusive politics, 
Haraway's conception of nature as social and artifactual emphasises the social, 
that is human, dimension of nature. As we have seen, Haraway rejects the 
notion of nature as something out there that needs to be saved, and insists on 
giving acknowledgement to those people for whom nature is a partner in a 
mutual struggle to survive. In doing so, she also candidly reminds us that nature 
acknowledgement of differences is not sufficient as it does not necessarily entail or guarantee 
a respect for differences. 
45 That the lnappropriate/d Other also functions as an alternative notion of the human, renders 
it an alternative notion of the self with an ecological character that is not necessarily gender 
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conceived in typically Western terms is a place that only the elite have access to 
in any case, a place which can and could only have become "wilderness" at the 
expense of the indigenous inhabitants whose livelihoods depend/ad on nature.46 
Haraway's endorsement of a politics of articulation is however not to deny the 
role of other articulators, but rather signals an attempt to convey the importance 
of giving others a voice -those others, human and unhuman whose "voices" are 
often obliterated by the authority of the "experts" (1992a: 314-315). 
In the light of the above, two questions come to mind. Although the notion of 
social nature is definitely one I would support, I do wonder how this notion can 
help us to prevent the destruction of those parts of nature that are no longer the 
habitat of indigenous peoples. Perfectly in keeping with the notion of social 
nature this obstacle is resolved by the fact that Haraway does not perceive the 
act of articulation to be the privilege of indigenous peoples only, thus making it 
perfectly possible for those who care to articulate their case. Haraway's 
invokement of relationality becomes significant here. However, whilst in 
agreement with the need for an inclusive politics, I still wonder whether a 
politics of articulation, whilst most certainly necessary, is a sufficient strategy to 
follow in addressing environmental issues. What mechanisms does Haraway's 
position offer to prevent a democratically arrived at decision to destroy a 
rainforest? It seems that here, a more substantive valuation of nature is called 
for. It is here that Plumwood's more sophisticated and detailed exposition of 
nature formulated in the context of environmental ethics, provides substantive 
ethical criteria with which to evaluate the outcome and quality of democratic 
decisions. Her conception of nature as entity that flourishes independently from 
humans, can be argued to have an important role to play when we come to 
stand before a situation as the one described above. It is somewhat ironical then 
(given that at first glance Haraway seems to be more of a difference theorist 
than Plumwood) that it is Plumwood's insistence on nature's independence, 
concurrent with her consistent formulation of nature in terms of continuity and 
specific, whilst at the same time accommodating differences. 
4 Plumwood's (1993: 162) view on this point shows a marked resemblance to Haraway's in 
that she asserts that "stereotyping wilderness in either of these ways, as Same or Stranger, 
indicates the dilemmas of difference symptomatic of unresolved dualism ... further problems 
are created by hyperseparated understandings of the concept of wilderness which demands 
apartness of nature to the point of insisting that there can be no human influence at all on the 
genuinely natural". 
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difference, that offers us with a way out of this dilemma. Plumwood's argument 
is that we need to reconceive our relationship with the natural environment from 
one that is hyperseparated to one that is continuous. The notion of continuity 
that she endorses is formulated with the explicit intent to generate a relationship 
of respect and care based on an acknowledgement of difference. In doing so, 
she goes one step further than Haraway to emphasise that for the flourishing of 
differences, an acknowledgment of and respect for autonomy and independence 
is a prerequisite. 
This brings us back to the figure of the cyborg, which presents us with an 
alternative to the isolated individual self which characterises modernist or 
Cartesian epistemology. The cyborg is an open system that is connected to its 
environment. In this way the dualist split between humans and nature is 
overcome. But to get rid of dualism and to acknowledge that humans are 
connected with nature does not amount to much from an environmental 
perspective since it does not guarantee a responsible interaction with that with 
which you connect. In a patriarchal marriage no one will dispute the fact that the 
husband and wife are connected, but whether they have an equal relationship in 
which they engage with each other in a morally responsible way by respecting 
the autonomy and independence of each other (which makes possible a respect 
for difference) is certainly disputable. In other words, the fact that the cyborg is 
connected to nature does not mean the cyborg will respect the autonomy and 
independence (read: difference) of nature. It is entirely possible to destroy that 
with which you are connected. Which in its turn implies the importance of 
safeguarding the independence or difference of nature. Plumwood provides one 
such a safeguard by arguing that nature should be morally considerable on the 
grounds that natural entities have a good of their own towards which they strive 
intentionally. In the final analysis of Haraway's politics of articulation, the 
difference between Haraway and Plumwood can be described as follows. 
Plumwood (1996: 140), who also stresses the importance of the free flow of 
information and communication, formulates this point succinctly: 
It is increasingly apparent that the "interest group" politics of actually 
existing democracy is inadequate for ecological protection: it cannot 
create stable measures for the protection of nature and is unable to 
recognise that nature is not just another interest group or another 
speaker, but the condition of all our interests and all our speech. 
6. Conclusion 
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From the above, it is evident that the figure of the cyborg is one that has many 
facets, some of them which have more or less to contribute to the articulation of 
an ecological feminist notion of the self beyond dualism and essentialism. 
Articulated in the "belly of the monster", the figure of the cyborg is presented as 
a radically differentiated poststructuralist entity that takes pleasure in 
destabilising boundaries previously held sacred. The cyborg's disruption of the 
dualisms that underpin sexism, racism, colonialism, and naturism is most 
appealing. Despite the attraction that these characteristics of the cyborg hold, 
caution is in order. This regards the serious questions can be raised concerning 
the overtly technophilic character of the cyborg. Already a salient feature of 
masculinist Western culture, such a technophilia is viewed as promoting an 
eroticisation of domination of others and as fuelling a rapacious destruction and 
degradation of the natural environment. Concurrently, severe reservations are 
expressed with regard to what seems to be a dangerous leaning towards a 
reinforcement and intensification of the disembodied, highly individualist self. 
Seduced by the quest for total control over nature and human limits, such a 
notion of the self displays a disturbing disconnectedness from material reality. 
This distorted view of humans as invincible is in keeping with a disregard of our 
dependence on nature not only for the survival of humans, but also life on earth 
as we know it. 
Despite its non-dualist character, the radical differentiatedness of the cyborg 
gives reason for pause. As I have observed, the cyborg seems unable to 
establish or affirm a relation of significant (ethical) connection with the other. 
From an ecological perspective it is argued that to convincingly overcome the 
dualist structure of the human-nature relation, some notion of continuity 
between humans and nature that also acknowledges the other's difference, is 
required. As such, the cyborg fails to meet the requirements that are needed to 
promote an ethical engagement with the natural environment. Moreover, given 
193 
the cyborg's playful affirmation of contradictions and what seems to be an 
indiscriminate connection with everything that comes her way, along with the 
seeming lack of dis-ease with the world that she inhabits, severe doubt is cast 
on the cyborg's competence to make no-nonsense political commitments. 
In contrast, Plumwood's notion of the mutual self as an ecological self is much 
more promising. The difficulties that we are confronted with in the figure of the 
cyborg are overcome by Plumwood's strategy to establish some notion of 
continuity between humans and nature, but not at the expense of 
acknowledging differences. As we have seen, Plumwood's endorsement of the 
mutual self as ecological self successfully overcomes the human/nature dualism 
in that continuity between humans and nature is established in terms of a 
broadened notion of intentionality. This notion of intentionality denotes 
heterogeneity not only between humans and nature, but also within nature. 
Establishing continuity and difference in these terms that acknowledges the 
autonomy and independence of nature, makes possible the respect for nature's 
difference, as having needs and ends of its own that are strived towards 
intentionally. Thus conceived Plumwood's feminist notion of an ecological self is 
conducive to generating an ethical relation with the other that thwarts relations 
of domination. 
The lnappropriate/d Other and situated self (albeit different instances of the 
cyborg), rectify some of the deficiencies of the cyborg. The lnappropriate/d 
Other, is articulated as an alternative female feminist subjectivity that is socially 
(materially) and discursively (symbolically) constructed along variable axes of 
differences. Given its critical and reconstructive affirmation of otherness along 
with a thorough engagement with differences between and within women, this 
notion of a female feminist subjectivity is positively received. Moreover, 
regarding the question how to conceive of an ecological notion of a feminist self 
that resists an essentialist relation of identification between women and nature 
without forsaking women's alliance with nature, the question is posed whether 
shared otherness (lnappropriate/d otherness) can not be fruitfully employed here. 
The suggestion is made that lnappropriate/d otherness can be viewed as a basis 
for alliance not only between different women, but also for situating women 
with nature. This proposal receives further support in Haraway's discussion of 
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the situated self as alternative female knowing subject that overcomes the sharp 
separation between the knowing subject and object of knowledge. Here 
Haraway's depiction of nature as material semiotic actor that refuses to be 
pinned down and controlled also emerges as lnappropriate/d Other. The 
ecological character of Haraway's notion of female feminist subjectivity is laid 
bare by sharing with nature a socially and discursively constructed complexly 
differentiated lnappropriate/d otherness. 
Compared to Plumwood's notion of a pluralist feminine self that fails to 
overcome universalising female identity, these notions of female feminist 
subjectivity pose a more viable alternative. In keeping with the development in 
contemporary feminist theory, the situated self and lnappropriate/d Other are 
complexly differentiated embodied subjectivities that are socially and discursively 
inscribed. In contrast to the cultural ecofeminist valorisation of the female body, 
the embodiedness that these notions of female subjectivity denotes, emphasises 
the materiality of subjectivity. That is, the body is biologically, socially and 
discursively marked. The appeal to embodiedness is not to lapse into a 
regressive essentialism, the marked body is an interpreted body, but the body is 
not a clean slate that passively receives inscriptions. Embodied subjectivity, in 
terms of which the body is recognised as bio-cultural being, is to emphasise the 
materiality of discourse and therefore the cultural and social specificity as 
opposed to the neutrality of subjectivity. 
Haraway's conception of nature as Coyote Trickster that locates agency in 
nature, signals a creative transformation of nature as it has traditionally been 
conceived, and resists a lapse into anthropocentrism. Consistent with the 
ecological character of the female feminist subjectivity noted above, this 
refiguration of nature coincides with Plumwood's nature as continuous but also 
different from humans. As lnappropriate/d Other - which we have seen is a 
differentiated other - the differences within nature seems to be accommodated 
as well. In keeping with her integration of the social and discursive, the material 
and symbolical, another notion of nature is introduced by Haraway. 
The importance of Haraway's politics of articulation that is informed by a 
conception of nature as social nature, lies in its appeal to give equal 
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consideration to the arguments and interests that are articulated by those whose 
(complexly differentiated voices) are often silenced by the authority of the 
experts. Haraway's employment of the notion of relationality is important in this 
regard. In the context of social nature, relationality acquires the meaning of living 
in material relationship with and close proximity to nature. This might come 
across as privileging the voices not only of those who see nature as partner in a 
mutual struggle to survive, but also those who are traditionally identified with 
nature, women and others. Haraway avoids the charge of privileging the voices 
of those that live in and are perceived as occupying a closer proximity to nature 
by stressing that relationality is not restricted to a physical or symbolical 
proximity to nature. What is communicated here is that the different relations to 
nature that can be identified, for example the woman's relation to the fetus, has 
to be acknowledged and taken seriously so that those who are directly affected 
are not silenced by the experts. In this way, compensation for the domination 
and subordination of the other can take place in a setting that is predisposed to 
negotiation and communication. Like Plumwood who also stresses the 
embeddedness of self in relationships, Haraway also rethinks nature on a 
conceptual level, as artifact and Coyote Trickster. Haraway's inclusive politics of 
articulation therefore deserves serious consideration and could be employed to 
address a wide range of political issues. This brings us to Haraway's 
engagement with technology. 
Although the cyborg as half-human half-machine is most definitely not a 
desirable alternative notion of an ecological feminist self, Haraway's 
confrontation of the powerful impact of technology deserves recognition. Unlike 
Haraway, Plumwood avoids the issue of technology in her formulation of self 
and concomitant ethic, which is most unfortunate. Haraway's stance towards 
technology is insightful in that she resists the temptation to demonise 
technology or to avoid the topic altogether. Aware of the risks involved in a 
culture marked by escalating technological advancement she calls upon us to 
educate ourselves and actively engage with these developments so as to curtail 
its harmful effects on humans and nature. 
Significant comparisons can be drawn between cyber-(eco)feminism and critical-
transformative ecofeminism. This is made apparent by the fact that like 
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Plumwood whose notion of the mutual self is a post-rationalist feminist 
subjectivity, Haraway submits the lnappropriate/d Other also as an alternative 
notion of the human in a post-human landscape. Like the mutual self then, the 
lnappropriate/d Other is not necessarily female, but it allows for the articulation 
of specificity. In this regard it can be asked whether such an inclusive feminist 
subjectivity does not erase differences that continue to affect different social 
groups. This can be illustrated by playing off the critically positioned black South 
African woman against the critically positioned white South African male. Given 
the complexly differentiated character of the lnappropriate/d Other however, 
differences in terms of relative positions of power and meaning are not negated. 
I would like to conclude that despite their obvious discrepancies, there are 
certain points of significant overlap in the respective notions of the self and 
nature that cyber-(eco)feminism and critical-transformative ecofeminism 
articulate. As we have seen, some aspects of Haraway's notions of the self and 
nature exhibit significant features that are required towards a conceptualisation 
of an ecological feminist notion of the self. This is particularly evident in her 
articulation of the lnappropriate/d Other and situated self as alternative female 
feminist subjectivities. Haraway's notion/s of female feminist subjectivity offer a 
more suitable alternative to the pluralist feminist self that Plumwood endorses. 
This is not only for its complexly differentiated socially discursive character, but 
also for the ecological dimensions of these notions of a feminist self. As 
Plumwood also emphasises, this makes possible a positioning of women as 
situated with nature. Haraway's articulation of nature as artifact and as Coyote 
Trickster that imparts agency to nature is also most commendable, not only for 
moving beyond anthropocentrism, but for establishing continuity between 
humans and nature. In the final analysis I would like to remark that Haraway's 
concepts of nature are not wholly unproblematic. Articulated within the context 
of feminist epistemology, the refiguration of nature as Coyote Trickster is of 
course a welcome departure from the harsh separation between knowing subject 
and the object of knowledge. From an environmental perspective however, it can 
be asked whether this figuration of nature is indeed sufficient. This moment of 
pause is consistent with the hesitation that is expressed with regard to the 
concept of social nature and a politics of articulation. Both these notions have 
been positively assessed, but whether Haraway's reinvention of nature allows 
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adequate space for the independence and autonomy of nature as an other that 
has goods and ends of its own, is uncertain. 
Having discussed the notions of the self and the concomitant ethic or politics 
that are endorsed by the respective positions of cultural, critical-transformative 
and cyber-(eco)feminism, I would now like to close this inquiry into the 
contributions that the respective ecofeminist positions make towards the 
articulation of an ecological feminist notion of the self beyond dualism and 
essentialism. This will entail giving an overview of the notions of the self and 
ethic or politics, and evaluating them with reference to the question that informs 
this research project, namely, "What are the contributions that cultural, critical-
transformative and cyber-(eco)feminism respectively make towards the 
articulation of an ecological feminist notion of the self that would generate the 
ethical treatment of nature beyond dualism and essentialism?n This is done in 
the last section of this thesis titled Conclusion. 
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Conclusion 
In what follows, I would like to conclude this inquiry into the contributions that 
cultural ecofeminism, critical-transformative ecofeminism and cyber-(eco}feminism 
make towards the articulation of an ecological feminist notion of the self that can 
generate an ethical relation with nature beyond dualism and essentialism. This will 
consist of a summary of my findings followed by a few concluding observations. 
Before I proceed however, I would like to make a few preliminary remarks. As a 
discipline of thought, environmental philosophy which originated in the mid 1960's 
and early 1970's is still in an early stage of development. Along with the nature of 
the literature at hand and the fact that we, at the dawn of a new millennium, are in 
the midst of a cultural period of transition characterised by a mistrust of coherent 
grand narratives, it has to be kept in mind that this study was not embarked upon 
with the objective of arriving at any fixed or final answers. I therefore appeal to the 
reader to suspend for a moment the quest for clear and distinct answers and 
graciously allow for one open-ended answer to the enormous challenges and 
pressing concerns that we are presented with in the face of the environmental 
crisis. From the outset these qualifications characterised this study, the aim of 
which can be described as an ecological and feminist exploration of different 
notions of the self and an associated ethic. Diffen;mt aspects of these notions were 
revealed as having the potential to be fruitfully incorporated as different dimensions 
of an ecological feminist notion of the self. It must be stressed, however, that an 
articulation towards such an ecological feminist notion of the self has _no pretense 
to solve our ecological and related political and socio-economic problems, but, as 
one response and modest contribution to addressing the environmental crisis·, it is 
certainly deserving of our attention. 
~n the first chapter, titled Cultural ecofeminism, we have seen that the cultural 
ecofeminist response to the environmental crisis as an effect of patriarchy is an 
affirmation of women's difference and what is perceived as constituting this 
difference. The implicit or explicit argument that is forwarded by cultural 
ecofeminists is that women are better equipped to address the environmental crisis, 
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both ethically and politically. In this discussion, I have tried to limit my focus to the 
ethical aspects of their arguments, although the two can necessarily not remain 
completely separate. 
In the light of the research question informing this study, I have concluded that, 
despite their shortcomings, there are two main contributions that cultural 
ecofeminism makes toward the articulation of an ecological feminist notion of the 
self and concomitant ethic. This lies in the cultural ecofeminist insistence that we 
should reconceptualise our relation with the natural environment in terms that 
overcome the disconnectedness and alienation fueling the domination and 
subjugation of nature. As a result, some form of relationality is endorsed, and finds 
expression in the female and feminine self that are affirmed by cultural 
ecofeminists. 
Insofar as a revaluation and celebration of women, nature and the body signals an 
unambiguous rejection of the patriarchal inferiorisation of women and nature, 
cultural ecofeminism's strategy to affirm women's difference can be positively 
appraised. Notwithstanding the magnitude of problems surrounding the cultural 
ecofeminist valorisation and celebration of women, the body and nature, an 
emphasis on difference opens up the way for the daunting task of thinking and 
rethinking difference, also in the context of ecological philosophy. As I have tried to 
show, to effect lasting transformation in a culture that is marked by dualistically 
construed hierarchical power relations, more is required than the largely uncritical 
affirmation of what is devalued and regarded as inferior in Western patriarchal 
culture. 
The most prominent inadequacies that have been identified in this position concern 
the dualist and essentialist, or universalist character, of the notion/s of the female 
and feminine self in cultural ecofeminist thinking. As I have argued and illustrated, 
these problems can be traced back to a reductionist focus on patriarchy as the 
cause of the oppression and subjugation of both women and nature, along with an 
inadequate engagement with the nature and functioning of dualism. As we have 
seen, a rejection of the male and masculine self is followed by an appeal to 
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"women's experience" as providing us with characteristics and values that are 
desirable, particularly from an ecological perspective. This is accompanied by a 
more or less uncritical affirmation and privileging of the female and feminine self. 
Apart form being criticised as reinforcing dualism through the strategy of reversal, 
the endorsement of these notions are revealed as bearing witness to a naive 
assumption that women are not implicated in naturism or racism. 
The continued entrapment of cultural ecofeminism in dualism and essentialism was 
shown to manifest itself in a number of ways. For example, the essentialism (which 
is part and parcel of dualism) of the female self as a result of its unambiguously 
biologistic and naturalistic character, is untenable from both a feminist and 
ecological perspective. As I have shown, the strategy of replacing a male self with a 
female self boils down to a simple reversal of dualism and reinforcement of 
damaging essentialist images of women. From an ecological perspective, the 
message that is thus conveyed is that men are inherently disconnected from the 
natural environment whilst women are connected and should be put in charge of 
"taking care of nature". Here we come face to face with another questionable effect 
of insisting on women's privileged relation with nature, whether this is grounded in 
a biological or social argument. Not only does this amount to a reversal of dualism, 
it also prevents other social groups from shouldering their share of the responsibility 
for environmental destruction as well. As such we have a scenario where it is once 
again women who (are expected to) clear up whilst others continue their business 
undisturbed. As we have seen, women's privileged relation with nature is employed 
with another (related) objective in mind, and that is that women are capable of 
making a superior contribution to solving environmental problems. Once again we 
are faced with the reversal of dualism, and essentialism or universalism. 
By taking these points of critique seriously, a central challenge to ecological feminist 
thinking emerges. This is to take up the task of carving out a strategy that 
overcomes the shortcomings noted above, but without forsaking an insistence on 
women's difference and their continued alliance with nature. The reason why this 
challenge is presented as pivotal to the ecofeminist project is because an insistence 
on women's difference is misdirected if it is employed to suggest that women are 
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"better" than men. This argument is to distort the ecological feminist project 
entirely. An insistence on difference is a political act that demands 
acknowledgement and respect (read: ethical treatment) not insofar one conforms to 
the norms and criteria of those in power, but in an insistence on the freedom to 
challenge and subvert existing structures of meaning and relations of power. 
Moreover, as I will argue shortly, it is not sufficient to appeal to the social 
constructedness of female gender identity in order to remedy the essentialist 
overtones that an affirmation of difference has thus far invoked. Adequate 
measures have to be taken to prevent the universalisation of female identity. This 
however, as we shall see in the summary of Critical-transformative ecofeminism, is 
not adequately addressed by appealing to a "pluralist notion of female gender 
identity" either. As I have argued in the Introduction such an undertaking is possible 
only if a shift in focus is enacted from female gender identity to a female feminist 
subjectivity that is socially and discursively constructed. 
The second notion of the self that is endorsed by cultural ecofeminism does not 
manage to secure a convincing position of difference for cultural ecofeminists 
either. Although not conceived of in biologically essentialist terms, the feminine self 
remains problematical. This is a result of its complementary character and 
subsequent continued entrapment in dualism, along with its - as already suggested 
above - universalisation of female gender identity. Moreover, to suggest that the 
feminine model of the self as an instance of a relational self can function as 
alternative self (for men and women) specifically for its ecological significance, has 
been shown to be unacceptable precisely for this entrapment in dualism. Supporting 
an androgynous self that is endorsed in an attempt to liberate the feminine model of 
the self from its dualist construal is also undesirable as such a notion of the self 
culminates in an erasure of differences. 
This point of critique brings us to another challenge to ecological feminist thinking, 
pertaining to the feminist character of an ecological self. Such a notion of an 
ecological self demands the articulation of a notion of relationality that stresses 
continuity, but not at the expense of acknowledging differences. As suggested 
above, these differences pertain to the differences between and amongst selves, 
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but also to differences between humans and nature. To conceive of an adequate 
notion of an ecological self then, requires a notion of the self that moves beyond 
anthropocentrism. This requirement was illuminated in particular by the relation of 
identification that is endorsed by cultural ecofeminists. Such a relation of 
overidentification between the self and nature necessarily results in an entrapment 
in self-referentiality that maintains a disregard for nature as having ends and needs 
of its own. As I have argued, what is needed instead is a reconceptualisation of 
nature, an undertaking which we have seen, was not successfully accomplished by 
cultural ecofeminists. The images of nature employed here consist of an affirmation 
of the regenerative qualities of nature and a depiction of nature as female on the 
one hand, along with a mystification of nature on the other. Both strategies are 
flawed, as they remain trapped in a dualist framework. 
'f._ This brings us to the second chapter, titled Critical-transformative ecofeminism. As 
in Chapter 1, the aim of this discussion was to determine the contributions made by 
this position towards the articulation of an ecological feminist notion of the self and 
an accompanying ethic beyond dualism and essentialism. An additional objective 
was to show where and to what extent the shortcomings identified in cultural 
ecofeminist thinking are overcome. In the process, the manner in which cultural and 
critical-transformative ecological feminism coincides and diverges from each other, 
was remarked upon. 
The contributions made by critical-transformative ecofeminism towards the 
articulation of an ecological feminist notion of the self and the ethic it implies, were 
approached in the light of an in depth engagement with dualism as the conceptual 
framework that grounds the twin domination of women and nature. Locating the 
domination of women and nature in dualism, critical-transformative ecofeminism 
draws attention to the network of different dualist pairs that function in a mutually 
supportive manner. As I have argued, a thorough engagement with dualism and the 
significance of acknowledging differences have significant implications for the 
articulation of an ecological feminist notion of the self beyond dualism and 
essentialism. In contrast to cultural ecofeminism then, the critical-transformative 
ecofeminist position problematises what cultural ecofeminism treats as 
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unproblematic. That is, to articulate an alternative ecological feminist notion of the 
self requires more than simply replacing a male or masculine self with a feminine 
self that reinforces dualism and essentialism. 
In her discussion of dualism, Plumwood stresses that the conceptual and material 
cannot be separated. This shift in focus from a predominantly materialist approach 
followed by cultural ecofeminism is a distinctive feature of critical-transformative 
ecofeminism. This is also manifested in the (re)constructive approach that 
characterises the contributions of critical-transformative ecofeminism toward the 
articulation of a feminist notion of an ecological self and an ecological notion of a 
female feminist self. 
As I have illustrated, Plumwood approaches her contribution towards the 
articulation of an ecological feminist notion of the self by focusing on the related 
human/nature, reason/nature and masculine/feminine dualisms. In the light of her 
strategy to move beyond dualism, she enacts a critical affirmation of female gender 
identity beyond dualism and she attempts to transform the notion of the human 
self. With regard to the latter, Plumwood initially introduces a notion of a 
degendered human with the objective of detaching the human from its overtly 
masculine character so as to provide us with a backdrop against which human 
relations of domination and instrumentalisation of nature can be transformed. As we 
have seen, this endeavour is accomplished by showing how the human/nature 
dualism can be transcended through a broadened notion of intentionality. Whilst the 
notion of the degendered human has been criticised and rejected (also by Plumwood 
herself in her later work) for an inadequate engagement with differences, the 
reconceptualisation of human-nature relations through a broadened notion of 
intentionality has been positively received. Conceiving of continuity in these terms 
provides us with a non-anthropocentric account of the inherent value of nature, 
which succeeds in establishing a notion of connectedness between humans and 
nature without forsaking the heterogeneous interests of nature. 
It has been shown that Plumwood's engagement with female gender identity was 
undertaken with two objectives in mind. The first is to untie women from their 
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"privileged" relation of identification with nature that, as it has by now been 
stressed too many times, has historically been employed to legitimise the 
oppression of women alongside that of nature. Whilst rejecting a relation of 
overidentification between women with nature, Plumwood stresses the 
undesirability of the alternative liberal strategy that entails an unambiguous and in 
some cases, a rather vehement rejection of any association of women with nature. 
For this reason Plumwood suggests neither a relation of identification with nature, 
nor a relation of opposition to nature, but one that positions women with nature. As 
we have seen, Plumwood enacts this by performing what she describes as a critical 
affirmation of female gender identity. In this way Plumwood holds on to women's 
difference, whilst also transforming, that is, dedualising female gender identity. 
Moreover, in an attempt to address the problem of universalism as a form of 
essentialism, it was shown that Plumwood endorses a pluralist notion of the female 
gender identity, hence the identification of this notion as a pluralist feminine self. In 
my understanding, Plumwood's engagement with female gender identity marks a 
movement towards the articulation of a notion of a female feminist self or 
subjectivity beyond dualism and essentialism, although this is a project that remains 
unfulfilled. In the final analysis Plumwood's notion of a pluralist feminine self indeed 
moves beyond dualism and (biological) essentialism, thus addressing the 
shortcomings identified in the notion(s) of the female and feminine self as endorsed 
by cultural ecofeminism. However, despite her consistent sensitivity towards 
differences, it was argued that she fails to adequately engage with differences 
between women. 
This brings us to Plumwood's notion of the mutual self as a feminist notion of an 
ecological self. Emphasising continuity and difference, the mutual self is a 
refinement of the relational self that is espoused by deep ecology as an ecological 
Self. The mutual self that is also a post-rationalist feminist subjectivity addresses 
the reason/nature dualism and transforms the dualist structure of the human/nature 
relation. The mutual self as post-rationalist feminist subjectivity is adapted to 
establish continuity between humans and nature. As mentioned above, this is 
achieved through a broadened notion of intentionality. Conceived of in the context 
of critical-transformative ecofeminist ethics, the mutual self as ecological self makes 
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possible the acknowledgement of nature as autonomous or independent other with 
a good of its own. The basis that critical-transformative ecofeminism provides for 
the ethical engagement with nature, which is a move away form a relation of 
(women's) identification with nature, is consistent with a shift away from an 
endorsement of "feminine" values and a restriction to a vocabulary or ethic of care. 
The values that are endorsed move beyond a restriction to mothering or motherhood 
and both Warren and Plumwood advance a range of previously marginalised moral 
concepts. Moreover, these moral concepts are transformed in a manner that is 
resistant to a construal along the reason/emotion dualism, thus detaching these 
concepts from their association with powerlessness. 
My final evaluation of this chapter is that the strength of critical-transformative 
ecofeminist contributions towards conceptualising an ecological feminist notion of 
the self, lies in its thorough engagement with the problem of dualism. The strategy 
Plumwood offers to move beyond dualism is to establish a notion of continuity 
between humans and nature without erasing differences. In my understanding, the 
success of Plumwood's approach lies in the fact that the basis she offers for 
establishing continuity transforms both self and other; and therefore differences too 
do not remain the same. For this reason Plumwood successfully addresses the 
problem of radical exclusion without lapsing into an uncritical affirmation of 
differences. At the same time she manages to avoid the pitfall of incorporation. 
Conceiving of continuity between humans and nature in terms of a broadened 
notion of intentionality offers a non-anthropocentric account of the inherent value of 
nature and of human continuity with nature. This demands a departure from the 
view of nature as instrument of the fulfillment of the needs and endeavours of man, 
calling for the consideration of nature as alike, but also unlike, having needs and 
ends of its own. 
Plumwood's endorsement of the notion of the mutual self provides us not only with 
a feminist notion of an ecological self that transforms the dualist relation between 
humans and nature. As an articulation of a post-rationalist feminist subjectivity, the 
mutual self establishes continuity also between humans on the basis of subjectivity. 
That is, this notion of the self is offered also as an alternative to a rationalist notion 
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of the self that has systematically excluded women and others from the realm of 
subjecthood. The emphasis that Plumwood places on differences in the 
rearticulation of the self as mutual self, signals an acknowledgement of differences 
between humans in terms of identity and relative positions of power. As we have 
seen, Plumwood, speaking from her locatedness as ecofeminist, performs a critical 
affirmation of a notion of female gender identity, which in itself is an 
acknowledgement of differences. However, it was concluded that Plumwood's 
endorsement of a pluralist feminine self is not altogether satisfactory. At the same 
time, as I have argued, the mutual self as post-rationalist feminist subjectivity 
invites and can accommodate the articulation also of a female feminist self. 
In the final chapter, titled Cyber-(eco)feminism, I have given an exposition of the 
notions of the self, nature and politics that are articulated from a cyber-
(eco)feminist perspective. Although cyber-(eco)feminism is not widely regarded as 
an ecofeminist position as such, the notions of the self, nature and politics as 
conceived by cyber-(eco)feminism make significant contributions towards the 
articulation of an ecological feminist notion of the self beyond dualism and 
essentialism. Moreover, these notions make visible the challenges that we are faced 
with in contemporary post-industrial, high-tech capitalist culture, challenges that are 
relevant from both feminist and ecological perspectives. As in the previous 
chapters, the exposition that was given of the different notions of the self, nature 
and politics as endorsed by cyber-(eco)feminism had the objective of determining 
the contributions that are made towards the articulation of an ecological feminist 
notion of the self beyond dualism and essentialism. Given its situatedness in 
poststructuralist philosophical thinking, an additional aim of this discussion 
emerged, which was to determine which aspects of cyber-(eco)feminist thinking are 
consistent with the articulation of an ecological feminist notion of the self. 
Moreover, in the light of the shortcomings identified specifically in the engagement 
with female gender identity as discussed by critical-transformative ecofeminism, 
whether or how cyber-(eco)feminism can make a contribution to remedying this 
deficiency was also looked into. 
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In the discussion of cyber-(eco)feminism, which is an unambiguous poststructuralist 
(eco)feminist position, it was observed that the figure of the cyborg is one that has 
many faces. As we have seen, some have more, and others less, to contribute to 
the articulation of an ecological feminist notion of the self. Articulated in a context 
that Haraway describes as "the belly of the monster" - late-201h century post-
industrialist capitalist culture - the figure of the cyborg is presented as a radically 
differentiated poststructuralist entity that is marked by the playful transgression and 
subversion of boundaries previously held sacred. The appeal of such an unabashed 
destabilisation of the powerful hierarchically structured dualisms that the cyborg 
embodies can hardly be denied. These dualisms that have underpinned the Western 
philosophical tradition, have systematically been employed in the service of sexism, 
racism, colonialism and naturism. As I have argued, however, despite the initial 
seduction that the figure of the cyborg holds, a different picture of the cyborg 
emerges at closer inspection. In the face of the challenges posed to us by escalating 
technological advancement coupled with globalisation along with an increasingly 
consumerist culture, rather than inspiring hope, the cyborg inspires great caution at 
best, and at worst, a profound feeling of dread. 
Serious questions are raised regarding the overtly technophilic character of the 
cyborg which seems to bolster the technophilia that already marks Western 
masculinist culture. This technophilia has been exposed as promoting an 
eroticisation of domination of others and as fuelling the unrestrained destruction and 
degradation of the natural environment. As such, severe reservations are expressed 
regarding what seems to be a dangerous leaning towards a reinforcement and 
intensification of the disembodied, autonomous and individualist self. Suffering from 
the illusion of total control over nature, such a notion of the self displays a 
disquieting disconnectedness from material reality. A distorted view of humans as 
invincible is in keeping with a disregard for our dependence on nature for the 
survival not only of humans, but also life on earth as we know it; a very basic 
sensibility that is completely lost sight of. 
The countenance that the cyborg takes on here, is of course perfectly consistent 
with the observation that it is precisely in its appeal that the danger of the cyborg 
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lurks. That is, the radically differentiated (non-dualist) character of the cyborg 
renders it unable to establish or affirm a relation of significant connection with the 
other. From an ecological perspective it is argued that to convincingly overcome the 
dualist structure of the human-nature relation, some notion of continuity between 
humans and nature is required. As such the cyborg fails to meet the requirements 
that are needed to promote an ethical engagement with the natural environment. 
Moreover, given the cyborg's playful affirmation of contradictions and what seems 
to be an indiscriminate connection with everything that comes her way, along with 
the seeming lack of dis-ease with the world she inhabits, severe doubt is cast on 
the cyborg's competence to make no-nonsense political commitments for working 
towards justice and equity. Similarly, the cyborg does not seem to be able to 
provide a basis for deciding on issues where the intrinsic value of nature is 
threatened by human greed or exploitative endeavours. 
As we have seen, it is specifically with respect to the cyborg that Plumwood's 
notion of the mutual self as an ecological self becomes as particularly appealing. 
The difficulties we encountered in the figure of the cyborg are overcome by 
Plumwood's strategy of establishing some notion of continuity, but not at the 
expense of acknowledging differences. As we have seen, Plumwood's endorsement 
of the mutual self as ecological self successfully addresses the human/nature 
dualism in that continuity between humans and nature is established in terms of a 
broadened notion of intentionality. The very notion of intentionality denotes 
heterogeneity, not only between humans and nature, but also within nature. 
Establishing continuity and difference in these terms, that is, that acknowledges the 
autonomy and independence of nature, makes possible a respect for nature's 
difference, as having needs and ends of its own that are strived towards 
intentionally. Thus conceived, Plumwood's feminist notion of an ecological self is 
conducive to the generation of an ethical engagement with the other that thwarts 
relations of domination. 
In the light of the shortcomings displayed by Haraway's conception of the cyborg, 
the lnappropriate/d Other and the situated self (albeit different instances of the 
cyborg), were shown to rectify many of the deficiencies of the cyborg. The 
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lnappropriateld Other is articulated as an alternative (female) feminist subjectivity 
that is socially (materially) and discursively (symbolically) constructed along variable 
axes of differences. Given its critical (read: reconstructive) affirmation of otherness 
along with a thorough engagement with differences between women and within 
women, this notion of a (female) feminist self was positively acclaimed. Moreover, 
regarding the question of how to conceive of an ecological notion of a feminist self 
that resists an essentialist relation of identification between women and nature 
without forsaking women's alliance with nature, the question was posed whether 
shared otherness (read: inappropriateld otherness, or otherness differently 
conceived) could not be fruitfully employed here. That is, an inquiry was made as to 
whether lnappropriateld Otherness can not be viewed as a basis for the alliance not 
only between women themselves, but also for the alliance of women with nature. 
This suggestion finds further support if we recall Haraway's discussion of the 
situated self as an alternative female feminist knowing subject that overcomes the 
radical separation between knowing subject and object of knowledge. Here 
Haraway's rearticulation of nature as Coyote Trickster, depicted as material-
semiotic agent, also emerges as an lnappropriateld Other. As such, on the basis of 
a shared complexly differentiated lnappropriateld Other subjectivity, the ecological 
character of Haraway's notions of female feminist subjectivity is laid bare. 
As I have observed above, the situated self that is articulated in the context of 
feminist epistemology overcomes the harsh separation between knowing subject 
and the object of knowledge. Highly differentiated and radically specific like the 
lnappropriateld Other, the situated self is also offered as (female) feminist subject. It 
was argued that in keeping with contemporary developments in feminist theory, 
these notions of female feminist subjectivity are complexly differentiated embodied 
subjectivities that are socially and discursively inscribed. As such, these notions of 
female feminist subjectivity overcome the inadequacy of Plumwood's contribution 
towards the articulation of a female feminist self, which found expression in an 
endorsement of a pluralist feminine self. Moreover, in contrast to cultural 
ecofeminists' uncritical affirmation of the female body, the embodiedness denoted 
by these notions of female subjectivity, emphasises the materiality of subjectivity. 
Materiality here denotes an embeddedness of the self, not only physically and 
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socially, but also discursively. That is, the body is biologically and socially and 
discursively marked. To appeal to embodiedness is not to lapse into a regressive 
essentialism. The marked body is an interpreted body, where the body is not a clean 
slate that passively receives inscriptions. Embodied subjectivity in terms of which 
the body is recognised as bio-cultural being, is to emphasise the materiality of 
discourse and therefore the cultural and social specificity as opposed to the 
neutrality of subjectivity. 
To come back to Haraway's conception of nature as Coyote Trickster, the location 
of agency on the side of nature has been argued to effect a creative transformation 
of nature as it has traditionally been conceived, whilst resisting a lapse into 
anthropocentrism. Consistent with the ecological character of female feminist 
subjectivity noted above, this refiguring of nature coincides to a certain extent with 
Plumwood's notion of nature as continuous but also different from humans. In 
keeping with Haraway's integration of the social and discursive, or the material and 
the symbolical, another notion of nature as social nature, emerges. This is 
illuminated by her notion of a politics of articulation. 
The significance of a politics of articulation informed by the conception of nature as 
social nature, was shown to lie in its appeal to give equal consideration to the 
arguments and interests articulated by those whose (complexly differentiated) 
voices are often silenced by the authority of the experts. Here Haraway's appeal to 
a notion of relationality is interesting. In the context of social nature, relationality 
acquires the meaning of living in a material relationship with nature and also in close 
proximity to nature. As I have noted this may come across as a privileging of the 
voices not only of those who see nature as a partner in a mutual struggle to 
survive, but also those who are traditionally identified with nature, women and 
others. Avoiding the charge of privileging the voices of those who live in, and are 
perceived as occupying a closer proximity to nature, she stresses that relationality is 
not restricted to a physical or other proximity to nature. As I have shown, what is 
communicated here is that the different relations to nature that can be identified (for 
example the woman's relation to the fetus) have to be acknowledged and taken 
seriously so that those who are directly affected, are not silenced by the so-called 
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experts. In this way compensation for the domination and subordination of the other 
can take place in a setting that is predisposed to communication and negotiation. 
Moreover, like Plumwood, who also stresses an embeddedness of the self in 
relationships, Haraway conceives of relationality in conceptual terms, which if we 
recall, was illustrated by the notions of the self and nature that she articulates. To 
come back to a politics of articulation then, such a notion of an inclusive politics 
deserves serious consideration and could be employed in addressing a range of 
political issues, including those pertaining to technological development. 
Although we have seen that the cyborg as half-human, half-machine is most 
definitely not a desirable alternative notion of an ecological feminist self, Haraway's 
confrontation of the powerful impact of technological advancement in late industrial 
Western culture is most commendable. The reason for this is that she resists the 
temptation of demonising technology altogether. In fact, as we have seen, she 
urges women especially to "take responsibility for our machines". At the same time, 
she is most definitely not uncritical of the dangers that technological advancement 
hold. That these dangers are not only social, but also ecological, is also noted. This 
is most strongly conveyed by her vehement critique of an artifactualism that is part 
and parcel of the illusion that we can know and control nature to the extent that we 
lose sight of physical nature altogether. That caution should be taken in the light of 
the risks that technological advancement hold for the natural environment, was 
pointed out. Unlike Haraway, Plumwood avoids the issue of technology in her 
formulation of the self and the concomitant ethic, which is most unfortunate. As I 
have observed, Haraway's stance towards technology is insightful in that she 
resists the temptation to demonise technology or avoid the topic altogether. Aware 
of the risks involved in a culture marked by escalating technological advancement, 
she calls upon us to educate ourselves and actively engage with these 
developments so as to curtail its harmful effects on humans and nature. 
As we have seen above, significant comparisons can be drawn between Haraway 
and Plumwood's notions of the self and nature. This is made all the more evident by 
the fact that, like Plumwood who offers the mutual self as an articulation of a post-
rationalist feminist subjectivity, Haraway has been shown to endorse the 
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lnappropriate/d Other that is a conception of the human in a post-human world. Like 
the mutual self, the lnappropriate/d Other is not necessarily female, although it 
allows for the articulation of specificity. In this regard it was asked whether 
inclusion in the realm of lnappropriate/d otherness does not level out the differences 
that continue to affect different social groups. This can be illustrated by playing off 
the critically positioned black South African woman against the critically positioned 
white South African male. As I have tried to illustrate however, given the complexly 
differentiated character of the lnappropriate/d Other, differences in terms of relative 
positions of power and meaning are not lost. 
In conclusion I would like to observe that, despite the strong divergences that 
cyber-(eco)feminism and critical-transformative ecofeminism respectively display, 
there are certain points of significant overlap in their particular conceptions of self 
and nature. Moreover, some aspects of Haraway's notions of the self and nature 
can be shown to exhibit significant features that are required towards a 
conceptualisation of an ecological feminist notion of the self. This is particularly 
evident in her articulation of the lnappropriate/d Other and situated self as 
alternative female feminist subjectivities. I argued that in the final analysis, 
Haraway's notion/s of female feminist subjectivity offer a more suitable alternative 
to the pluralist feminine self that Plumwood articulates. This is not only for its 
complexly differentiated socially and discursively constructed character, but also 
because of the ecological character of these notions of a feminist self. As 
Plumwood has also emphasised, this makes possible a positioning of women neither 
as identical nor as in opposition to nature, but situated with nature. Haraway's 
rearticulation of nature as Coyote Trickster that imparts agency on nature as 
material-semiotic agent, is also most commendable, not only for moving beyond 
anthropocentrism, but for establishing continuity between humans and nature, 
apparently without obliterating nature's differences. 
However, here I would like to make a final concluding remark that, especially in the 
light of the problematic features characterising the cyborg, Plumwood's conception 
of continuity between humans and nature in terms of a broadened notion of 
intentionality is preferred. The reason for this is that such a reconceptualisation of 
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nature takes special care to stress the autonomy and independence of the natural 
environment, which is fundamental if we are to respect the different needs and 
interests of nature. This conceptualisation of nature is therefore a more suitable 
strategy to ensure the ethical treatment of the natural environment. As such, from 
an ecological perspective in particular, Plumwood's adaptation of the mutual self as 
feminist notion of an ecological self emerges as more sophisticated. However, to be 
fair to Haraway, it has been noted that she does not set herself the task of 
articulating an ecological self. Subsequently, in the light of the compatibility of 
much of the thinking of these two positions, it can be held that the cyber-
(eco)feminism and critical-transformative ecofeminism complement and challenge 
each other in a significant manner. This means that an ethical relationship with 
nature cannot be achieved without the ecological perspective of nature as an 
independent, active agent that has goods and ends of its own that it strives 
towards intentionally. At the same time, it cannot be achieved without a feminist 
perspective that acknowledges the material and discursive construction of a 
complexly differentiated female feminist subjectivity. Further elaboration on these 
ideas however, would be the purpose of a more comprehensive inquiry than the one 
I have set out to perform in this study. 
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